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3Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that investigate how the institutions and
organization of schools affect their performance, and how neighbors and siblings
affect human capital investment decisions.
Chapter 1 studies whether the effect of a reform that substantially increased daily
instruction time in Chilean primary schools varies depending on school institu-
tions. Focusing on legacy enrollment students and exploiting an IV strategy, it
finds that gains are larger in no-fee charter schools than in public schools. Au-
tonomy over personnel decisions emerges as an important institutional feature:
to provide additional instruction hours, charter schools rely more on hiring new
teachers, and less on increasing the workload of incumbent teachers.
Chapter 2 investigates whether the decision to attend university depends on
enrollment of close neighbors. The analysis uses detailed geographic and educa-
tional information from Chile and exploits the variation in enrollment generated
by the rules that define eligibility for financial aid. The chapter shows that
close neighbors have a large and significant impact on university enrollment of
younger applicants, suggesting that policies that expand access to university gen-
erate spillovers on the peers of their direct beneficiaries. The documented effect
is particularly strong among individuals who are more likely to interact and in
areas where university attendance is low.
Chapter 3 analyzes how the probability of applying and enrolling in a particular
university (or program) changes when an older sibling enrolls in it. In both coun-
tries, universities select their students using deferred acceptance admission sys-
tems (DA). This chapter exploits thousands of sharp admission cutoffs generated
by these systems, and in a fuzzy RD setting shows that older siblings generate
significant spillovers on the application and enrollment decisions of their younger
siblings. The chapter discusses five classes of mechanisms and presents evidence
consistent with information being a relevant driver of the results.
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Chapter 1
It’s Time to Learn: School Institutions and Re-






This paper investigates whether the effects of a reform that substantially increased daily
instruction time in Chilean primary schools vary depending on school institutions.
Focusing on legacy enrollment students and exploiting an IV strategy, we find that
longer daily schedules increase reading scores at the end of fourth grade and that the
benefits are greater for pupils who began primary education in no-fee charter schools
rather than in public schools. We provide evidence that these two types of publicly
subsidized establishments, which cater to similar students but differ in the degree
of autonomy, expand the teaching input in different ways: in order to provide the
additional instruction time, no-fee charter schools rely more on hiring new teachers
and less on increasing teachers’ working hours than public schools. We also show that
additional time at school seems to be more beneficial for schoolchildren of low socio-
economic status, who have limited support at home.
Keywords: School autonomy, charter schools, instruction time.
JEL classification: I28, I24, I20.
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1.1 Introduction
Given the important role played by schools in the formation of human capital,
academics and policymakers have long been interested in understanding what makes
a school more effective. While a first branch of the literature focuses on school inputs
(i.e. class size, instruction time, teachers), a more recent one highlights the relevance
of school institutions and governance on students’ performance [Woessmann, 2016]. In-
deed, there is active research exploring the effects of granting more autonomy to schools
on learning outcomes (see section 1.2). In this paper we study if and why the effects
of expanding a specific school input –instruction time– vary across public and charter
schools. This paper therefore lies at the intersection of these two literatures, as we
address the question of whether the way in which schools are managed and organized
affects how they use the additional resources.
Studying how school institutions affect returns to additional instruction time is in-
teresting because many countries are considering devoting, or have already allocated,
substantial funds to increasing the amount of time that pupils spend at school.1 In
addition, since time is an inherently limited resource, extended school schedules reduce
the amount of time that students can dedicate to other activities. Therefore, the effect
on achievement could depend not only on the absolute quality of time use at school, but
also on its relative quality with respect to the learning opportunities available outside
of school. Hence, we also examine whether the effects of increased instruction time are
heterogeneous in terms of students’ socio-economic background.
To address these questions, we take advantage of two attractive features of the Chilean
educational system. Firstly, we exploit the passing of the Full School Day (Jornada Es-
colar Completa, or FSD henceforth) reform in 1997, which substantially increased daily
instruction time in all publicly subsidized (i.e. public and charter) primary and sec-
1For instance, since 2003 Germany has begun phasing in all-day schooling and the percentage
of pupils attending all-day primary schools has increased from 7.9 per cent in 2005 to 24.2 per
cent in 2013 [OECD, 2016a]. Several Latin-American countries have recently transitioned from
two-shift schemes, where some grades are taught in the morning and some in the afternoon,
to one-shift schemes that feature a longer school day (see section 1.2). As other examples,
President Obama in 2009 and Chancellor Osborne in 2016 advocated for longer school days in
the US and UK respectively. In the US the National Center on Time and Learning (NCTL)
promotes extended school schedules.
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ondary schools, whilst leaving the term length and the national curriculum unchanged.
The increment was sizable, ranging from 4 to 9 additional instruction hours per week
depending on the grade. In grades 1 to 4 it translated into a 26.7 per cent increase
in weekly instruction time. Schools could decide when to adopt the longer school day
and how to allocate the additional time across subjects. Secondly, we leverage the fact
that in Chile there are public and charter schools. Both types of schools are funded
through a voucher system, but differ substantially in terms of ownership and in the
degree of autonomy that they enjoy: charter schools have more autonomy over staff
decisions and over the course offer and content.
We estimate the effect of additional instruction time on achievement by exploiting
within-school variation in years of exposure to the FSD across several cohorts of pupils
that start grade 1 between 2002 and 2010, and that later take standardized reading
and mathematics tests at the end of grade 4. As the availability of longer schedules
may affect the composition of pupil intake, we restrict our attention to cohorts of in-
cumbent students, i.e. those who started primary education in schools that had yet not
adopted the FSD and who may become exposed to it at different stages of their pri-
mary education. We further deal with potentially endogenous mobility across schools
by instrumenting actual exposure with the exposure a student would have accumulated
if she had remained in the school where she initially enrolled.
Our preferred linear specifications show that an additional year of exposure to the
FSD raises fourth grade reading scores by 0.024σ. The effect on mathematics scores is
smaller (0.007-0.008σ) and non significant.
We then explore heterogeneity by pupils’ socio-economic characteristics. The effect
of additional instruction time on academic performance is smaller for students from
advantaged backgrounds than for the rest of the pupils in our sample. This finding
is consistent across different measures of household resources, which include parental
education and the availability of books, a computer and a connection to the Internet at
home. Although non negligible, the difference in the benefits of additional instruction
time for pupils from different backgrounds is not statistically significant. With this
caveat about the precision of our estimates in mind, results suggest that returns to
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additional time at school are higher for pupils who —according to information drawn
from time-use surveys— have scarcer support available outside of school. We further
provide evidence suggesting that the longer school day is associated with a reduced
frequency of homework. As this is likely to particularly benefit students with limited
support outside of school, it could be a potential mechanism underlying these findings.
Then, exploiting the features of the Chilean setting, we study how school institutions
affect returns to instruction time. In order to avoid capturing differences in the char-
acteristics of students attending different types of schools, we compare public schools
to charter schools that do not charge fees. While fee-charging charter schools serve
pupils from more advantaged backgrounds, public and no-fee charter schools cater to
schoolchildren of similarly lower socio-economic status. We document greater benefits
of longer schedules for pupils who start primary education in no-fee charter schools
than for those who start in public schools. The difference is large for both subjects
—mathematics and reading— but is only statistically significant for the latter. More-
over, it does not decline when, in the same regression specification, we allow for the
effect of longer schedules to differ depending on students’ socio-economic background;
this further suggests that the estimated difference does not reflect heterogeneity in the
characteristics of students attending the two types of schools.
While survey evidence suggests that public and charter schools allocate the additional
instruction time across subjects in a similar way, we uncover a significant difference in
how public and no-fee charter schools adjust total contract and teaching hours to pro-
vide longer schedules: no-fee charter schools rely more on hiring new teachers and less
on increasing work hours per teacher than public schools, as shown by the evolution
of the number of teachers and their contract hours after the adoption of the FSD. It
therefore appears that the higher degree of autonomy enjoyed by charter schools over
staff decisions allows them to adjust the teaching input in a different way. Moreover,
we show that public school teachers display a lower degree of satisfaction with the FSD
scheme than their colleagues in charter schools. If extended teachers’ working hours
translate into a lower quality of time use at school, this could be one mechanism un-
derlying the documented heterogeneity. The literature has found that charter schools
are typically associated with better learning outcomes. Our findings suggest that in
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the context of a large-scale expansion of a school input (i.e. instruction time), charter
schools may be able to adjust other inputs (i.e. teaching hours) in a more effective way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 1.3 describes the Chilean education system and the FSD reform. Section 1.4
presents the identification strategy. Section 1.5 describes the data and the sample.
Section 1.6 discusses the main findings. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper speaks to the growing literature that examines the effects of school
institutions on pupils’ performance. Several papers focus on newly founded or con-
verted charter schools in the US. Studies on oversubscribed charter schools exploit
the fact that admission depends on a lottery and document a positive effect both on
school performance [Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2011, Dobbie et al., 2011] and on medium-
term non academic outcomes [Dobbie and Fryer Jr, 2015]. Dobbie and Fryer Jr [2013]
and Angrist et al. [2013] highlight that high-performing charter schools are charac-
terized by certain practices and features, among which there is increased instruction
time. Along this line, Baude et al. [forthcoming] show that the quality of charter
schools in Texas improved between 2001 and 2011 driven largely by the adherence to
No Excuses-style curricula. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. [2016] analyze charter takeovers (i.e.
formerly public schools converted into charter schools) and also report positive effects
on achievement of grandfathered students. Eyles et al. [2017] and Eyles and Machin
[2018] examine how the conversion of some English community schools into academies
—autonomous, state-funded education establishments not subject to local authority
control— affects achievement of legacy enrolled pupils. The former work studies sev-
eral post-2010 episodes of conversion involving already high-performing primary schools
and does not find significant effects on achievement. The second assesses the first round
of conversion of mostly under-performing secondary schools in the 2000s, documenting
instead a positive impact on test scores.
Our work is also related to the literature on the relationship between instruction time
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and achievement.2 A set of papers studies the effect of the number of school days
prior to standardized tests on performance, by exploiting either unplanned school clo-
sures due to adverse weather conditions [Marcotte, 2007, Marcotte and Hemelt, 2008,
Hansen, 2011, Goodman, 2014] or changes in term dates and/or test dates [Sims, 2008,
Agu¨ero and Beleche, 2013, Aucejo and Romano, 2016]. These studies find positive,
although in some cases modest, effects. While they leverage small variations in the
number of school days, we focus on substantial and permanent changes to the length
of the school day. Varying the length rather than the number of school days may have
different consequences on student achievement. For example, while the former entails
a re-organization of daily routines, the latter does not.
Starting from Lavy [2015], recent studies examine the effect of instruction time on
achievement and the drivers of its effectiveness by using cross-country PISA data and
exploiting within-pupil variation in subject-specific classroom hours. Lavy [2015] finds
that a one-hour increase of weekly subject-specific instruction time raises scores by
0.06σ and that school and student characteristics matter: the effect is larger for schools
that enjoy more autonomy and for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. Rivkin
and Schiman [2015] further highlight that productivity of instruction time depends
positively on the quality of the classroom environment, as captured by student dis-
ruption and student-teacher interactions. Cattaneo et al. [2017] focus their attention
on Switzerland and document that students in more demanding school-tracks enjoy
greater benefits. Also these studies leverage a source of variation different from ours.
Different allocations of weekly instruction time across subjects do not necessarily entail
a change in the length of the school day. Students do not have to re-arrange their daily
routine or reduce the time for activities carried out outside of school, nor do schools
need to operate for more hours.
A number of papers exploit instead reform-induced variation in instruction time. Pis-
chke [2007] and Parinduri [2014] study the effects of exceptionally short or long school
2The early studies mostly focus on term length and report modestly positive to insignificant
effects. These studies rely either on variation in term length between and within US states
over time [Rizzuto and Wachtel, 1980, Card and Krueger, 1992, Grogger, 1996, Betts and
Johnson, 1998, Eide and Showalter, 1998] or on cross-country differences [Lee and Barro, 2001,
Wo¨ßmann, 2003]. A review of studies conducted in the 1985-2009 period can be found in Patall
et al. [2010].
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years due to country-level reforms of school calendars that leave the curriculum un-
changed.3 More similarly to us, Huebener et al. [2017] and Lavy [forthcoming] exam-
ine reforms that increase weekly instruction hours in Germany and Israel, respectively.
They both find a positive effect on achievement. The former documents a larger gain for
high-performing students, while the latter does not find evidence of differential ben-
efits across pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds. Battistin and Meroni
[2016] and Meroni and Abbiati [2016] study an expansion of mathematics and reading
instruction time in lower secondary schools in southern Italy, documenting positive
effects on mathematics test scores, concentrated among high-achieving disadvantaged
pupils. Recently, Figlio et al. [2018] show that extending the school day and providing
additional literacy instruction time in low-performing schools in Florida have a positive
effect on reading test scores.
Similarly to Chile, several other Latin American countries have switched from a two-
shift scheme —where some grades are taught in the morning and some in the afternoon—
to a one-shift scheme, substantially lengthening the school day. The impact has been
evaluated in a series of reports.4 Findings are mixed, suggesting that how the reform
of school schedules is implemented and how additional instruction time is used play
important roles in shaping returns.
Two papers study the effect of the FSD reform in Chile on achievement. Bellei [2009] fo-
cuses on performance at grade 10 in 2001 and 2003, adopting a difference-in-differences
approach. Berthelon et al. [2016] explore the effect on early literacy skills at grade 2.
Based on one year of observations (2012), they instrument exposure to the FSD with
the local availability of schools offering longer schedules. Both papers find positive and
significant effects on performance. We focus on all cohorts that start primary school
between 2002 and 2010 and examine the effect of the FSD on their academic perfor-
mance in a different grade (grade 4). In addition, we propose a different identification
3The former studies the short 1966-67 West German school year and documents an increase
in repetition rates in primary school as well as a reduction in enrollment to higher secondary
school tracks, but no effects on earnings and employment. The latter examines the long 1978-79
Indonesian school year and reports a reduction in repetition rates and improved educational
attainment, with positive effects also on wages and on the probability of working in the formal
sector.
4Cerdan-Infantes and Vermeersch [2007] on Uruguay, Almeida et al. [2016] on Brazil and
Hincapie [2016] on Colombia.
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strategy to assuage concerns about student endogenously sorting into schools offering
the FSD. Furthermore, we examine how schools’ types and students’ characteristics
affect returns to longer schedules and explore some mechanisms that could explain the
heterogeneous effects.
1.3 Institutional Setting
1.3.1 The Chilean School System
The Chilean school system features two education cycles: primary education (grades
1-8) and secondary education (grades 9-12). Standardized tests called SIMCE assess
pupils’ knowledge and skills in core subjects at the end of various grades. The testing
frequency is highest in fourth grade, with tests taking place every year since 2005.5
Education is provided by three types of schools: public schools, charter schools and
non subsidized private schools. Public schools are free and are funded through student
vouchers.6 Charter schools are private, but they are publicly subsidized through the
voucher system as well. Since 1994 charter schools can also charge tuition fees, but the
size of the voucher decreases as tuition fees increase. Non subsidized private schools
are funded only through tuition fees and are usually substantially more expensive than
charter schools.
The FSD reform applies to public and charter schools, which serve more than 90 per
cent of the students attending regular programs in the school system.7 Despite both
being publicly subsidized, they are different in how they are managed and regulated.
Public schools are either managed by the Municipal Department of Education (DAEM )
or by non-profit Municipal corporations.8 The working conditions are regulated by a
5Fourth graders were also tested in 1999 and 2002.
6During the 1980s the Chilean school system experienced a major transformation that trans-
ferred the administration of public schools from the Ministry of Education to Municipalities.
Furthermore, the funding system was changed by introducing a voucher that could be used
both in public and charter schools.
7This figure excludes education for adults, education for students with specific disabilities
and other types of special programs.
8While the director of the DAEM is usually a teacher appointed by the Municipality, cor-
porations are led by a board of directors who do not need to be teachers and whose president
is the major of the Municipality.
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labor code specific to education professions.9 Charter schools are private organizations
and, accordingly, the working conditions of teachers are regulated by the private sector
labor code.10 Different regulations translate into charter schools having greater au-
tonomy and flexibility in the management of the teaching staff, in terms of recruiting,
dismissal and compensation policies. They also enjoy more responsibility and freedom
over the design of the curriculum. In Appendix section 1.A we discuss in more detail
the main regulatory differences between public and charter schools. We also provide
further evidence when exploring the differential effect of the FSD by type of school in
sub-section 1.6.3.
1.3.2 The FSD Reform
In 1997 the Chilean government decided to increase daily instruction time in all
publicly subsidized primary and secondary schools (i.e. public schools and charter
schools), whilst leaving the term length and the national curriculum unchanged.11 The
Full School Day (Jornada Escolar Completa, or FSD henceforth) reform aimed at im-
proving the quality of education and reducing inequality in learning outcomes.12 The
reform envisaged a substantial increase of instruction hours (which last 45 minutes).
Specifically, in primary schools 8 instruction hours were added in grades 1 to 6 and 5
hours in grades 7 and 8; in secondary schools, grades 9 and 10 experienced a 9-hour
increase of instruction time per week.13 In grades 1 to 4, this translated into a 26.7 per
cent increase of weekly instruction time. As a result, in 2015 the length of school days
in Chilean primary schools was the highest among OECD countries, when considering
total compulsory instruction time [OECD, 2016b].
Schools could choose when to implement the FSD.14 The deadline was initially set to
2002. However, it was later extended and differentiated by type of school and student:
2007 for all public schools and for charter schools catering to disadvantaged pupils,
9This is called Estatuto de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n.
10This is called Co´digo del trabajo.
11Increasing daily instruction time is not mandatory in grades 1 and 2.
12The Law 19494 that introduced the FSD was published on January 25, 1997.
13In grades 11 and 12, 6 instruction hours were added in the scientific-humanities track, while
4 hours were added in the vocational track.
14Schools could also adopt the FSD in different grades at different times, but they were
mandated to ensure that pupils who started attending the longer school day in a given grade
would then also be exposed in all following grades.
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2010 for the rest of charter schools. Yet, by 2013 —the last year of data available to
us— there were still schools operating under the old scheme. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
pattern of adoption of the FSD between 1997 and 2013 for primary schools. For every
year, it shows the number of schools, as well as the share of public and charter schools,
that had adopted the policy by that year. The two types of schools display similar
patterns of adoption, although a larger share of public schools had implemented the
FSD by 2013.15
By the time the reform was announced many schools were operating a two-shift scheme:
some grades were taught in the morning and some in the afternoon. The increased in-
struction time and the longer school day required a change to a one-shift scheme, where
all pupils attend school from the morning to mid-afternoon. Table 1.1 illustrates the
daily school schedules with and without the FSD, inclusive of time devoted to breaks.
Without the FSD pupils spend at least 5 hours per day at school. The typical morn-
ing shift runs from 8.00 to 13.00, while the typical afternoon shift runs from 14.00 to
19.00. Under the FSD students spend at least 7.08 hours per day at school. If the
school adopts the FSD from Monday to Friday, the typical school day starts at 08.00
and ends at 15.05. If the school adopts the FSD on 4 days and the shorter school day
on the remaining one, the typical longer school day starts at 8.00 and ends at 15.45.16
The passage from a two-shift to a single-shift scheme implies that pupils have lunch
at school. For most students, however, this did not translate into a substantial change
in the nutritive content of their diet. First, Chile had virtually no problem of infant
malnutrition when the FSD reform was passed.17 Second, students from disadvantaged
backgrounds could also have lunch at school under the short school day scheme. The
main difference between the short and the long school day is therefore the increase of
instruction time, which requires adjusting the teaching input.
Table 1.2 reports weekly instruction hours per subject with and without the FSD for
grades 1 to 4. It shows that the legislated increase in instruction time was not allotted
15By 2013 around 12 per cent of primary schools were still operating without the FSD.
16The minimum hours of daily instruction are prescribed by the law. Schools can freely choose
the time at which the school day starts. The daily schedules in Table 1 are built assuming that
the full school day and the morning shift start at 8.00, while the afternoon shift starts at 14.00.
17In 2000 only 2.9 per cent of children aged 0-6 suffered from malnutrition and only 0.3 per
cent suffered from moderate or serious malnutrition (Mo¨nckeberg B. [2003]).
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to specific subjects, but rather allocated to the so-called “Free Choice time”, which
schools could decide how to use. Therefore, schools had considerable freedom over the
organization of the FSD, the only constraint being the approval by the Ministry of
Education of a pedagogical plan that described the use of the additional time.
We do not observe how each school allocates the additional time across subjects. How-
ever, we can provide some evidence based on a survey administered in 2005 to in-
vestigate the use of time in fifth grade at 387 urban primary schools that had already
implemented the FSD at that point.18 Drawing on this, Table 1.3 reports the allocation
of weekly instruction time across curricular subjects, both for all schools (columns 1-2)
and distinguishing between public (columns 3-4) and charter (columns 5-6) schools.
“Core Time” excludes “Free Choice Time”. It shows that schools devote a substantial
portion of “Free Choice Time” to core subjects. Among those, more hours are allocated
to Spanish than to mathematics.19 A small fraction of additional instruction time is
dedicated to other subjects; the remaining portion of ”Free Choice time” is distributed
among various extra-curricular activities (not reported in the table for brevity). Char-
ter schools devote slightly less additional time to Spanish and mathematics. However,
the allocation of additional instruction time across subjects is similar in public and
charter schools. The only significant differences emerge with regards to foreign lan-
guages and religion, to which charter schools devote more of the additional instruction
time.
To further investigate the effect of the FSD on schools’ time use, we rely on data that
reports, at the school-class-year level, the list of subjects taught.20 Appendix Figure
1.C1 shows, in an event study framework that collapses information at the school-
grade-year level, the evolution of the total number of subjects, as well as subjects
related to specific disciplinary areas, around the adoption of the FSD.21 Following the
18The survey was administered by the Studies Directorate of the Sociology Faculty at the
Catholic University of Chile (DESUC ) and a report based on it was written by Ruz Pe´rez and
Madrid Valenzuela [2005].
19Spanish also features more instruction time also under the shorter school day.
20This data is available at http://datos.mineduc.cl/dashboards/19923/
bases-de-datos-de-planes-y-programas-de-estudios-anos-2002-al-2016/.
21The event study specification reads:
Ygst = γg + ηs + θt + λsg + φst + µgt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βρ1(pgst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pgst = ρ) + εgst (1.1)
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introduction of a longer school day in a given grade, the number of subjects taught in
that grade increase by a small but statistically significant amount, up to almost 0.1
four years after the implementation of the policy. The increase is driven by the fact
that there are more subjects related to foreign languages as well as more tutorials and
workshops. While the number of subjects is an imperfect measure of how schools use
the additional time, as they could simply increase the hours devoted to each subject,
this provides further evidence that the longer school day translated into an increase of
instruction time.
Augmenting instruction time and lengthening the school day generated additional op-
erational costs, which were funded through an increase in the baseline vouchers, by
25-50 per cent depending on the grade (Table 1.2).22 Some schools also had to expand
their infrastructure in order to switch to the single-shift scheme. Infrastructure-related
costs were funded through ad-hoc additional resources, which were allocated through
public tenders organized by the Ministry of Education and its regional offices. Pri-
ority was usually granted to schools catering for students from lower socio-economic
backgrounds.23
1.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to study whether increased instruction time and a longer school day af-
fect achievement, we exploit the fact that we observe several cohorts of pupils starting
primary education in a given school in the 2002-2010 period and then taking a stan-
dardized test at the end of grade 4 – possibly in a different establishment – over the
period 2005-2013. Since we can follow the entire school career of each one of such
students, we can compute actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4
g, s and t index the grade, the school and the year, respectively. pgst = t−Egs is the distance
(in years) from the event, which is the introduction of the FSD in grade g of school s. Controls
consist of grade (γg), school (ηs) and year (θt) fixed effects, as well as their interactions. The
FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients βρ show how different the number of subjects
taught is in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. Standard
errors are clustered at the school-grade level.
22The final amount that a school receives through student vouchers also depends on its
location, size, and other characteristics. We report the increase of the baseline voucher, because
this was the change common to all schools.
23Yet schools serving pupils from higher socio-economic backgrounds were less likely to need
infrastructure-related investments.





i , where d
j is a dummy that takes value 1 if the pupil is ever
exposed during grade j to the FSD.24
We then estimate the following specification:
Yist = ηs + θt + βExpFSD4ist + γXist + δZst + εist (1.2)
Yist is the test score of student i who starts primary school in school s in year t and
then takes the standardized test at the end of grade 4. ηs is a set of school fixed
effects that account for time-invariant heterogeneity across schools; θt is a set of year
fixed effects that control for common unobserved year-specific shocks. In the richest
specifications, we also include a set of controls at the student and at the school level.
Specifically, Xist is a vector of student characteristics measured in first grade, which
include: gender, age, attendance rate and end-of-year status (i.e. promotion to second
grade or retention in first grade). Zst averages student characteristics contained in
Xist at the school level. It also includes enrollment and average class size in first grade.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
By including first-grade school fixed effects, specification (1.2) leverages variation in
exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4 across cohorts of students who enrolled
in the same establishment. It therefore exploits the fact that, depending on whether
the school adopted longer schedules within our sample period (i.e. by 2013) and on
the exact year of adoption, adjacent cohorts of enrollees could experience a different
exposure to the FSD before taking the test. This source of variation can be used to
estimate the causal effect of the FSD on learning outcomes if cohorts of pupils are not
systematically different along characteristics that are not taken into account in specifi-
cation (1.2) and that correlate both with years exposure to increased instruction time
and with achievement.
Given the staggered adoption of the FSD across schools, a first concern is that parents
would factor the availability of the longer school day into their preferences about the
24The treatment is therefore more precisely defined as the number of grades attended at least
once under the FSD scheme by the end of grade 4. Throughout the paper, we use the term
years of exposure to the FSD for brevity. Moreover, the two definitions are exactly equivalent
for non repeaters, who constitute the largest majority of the sample (88 per cent).
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school in which to enroll their children. This could affect the composition of pupil
intake, possibly along dimensions that our set of controls cannot account for. Accord-
ing to parent surveys administered alongside the test in 2005, the FSD was the most
important reason for enrolling their child in a given school for only 1.97 per cent of
parents. Proximity to home (29.84 per cent), the presence of a relative in the school
(18.61 per cent) and the school’s prestige (18.48 per cent) were cited as the most im-
portant determinants of school choices.25
Nonetheless, we address this concern by restricting our analysis to incumbent pupils.
This means that we only consider pupils who enroll in first grade in a given school
before such school adopts the FSD. As an example, if a school adopts the longer school
day in 2007, we discard students who start primary education in that school in 2007
or later. Cohorts who enrolled before 2007, on the other hand, made their decision
before the introduction of the FSD and possibly became exposed to it at some point in
their school career. For incumbent students who never repeat a grade the range of the
treatment variable (ExpFSD4ist) is 0-3, as exposure to the FSD can start as early as
grade 2. For repeaters, on the other hand, the range is 0-4; the variable takes value 4
in cases when the school adopts the FSD in the year when the pupil is repeating first
grade. Furthermore, restricting the sample to incumbent students implies that first-
grade controls included in specification (1.2) are observed before the adoption of the
FSD and hence are pre-determined with respect to the treatment. The focus on legacy
enrollment cohorts also characterizes recent studies on the effects of charter takeovers
in the US and of academy conversions in England [Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2016, Eyles
et al., 2017, Eyles and Machin, 2018]. This restriction attenuates identification issues
related to unobserved changes in pupil intake, the more so the less parents can antici-
pate the exact year in which a school will adopt the FSD.
Students can move across schools and in Chile school transfers are indeed a common
phenomenon; in our master sample (described in section 1.5) around 35 per cent of
students change school between grades 1 and 4. Pupils who enroll in first grade in the
same establishment and in the same year can therefore experience a different exposure
25The cost (9.35 per cent) and the ethical values (8.95 per cent) of the school follow in the
ranking. The presence of the FSD is ranked seventh among fifteen options.
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to the FSD by the time they reach grade 4. Furthermore, if mobility across schools is
influenced by the availability of longer schedules, student-level actual exposure to the
FSD could be correlated with other unobserved determinants of achievement. To mit-
igate this concern, in our preferred specification we instrument actual exposure to the
FSD with the exposure a student would have accumulated had she never transferred







s is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if student
i would have ever been exposed to the FSD in grade j, had she remained in school s,
where she started first grade.26
When discussing results in section 1.6, we will show that the instrument is relevant,
as there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between “potential” ex-
posure and actual exposure to the FSD by grade 4. By relying on this instrument
we aim to isolate and exploit the variation in actual exposure that is not affected by
possibly endogenous mobility decisions of incumbent pupils after first grade. Moreover,
we assume that “potential” exposure is not systematically correlated with unobserved
determinants of achievement and affects fourth grade test scores only through its im-
pact on actual exposure.
A remaining concern is that the timing of adoption may depend on past performance.
For example, if schools switch to the longer school day after they observe a cohort
of pupils faring particularly poorly at the test, our estimates may simply capture
mean-reversion effects. In general, there can be concerns about confounding effects
of underlying school-specific trends in test scores. We show in section 1.5 that there
are no visible clear trends in reading and mathematics scores in the years preceding
the switch to longer schedules. Another concern is that other events may take place
at the school around the time of FSD adoption, which could also affect learning out-
comes in the following years. We discuss and address these further issues in Appendix
26To build this “potential” measure of exposure we also assume that the student would have
never repeated, as we do not observe the pattern of repetitions in this counterfactual school
career. Therefore, the range of the instrumental variable for all incumbent pupils is 0-3. The
first stage regression specification reads:
ExpFSD4ist = η0,s + θ0,t + β0PotExpFSD4ist + γ0Xist + δ0Zst + ist (1.3)
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section 1.B, where we show that findings remain similar when we restrict our attention
to pupils starting primary school in establishments that did not receive public funds
for expanding infrastructure, when we control for another policy targeting disadvan-
taged students implemented in 2008 and when we focus our attention only in cohorts
of students not exposed to such policy.
1.5 Data and Sample
We link several administrative and survey datasets on account of unique school,
student and teacher identifiers.
Data on achievement in fourth grade comes from a nationwide standardized low-stakes
test (SIMCE test) designed by the Education Quality Agency (Agencia de Calidad de
la Educacio´n).27 It is administered at the end of the school year and is marked by
external examiners, therefore leaving little room for test score manipulation. Individ-
ual records on performance in the test are available for fourth grade students in 1999,
2002 and then with a yearly frequency from 2005 onward. We restrict our attention to
the 2005-2013 waves of the test. The reason being that we can follow students’ school
careers only for cohorts who start primary school from 2002 onward; this is necessary
both to correctly identify incumbent students (i.e. pupils who enroll in first grade in a
school that has not yet adopted the FSD) and to compute actual exposure to the FSD
for students who move across schools between grades 1 and 4. 2013 is the last year
of data available to us. We use pupil-level test scores in the reading and mathematics
sections of the test as our measure of achievement. Scores are standardized by year
and subject to have a mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation equal to 1. Alongside
the test, surveys are administered to students and their parents, as well as to teach-
ers. Based on questions that are consistent across all waves of the parent survey, we
recover a rich set of information on pupils’ backgrounds as of grade 4 that we use to
study heterogeneity by students characteristics. Based on teacher surveys, we provide
evidence on the frequency of homework assignments in schools with and without the
FSD.
27While the stakes are low because the test does not impact a student’ final evaluation,
schools care about it because school-level average scores are publicly available for consultation.
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The second source of information is the register of pupils enrolled in the school system
over the period 2002-2013, which is maintained by the Ministry of Education. Be-
sides gender and date of birth, for every school year it records information about the
school that the student attends, the attendance rate and the end-of-year status (i.e.
promotion to the next grade or retention in the same grade). We also have access
to the register of educational establishments, from which we recover the location (an
urban or rural area) and the administrative status of the school (public, charter or non
subsidized private). A companion dataset records the year of adoption of the FSD at
the school-grade level over the period 1997-2013. Based on these sources, we recon-
struct the school career from grade 1 to grade 4 of every student who started primary
school between 2002 and 2010 and took the fourth grade test between 2005 and 2013;
we then compute the actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4, as
well as the exposure a student would have experienced had she never transferred from
her first grade school. We also retrieve the set of first grade student- and school-level
characteristics that we include in the richest regression specification. In order to dis-
tinguish charter schools with and without tuition fees, we rely on a dataset maintained
by the Ministry of Education that records all the subsidies that schools received from
the government over the 2005-2013 period. Since charter schools that charge tuition
fees receive reduced subsidies, we can distinguish them from schools that do not charge
tuition fees.28
We also exploit the information contained in the register of teachers, which is available
for the period 2003-2013. We draw on this dataset to study how no-fee charter and
public schools adjust the number of teachers and their working hours after the adoption
of the FSD. We also rely on the 2005 Longitudinal Teachers Survey (Encuesta Longi-
tudinal Docente) to investigate differences in teachers’ opinions on the FSD;29 based
on the 2015 Time -Use Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Uso de Tiempo), we examine if
academic support outside of school varies across pupils from different socio-economic
28We classify a charter school as a no-fee charter school if it never charged fees between 2005
and 2013. For 2.39 per cent of charter schools attended in first grade by students belonging to
the master sample we do not find information about the tuition fees in the dataset.
29The Longitudinal Teachers Survey was implemented by the Microdata Center of the Uni-
versity of Chile.
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backgrounds.30
Finally, we digitized from primary sources the list of schools that received additional
funds to expand their infrastructure when lengthening the school day; we parsed the
releases of the Official Journal (Diario Oficial) published by the Interior Ministry over
the period 1997-2004 and searched for the outcomes of all public tenders through which
ad-hoc resources for infrastructures were assigned.31 Based on this, we create a dataset
that records, for every school, the year in which resources were disbursed and the
amount received, if any. Since 2008, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are
granted additional subsidies (PSS) on top of the vouchers. We obtain the list of benefi-
ciaries from the Ministry of Education. This information is used to perform robustness
checks described in Appendix section 1.B.
In order to create the master sample of our analysis, we restrict our attention to in-
cumbent pupils, i.e. students who started first grade in a given school when the FSD
had not been yet introduced (see section 1.4). Furthermore, we discard students that
attended non subsidized private schools at some point between grades 1 and 4. This is
motivated by the fact that the FSD reform only applies to publicly subsidized schools.
Moreover, we do not know whether a given non subsidized private school was already
offering a longer school day or started providing it at some point after it became com-
pulsory for other types of schools. Therefore, students attending non subsidized private
schools cannot serve as a control group.
The master sample consists of around 600,000 fourth-grade test takers; they started
primary school between 2002 and 2010 in schools that had not yet adopted the FSD
and took the test between 2005 and 2013. It follows that schools attended by pupils
in the master sample had not switched to the longer school day by 2002. Given that
the first transitions to the single-shift occurred in 1997, our sample of schools consists
of mid to late adopters.
As discussed in section 1.4, a threat to identification could arise if schools adopted
the FSD based on the trend or transitory component of test scores. Figure 1.2 plots
30The database of the 2015 Time-Use Survey can be downloaded from https://www.ine.
cl/estadisticas/menu-sociales/enut.
31The last tender took place in 2004.
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coefficients from an event study exercise where the specification reads:
Yist = ηs + θt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βp1(pst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pst = ρ) + εist (1.4)
Yist is the reading or mathematics score of student i who takes the SIMCE test in
school s in year t. pst = t − Es is the distance (in years) from the event, which is
the introduction of the FSD in at least one grade in school s. ηs and θt are school
and year fixed effects, respectively. The FSD is implemented in event-year 0 and
coefficients βρ show how different scores in event-year ρ are relative to event-year -1,
which is taken as the reference year. Schools are observed up to 5 years before and
after the introduction of the longer school day and the sample consists of all schools
where students in the master sample enrolled in first grade.32 For both subjects, there
appear not to be evident trends in the pre-adoption period, suggesting that test scores
were not trending either downward or upward before schools decided to implement
longer daily schedules. Furthermore, there are no evident spikes or dips in test scores
just before the introduction of the FSD. On the other hand, from event-year 1 scores
start increasing, suggesting a positive effect of the FSD on achievement. We will then
provide a formal estimation based on our identification strategy in section 1.6.
Table 1.4 reports summary statistics for pupils in the master sample. Column (1) pools
all students together, whereas columns (2) to (4) split schoolchildren according to the
type of school (public, charter without tuition fees or charter with tuition fees) they
attended in first grade. In the vast majority of households (87 per cent) parents do not
have university education.33 Only 15 per cent of students have more than 50 books at
home; 55 per cent of the households have a computer at home and slightly less than
one third also have a connection to the Internet.34 The first grade attendance rate is
32The sample is unbalanced, meaning that not all schools are observed in every event-year.
Given the calendar of SIMCE tests, using a balanced sample would significantly reduce the
number of event-years that we can observe. For this exercise, we also use the 1999 and 2002
waves of the SIMCE test.
33We build a variable that measures parental education by setting ParentalEd =
max(MotherEd, FatherEd), where MotherEd and FatherEd are the highest mother and
father’s academic attainment, respectively; if the information for either one of the two parents
is missing, we rely on the level of education achieved by the other parent.
34Information about students’ backgrounds, i.e. parental education and resources at home,
is drawn from parent surveys. Since these variables are observed at the end of grade 4, they
could be affected by a student’s exposure to the FSD (for example, if longer school days have
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very high (94 per cent) and 3 per cent of pupils repeat first grade. On average, there
are 35 students in a first grade class.
When splitting students according to the type of establishment they started primary
school in, it emerges that public schools and charter schools without tuition fees cater
to relatively similar students. On the other hand, schoolchildren attending charter
schools that charge tuition fees live in more aﬄuent households. Test scores are lowest
in public schools and highest in charter schools with tuition fees.
1.6 Results
In this section we first discuss the average effect of the FSD on all pupils in the
master sample (sub-section 1.6.1). We then explore whether and how effects are hetero-
geneous depending on the resources available in the household where the student lives
(sub-section 1.6.2) and on the type of school she attends (sub-section 1.6.3). Heteroge-
neous effects of additional instruction time are interesting to study because increasing
the amount of time that pupils spend at school reduces the amount of time they can
devote to other activities outside of school. The return to longer school schedules there-
fore could depend on the absolute quality of time use at school, which can vary across
schools, and on its relative quality with respect to time use outside of school, which
can vary among students.
When investigating heterogeneous effects, we estimate a richer version of specification
(1.2), whereby we also interact the treatment and all controls with a dummy variable
D that captures a given dimension of heterogeneity.35 We report estimates coming
from the preferred linear IV specification that includes the full set of controls (which
we denote as FE-IV2).36
an effect on parents’ labour supply); for this reason, they are not included in the regression
specifications, which only feature pre-determined controls. Furthermore this information is
missing for around 15 per cent of schoolchildren in the sample.
35A fully interacted specification yields estimates that are equivalent to those obtained from
separately estimating two regressions on the sub-sample where D = 0 and on the sub-sample
where D = 1.
36ExpFSD4 and ExpFSD4×D are instrumented with PotExpFSD4 and PotExpFSD4×
D, respectively.
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1.6.1 The Effect of the FSD on Achievement
Table 1.5 reports results from regression specification (1.2). We start by discussing
coefficients when we estimate the most parsimonious specification, which only includes
school and year fixed effects, and we do not instrument actual years of exposure to
the FSD (specification FE1, column 1). These estimates point to a virtually null
effect on reading and a negative impact on mathematics. Including pre-determined
controls listed in section 1.4, however, changes the picture significantly (specification
FE2, column 2): the effect of an additional year of exposure to the FSD is positive
for both subjects, although it is only statistically significant for reading (0.011σ). This
indicates that controlling for first-grade status (pass or repeat) is important because
repeaters, who are low performers, spend more years at school and are therefore more
likely to be exposed to the FSD at some point.
As mentioned in section 1.4, a non negligible fraction of students transfer from one
school to another between grades 1 and 4. Furthermore, the availability of longer daily
schedules appears to influence mobility across schools. Appendix Figure 1.C2 shows
the evolution of transfers of pupils attending grades 1 to 4 at the school-year level, in
a 5-year window around the implementation of the FSD. The estimated event study
specification reads:
Yst = ηs + θt +
−2∑
ρ=−5
βp1(pst = ρ) +
4∑
ρ=0
βρ1(pst = ρ) + εst (1.5)
Following the introduction of longer schedules schools experience a decline in the out-
flow of pupils; at the same time, although the pre-adoption pattern is more scattered,
inflows of students appear to increase, with a spike in the year of adoption. As a
result, net transfers (i.e. the difference between transfers into and transfers out of a
given school) grow, by up to 5 pupils per year. Appendix Table 1.C1 further shows
that, among schoolchildren who belong to the master sample, those who transfer are
negatively selected, as they have a slightly lower attendance rate in grade 1 (93 per
cent versus 95 per cent) and are more than twice as likely to repeat first grade.37 More-
37First-grade attendance rates have a very low dispersion, so that a 1 percentage point
difference amounts to almost one fifth of a standard deviation.
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over, it emerges that pupils tend to transfer towards schools that offer the FSD; while
transferring and non transferring students have a very similar “potential” exposure
(i.e. the exposure they would have experienced had they remained in their first-grade
schools), the former end up with a much higher actual exposure.38 Partly because of
fewer transfers out and more transfers in, the number of students per class in grades 1
to 4 increases after the adoption of the FSD (Appendix Figure 1.C3) by an amount that
is however modest (at most around 1.50 more pupils) when compared to the average
class size in primary schools.
These patterns motivate the decision to instrument actual exposure (ExpFSD4) with
the exposure a student would have experienced had she never transferred (PotExpFSD4).
When adopting the IV approach, estimates are remarkably stable across the most par-
simonious specification (FE-IV1, column 3) and the specification featuring all controls
(FE-IV2, column 4). An additional year of exposure to the FSD significantly raises
reading test scores by 0.024σ. The effect on mathematics test scores lies in the narrow
range 0.007-0.008σ, but is not statistically significant. As shown in the same table, the
instrumental variable displays a positive and strong relationship with the treatment, as
the first stage coefficient is statistically significant and equal to 0.72, implying that for
slightly less than 30 per cent of pupils the real exposure and the “potential” exposure
do not coincide.
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.5, we relax the assumption that every additional
year of exposure has the same effect on achievement. We estimate the preferred IV
specification in a fully non parametric way, by introducing a set of dummies for every
possible level of exposure to the FSD and setting 0 years of exposure as the reference
category.39 The non parametric specification reveals that the effect of longer schedules
38This also holds true also when restricting the comparison to students who never repeat
between grade 1 and grade 4.




βk1(ExpFSD4ist = k)+β31(ExpFSD4ist >= 3)+γXist+δZst+εist (1.6)
Specification (1.6) highlights that we collapse 3 and 4 years of actual exposure into a unique
category, as only very few pupils (i.e. students who repeat first grade in the year when the
school adopts the longer schedules) attend all 4 grades under the FSD scheme. In the IV
specification, the set of dummies that capture every possible level of actual exposure to the
FSD are instrumented by a set of dummies that capture every possible level of exposure a
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increases more than linearly with exposure. Three years of exposure are associated
with a 0.114-0.116σ increase of reading test scores, significant at the 1 per cent level,
and a 0.057-0.058σ increase of mathematics test scores, significant at the 5 per cent
level.
The IV estimates therefore show that the FSD has a positive effect on learning out-
comes, which increases more than linearly with exposure and is stronger for reading
than for mathematics. The stronger impact on reading may depend on the fact that
a larger fraction of additional instruction time is devoted to Spanish than to mathe-
matics (Table 1.3). The pattern of coefficients in the fully non parametric specification
is consistent with added instruction time in earlier grades having a positive effect on
achievement in later grades. Moreover, as the passage from a two-shift to a one-shift
scheme implies a re-organization of daily routines, it may also be explained by the
presence of adaptation costs that eventually fade away over time.
A possible remaining concern is that other events may happen in a school around the
adoption of the FSD and affect learning outcomes in the following years. In Appendix
section 1.B we show that our estimates are robust to: i) restricting the attention to
pupils who started primary schools in establishments that most likely did not expand
their infrastructure at the same time when the FSD was adopted; ii) controlling for a
policy granting further subsidies to disadvantaged schoolchildren since 2008.
1.6.2 Heterogeneity by Students’ Backgrounds
In this sub-section we explore whether the effect of the FSD varies depending on
the characteristics of the environment students are exposed to when they are not in
school. We focus our analysis on the role of household resources, as reflected by parental
education and the availability of books and ICT technologies at home.40 We rely on
this information to distinguish schoolchildren from a more privileged background (for
whom D = 0) from others (for whom D = 1).
Table 1.6 shows that longer schedules appear not to benefit in a significant way pupils
student would have experienced had she never transferred out of her first grade school.
40This information is drawn from parent surveys administered alongside the test. The non-
response rate is similar across the variables and is around 15 per cent. This explains the smaller
sample size.
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from more advantaged backgrounds. An additional year of exposure to the FSD does
not raise by a statistically significant amount reading and mathematics scores for chil-
dren living in households where at least one parent has some university education
(columns 1 and 4), there are more than 50 books (columns 2 and 5), or both a com-
puter and a connection to the Internet are available (columns 3 and 6). On the other
hand, reading scores increase by a significant amount for pupils living in households
where neither parent has any university education (0.022σ), there are at most 50 books
at home (0.022σ), and either a computer or a connection to the Internet is not available
(0.024σ).41 Also mathematics scores increase by a larger amount, which however never
becomes significantly different from 0.
It has to be noted, however, that the documented difference, as captured by the inter-
action term ExpFSD4×D, although large in size, is not statistically significant. With
this caveat concerning the precision of the estimates in mind, the analysis provides
suggestive evidence that returns to an additional hour of instruction time tend to be
larger for students who have fewer resources and opportunities available at home and
for whom, therefore, the relative quality of time spent at school is higher.
Drawing on information coming from the 2015 Chilean Time-Use Survey, Appendix
Table 1.C2 shows that pupils from privileged backgrounds indeed receive more support
outside of school. We restrict our attention to households where there is at least one
child aged 5-18 and we divide them into two groups, depending on whether either the
head of the household or the head’s spouse has any university education (Uhh = 1) or
not (Uhh = 0). In households where Uhh = 1, the percentage of heads of household
and heads’ spouses who declare that they help their children with their homework is
48 per cent, whereas this percentage drops to 33 per cent in households where Uhh = 0
(column 1). Summing up the minutes that they dedicate to helping with homework
on a given day of the working week and on a given day at the weekend, there is a
14-minute difference in favor of households where Uhh = 1 (column 2). Assuming a
uniform distribution of help across the days of the week, this would translate into a
difference of around 50 minutes per week. It is also interesting to look at support by
41These figures are the sum of coefficients related to the main term ExpFSD4 and the
interaction term ExpFSD4×D. They are significant at the 1 per cent level.
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other providers, in the form of tutoring outside of school. 5 per cent of pupils aged
12-18 and living in households where Uhh = 0 receive some tutoring, as opposed to
12 per cent of students living in households where Uhh = 1 (column 3). In terms of
minutes per day, the former receives tutoring for less than half the time than the latter
(column 4).
Appendix Table 1.C3 draws information about the frequency of mathematics home-
work from the teacher surveys administered alongside the SIMCE test in 2011, 2012
and 2013. The limited period for which this information is available does not allow
us to study the evolution of homework’s frequency around the adoption of the FSD
in an event study framework such as the one in (1.5). Panel A considers all schools
and shows that the frequency of homework is lower in schools with the FSD than in
establishments without it. For example, the percentage of teachers assigning homework
after every class is roughly 20 per cent in schools where the FSD is not in place, while
it drops to about 12 per cent in schools that feature longer schedules. In panel B we
restrict our attention to schools that had not adopted longer schedules by 2011 and
we compare the frequency of homework between the years 2011 and 2013. In estab-
lishments that did not adopted the FSD in 2012 or 2013 (column 2), the frequency is
very similar in the the two years. On the other hand, homework is assigned much less
frequently in 2013 than in 2011 in establishments that switched to the FSD by that
year (column 3).42 Overall, there is therefore suggestive evidence that longer school
schedules are associated with less homework. If the productivity of homework is higher
for schoolchildren from advantaged backgrounds, because they have more support at
home, the reduction of its frequency that seems to be associated with longer school
schedules could be one of the mechanisms that explains the documented heterogeneity.
1.6.3 Heterogeneity by School Type
The absolute quality of time use is likely to be the primary driver of additional
instruction time’s effectiveness. It is therefore important to study the contribution
42As an example, in 2011 around 52 per cent of teachers working in schools that had not
adopted the policy declared that they had assigned homework after almost every class. This
figure remained the same in schools that had not adopted the FSD by 2013, while it fell to
31.82 per cent in schools that adopted it in 2012 or 2013.
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of school characteristics in shaping returns to longer schedules. The Chilean school
system provides an attractive setting because public and charter schools, whilst being
both publicly subsidized, differ in terms of ownership and in the degree of autonomy.
As explained in sub-section 1.3.1, charter schools have more autonomy than public
schools over the management of school resources and the design of the curricula. Ap-
pendix Table 1.C4 reports answers to school surveys administered alongside the 2006
and 2009 waves of PISA tests, which ask about the tasks over which the principal or
the governing body of the school have considerable responsibility. The sample con-
sists of all public and charter schools that offer primary education.43 It confirms that
principals as well as the governing bodies of charter schools have greater autonomy in
designing the curricula, as they can decide the course offer and the course content more
frequently. Moreover, they are more likely to be responsible for the budget formula-
tion and allocation. They are also in charge of taking personnel decisions, in terms of
recruitment, promotions and dismissals.
We therefore study whether the FSD has a differential effect in public and charter
schools. To this end, we compare pupils who attended a public school in grade 1 (for
whom D = 0) to students who enrolled in a charter school that does not charge tuition
fees in grade 1 (for whom D = 1). The choice of focusing on these two types of schools
is motivated by the fact that, as shown in Table 1.4, charter schools that charge tuition
fees cater to more aﬄuent pupils, whereas public schools and charter schools without
tuition fees serve pupils of similarly lower socio-economic status. As we aim to uncover
the role of school institutions, we do not want to capture differences related to students’
characteristics.
Table 1.7 shows that returns to additional instruction time are higher for students
starting primary school in no-fee charter schools than for those who enrolled in public
schools. The difference, as captured by the interaction term ExpFSD4×D, is sizable
for both subjects and statistically significant with regards to reading (columns 1 and 5).
The effect of an additional year of exposure to the FSD on reading test scores is more
than three times larger for students starting primary school in no-fee charter schools
43PISA tests are administered to pupils aged 15. We therefore restrict our attention to
secondary schools that also offer primary education, which explains the very small sample size.
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(0.061σ) as opposed to in public schools (0.019σ). Mathematics scores are raised by
a statistically insignificant 0.012σ for pupils attending grade 1 in public schools; the
coefficient more than doubles to 0.029σ for enrollees of no-fee charter schools, although
the associated p-value is slightly above 0.1. Pupils attending public schools and no-fee
charter schools are similar. If anything, those attending the latter type of school are
slightly more aﬄuent. In sub-section 1.6.2 we provided suggestive evidence that longer
schedules are less beneficial to students from advantaged backgrounds. Hence, small
differences in student characteristics across the two types of institutions should not be
responsible for the large observed differences in returns to longer schedules. In columns
(2) to (8) we further show that the documented differential effect remains remarkably
stable when we add the interaction between exposure to the FSD and a dummy captur-
ing parental education (columns 2 and 6), the availability of books at home (columns
3 and 7), and the availability of ICT technologies at home (columns 4 and 8).44
As discussed earlier, charter schools have more autonomy over the design of the cur-
riculum and personnel decisions. According to survey evidence provided in sub-section
1.3.2, public and charter schools allocate the additional instruction time across subjects
in a similar way. We therefore focus on personnel decisions. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot
coefficients from the event study specification outlined in (1.5), where the outcomes
are various measures of teaching inputs at the school-year level. Consistent with the
need to provide more instruction hours, Figure 1.3 shows that total teachers’ contract
hours and teaching hours increase after the adoption of the FSD (top panel). More-
over, the pattern of coefficients is similar across public and no-fee charter schools and
confidence intervals overlap. Indeed, Appendix Table 1.C5 shows that the difference
between public and no-fee charter schools is significant only in the final event-years.
When total contract and teaching hours are divided by the number of classes (bottom
panel), the differences between the two types of schools are never significant.45
44In columns (2) to (8) all controls are also interacted with the dummy capturing a given
characteristic of the household in which the student lives. Furthermore, specifications are esti-
mated on the sub-sample of pupils for whom all background characteristics (parental education,
number of books at home, availability of ICT technologies at home) are non missing. The num-
ber of observations is nonetheless slightly different across specifications because of differences
in the number of singletons that are dropped.
45The coefficients presented in Table 1.C5 come from a richer version of specification (1.5),
where event year dummy and calendar year fixed effects are also interacted with a dummy (Ds)
taking value 1 if the school is a no-fee charter school. This specification allows to test whether
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An increase in the number of total contract and teaching hours can be achieved by
adjusting both the number of teachers and the number of contract/teaching hours per
teacher. Figure 1.4 shows that the number of teachers grow both in public and no-fee
charter schools, but the increase is significantly higher in charter schools that do not
charge tuition fees. On the contrary, contract hours per teacher increase significantly
more in public schools. Appendix Table 1.C5 confirms that these differences are statis-
tically significant. Also teaching hours per teacher grow more in no-fee charter schools
than in public establishments, with the difference been slightly smaller. Therefore no-
fee charter schools rely more than public schools on expanding the number of teachers,
whereas they resort less to increasing teachers’ workload. It appears that autonomy
over personnel decisions allows charter schools to adjust the teaching input in a differ-
ent way.
Appendix Table 1.C6 reports teachers’ opinions in 2005 about the FSD, dividing them
according to the type of school (public or charter) in which they teach. Public school
teachers display a lower degree of satisfaction with longer daily schedules. Only 45
per cent of them judge the FSD as “good or very good”, compared to 54 per cent of
charter school teachers. This may signal that the workload of teachers in public schools
increases excessively following the introduction of the FSD. This could in turn nega-
tively affect the absolute quality of additional time use in public schools, contributing
to explain the lower returns to longer schedules.46
differences between public and charter schools are statistically significant.
46Bellei [2009] and Berthelon et al. [2016] find that the effect of the FSD on achievement is
larger in public schools. Bellei [2009] focuses on pupils attending grade 10 in 2001 and in 2003,
while Berthelon et al. [2016] examine the effect of the FSD at grade 2 in a single year (2012).
In both cases, the sample of schools and the population studied are different from the ones
we investigate, and the sample periods mostly do not overlap. Furthermore, to avoid that our
estimates are confounded by differences in students’ characteristics, we compare public schools
only to charter schools that do not charge tuition fees, because we provide evidence that they
serve pupils from similar backgrounds. Additionally, we show that the larger effect of the FSD
found for students starting primary school in no-fee charter schools persists once we also allow
longer schedules to affect schoolchildren of higher and lower socio-economic status in a different
way.
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1.7 Conclusions
Academics and policymakers have long been interested in understanding the deter-
minants of school effectiveness. With the goal of improving pupils’ academic achieve-
ment, many countries undertake costly educational reforms in order to expand the
resources available to schools. Some other countries, including US and UK, have also
implemented reforms that grant schools more autonomy.
In this paper we study whether the effects of a large-scale expansion of instruction time
in Chilean primary education are different across public and no-fee charter schools.
While catering for similar students, no-fee charter schools enjoy greater levels of au-
tonomy. We find that school institutions matter in shaping returns to longer schedules
and that pupils who start primary school in no-fee charter schools benefit more than
those who start in public schools. In addition, as the returns to additional instruction
hours depend not only on the absolute quality of time-use at school, but also on the
relative quality of time spent outside of school, we further examine whether the effects
of the instruction time expansion are heterogeneous across schoolchildren from different
backgrounds. We provide evidence suggesting that returns could be larger for students
of lower socio-economic status who have less support at home.
To address these questions, we take advantage of the introduction of the Full School
Day (FSD) in publicly subsidized (i.e. public and charter) schools. We exploit within-
school variation in years of exposure to longer schedules by the end of grade 4 across
several cohorts of pupils starting primary education in a given school between 2002
and 2010 and taking a national level standardized test at the end of grade 4. To limit
the confounding effect of changes in the characteristics of pupil intake, we restrict our
attention to cohorts of incumbent pupils, i.e. students who started primary education
in schools that had not yet adopted the FSD and who possibly became exposed to it
at some stage of their first four years of education. Furthermore, we account for po-
tentially endogenous mobility across schools after first grade by instrumenting actual
exposure with the exposure a student would have experienced, had she never trans-
ferred out of the school where she attended first grade.
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We first document a positive average effect of longer schedules on reading and math-
ematics test scores, although estimates for the latter are not statistically significant.
It is important to highlight that relying on legacy enrollment cohorts for the sake of
identification implies that we are able to study only the first years after the implemen-
tation of the FSD. Insofar as it takes time to adjust, short-term effects —which are
interesting to study because most large-scale input expansion programs would entail
some initial adaptation challenges— may be lower than long-term ones.
Exploiting the features of the Chilean setting, we explore whether school institutions
affect returns to additional instruction time. To answer this question, we compare
pupils who started primary education in no-fee charter schools with pupils who started
in public schools. We focus on these two types of establishments because, while differ-
ing in terms of ownership and levels of autonomy, they serve similar students. Charter
schools that charge tuition fees, on the other hand, cater to children of higher socio-
economic status. This choice therefore attenuates concerns that the estimates reflect
differences in the types of students who attend different types of schools.
Charter schools enjoy more autonomy over the design of the curriculum and personnel
decisions. Since survey evidence suggests that public and charter schools allocate ad-
ditional instruction time across subjects in a similar way, we turn to staff decisions and
we uncover a significant difference. No-fee charter schools and public schools increased
the total contract and teaching hours required to provide longer schedules in a differ-
ent way: no-fee charter schools relied more on hiring additional teachers and less on
increasing working hours per teacher than public schools. If public school teachers deal
more often with a higher workload, which would be consistent with them reporting a
lower satisfaction with the FSD, then the absolute quality of time use in public school
may be lower, thus contributing to explaining the lower benefits we document for them.
Our findings are in line with the growing literature showing that charter schools are
associated with improved learning outcomes (see section 1.2). Lavy [2015] documents
that the productivity of instructional time is larger in schools that have more autonomy
over staff and budget decisons. We find a similar result and provide suggestive evidence
that autonomy over staff decisions seems important when expanding instruction time,
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because providing longer schedules requires adjusting the teaching input. In general,
our results suggest that school institutions and governance matter for the effectiveness
of various education policies. Further analysis on complementarities between school
inputs and institutions could be a promising avenue for future research.
Because increasing the amount of time pupils spend at school reduces the time for ac-
tivities outside of school, we also check whether the effects of the FSD vary depending
on the resources that students have available at home, as captured by parental edu-
cation, the number of books, and the availability of a computer and a connection to
the Internet. We show that pupils from advantaged backgrounds do not significantly
benefit from longer schedules, while the rest of the students in our sample do. Al-
though large in size, the difference in the benefits enjoyed by individuals from different
backgrounds are not statistically significant. With this caveat in mind, our findings
suggest that for children with fewer resources at home the relative quality of additional
time spent at school is higher, thus yielding larger benefits. According to information
contained in teachers’ surveys, the adoption of the FSD is likely associated with a re-
duced frequency of homework. In light of the limited support, as shown by time-use
surveys, that pupils of low socio-economic status receive outside of school, substituting
autonomous study at home with supervised learning at school may be a mechanism
underlying the documented heterogeneity.
These findings are in line with the results of Lavy [2015].47 If also confirmed in other
settings, they would suggest that the amount of time spent at school may play a role
in reducing inequality in learning opportunities. As pupils from different backgrounds
are exposed to the same school inputs for a larger part of the day, the role of house-
hold inputs —the quality of which varies greatly— may become less important. This
is likely to be especially true if, as in the Chilean setting, the additional instruction
time does not entail an expansion of the curriculum. Indeed, in a setting in which in-
creased weekly instruction hours are accompanied by an expansion of the curriculum,
Huebener et al. [2017] document a widening gap between high- and low-performing
47When restricting the analysis to a sub set of developing countries that include Chile, Lavy
[2015] finds a stronger effect among schoolchildren from highly educated families. However, he
does not provide country-specific estimates that allow to verify what is the estimated effect in
the case of Chile.
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German pupils.
Finally, policies that extend the length of the school day may also affect non-academic
outcomes. Berthelon and Kruger [2011], for instance, show that the FSD reduces the
incidence of teenage motherhood among girls and of youth crime, with the effects con-
centrated among poorer families; Contreras and Sepu´lveda [2016] report a positive
effect of the FSD on labor force participation and employment of single mothers whose
youngest child is eligible to attend longer schedules. Studying these outcomes goes be-
yond the scope of this paper, but it is important to bear them in mind when evaluating
this type of policies.
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Figure 1.1: FSD Adoption over the Period 1997-2013
Notes: The figure illustrates the pattern of adoption of the FSD in primary
publicly subsidized schools over the period 1997-2013. On the left axis it plots
the number of schools that had adopted the policy by a given year; on the right
axis it displays the share of public and charter schools that had implemented
the FSD by a given year.
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of Test Scores relative to 1 Year before the FSD Adoption
(a) Reading
(b) Mathematics
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence
intervals, from the event study specification (1.4). The FSD is adopted in
event-year 0 and coefficients show how different reading and mathematics test
scores are in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the
reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master
sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of Contract and Teaching Hours relative to 1 Year before
the FSD Adoption
(a) Contract hours (b) Teaching hours
(c) Contract hours/n. of classes (d) Teaching hours/n. of classes
Notes: Panels (a) to (d) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence inter-
vals, from the event study specification outlined in (1.5). The FSD is adopted
in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different contract and teaching hours
are in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference
year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample
enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of Number of Teachers, Contract Hours per Teacher and
Teaching Hours per Teacher relative to 1 Year before the FSD Adoption
(a) Number of teachers
(b) Contract hours per teacher
(c) Teaching hours per teacher
Notes: Panels (a) to (c) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence
intervals, from the event study specification outlined in (1.5). The FSD is
adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different the number of
teachers, contract hours per teacher and teaching hours per teacher are in
event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. The
sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample enrolled in
first grade. All specifications include school and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 1.1: Daily Schedules with and without the FSD
FSD No FSD
(1) (2)
Minimum number of hours per day 7.08 5.00
Example of daily schedule
5 days under FSD:
08:00-15.05




Notes: The table reports the minimum number of hours students spend at school every day
and the daily schedule with and without the FSD in place, inclusive of time devoted to
breaks. The minimum number of hours is prescribed in the law. Schools can freely choose
the time at which the school day starts. The daily schedules are built assuming that the full
school day and the morning shift start at 8.00, while the afternoon shift starts at 14.00.
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Natural and Social Sciences 6 6
Physical Education 3 3
Arts and Music 4 4
Technology 3 3
Others 2 2
School Free Choice 8 0
Total 38 30
Student Voucher (U.S.E.) 1.99 1.45
Notes: The table reports weekly subject-specific and total instruction
time with and without the FSD, for grades 1 to 4. The information
comes from the Decree 625 of the Ministry of Education published
in 2003 (http://bcn.cl/253tx). It also reports the amount of the
student voucher with and without the FSD, expressed in educational
subsidy units (U.S.E). This information comes from the version of
the DFL2/1996 of the Ministry of Education published in May, 2003
(http://bcn.cl/1uy40). These units underwent some modifications
since the implementation of the FSD reform.
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Table 1.3: Use of Time under the FSD in Primary Schools (Hours per Week)
Subject All Schools Public Schools Charter Schools
Core Time Free Choice Time Core Time Free Choice Time Core Time Free Choice Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spanish 5.47 2.39 5.39* 2.49 5.59* 2.24
(0.98) (1.64) (0.81) (1.59) (1.18) (1.71)
Mathematics 5.19 1.48 5.14 1.55 5.25 1.37
(0.94) (1.31) (0.78) (1.34) (1.13) (1.26)
Social Sciences 3.83 0.17 3.84 0.15 3.81 0.19
(0.81) (0.56) (0.74) (0.56) (0.91) (0.55)
Natural Sciences 3.89 0.49 3.91 0.47 3.85 0.51
(0.73) (0.94) (0.70) (0.93) (0.77) (0.96)
Foreign Languages 2.03 0.27 1.90*** 0.16*** 2.22*** 0.43***
(0.70) (0.75) (0.59) (0.57) (0.80) (0.93)
Technology 2.03 0.01 2.00 0.004 2.05 0.02
(0.53) (0.12) (0.52) (0.07) (0.54) (0.18)
Art 3.12 0.06 3.09 0.07 3.17 0.06
(0.81) (0.35) (0.77) (0.33) (0.86) (0.38)
Sports 2.10 0.04 2.04** 0.028 2.19** 0.06
(0.61) (0.27) (0.50) (0.21) (0.74) (0.34)
Religion 1.92 0.04 1.89 0.00*** 1.97 0.10***
(0.47) (0.28) (0.51) (0.00) (0.38) (0.43)
Number of Schools 387 229 158
Notes: The table reports hours per week allocated to different subjects in fifth grade for a representative sample
of urban schools that adopted the FSD by 2005 and were surveyed by the Studies Directorate of the Sociology
Faculty at the Catholic University of Chile (DESUC ). “Core Time” excludes “Free Choice” time. *, **, ***
indicate that the number of hours allocated to a given subject is significantly different between public and
charter schools at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics
All Public Charter
No Tuition Fees Tuition Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Students demographics
Female 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49
Age at school entry 6.60 6.60 6.60 6.59
Parental education
Less than university 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.78
Books at home
At most 50 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.79
Other resources at home
Computer 0.55 0.42 0.50 0.72
Internet 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.46
Schools Characteristics
First grade average class size 34.68 33.69 35.37 35.53
First grade enrollment 82.33 83.09 72.39 86.56
Academic performance
Reading test score -0.04 -0.17 -0.12 0.18
Mathematics test score -0.04 -0.17 -0.15 0.19
First-grade attendance rate 94.23 93.88 94.83 94.33
End of first-grade status (1=repeat) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
N. of students 604532 270417 114074 218495
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the sample of fourth graders who start
primary school between 2002 and 2010 in publicly subsidized schools that had not yet
adopted the FSD. Parental education refers to the highest educational attainment among
the mother and the father; in case the information is missing for one parent, it refers
to the education level of the other parent. All figures are expressed as fractions, except
from averages referring to the age of pupils, class size, enrollment, test scores and the
attendance rate. Test scores are standardized by year and subject (including also pupils
who are not in the master sample) to have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal
to 1. The number of observations in columns (2) to (4) does not sum to the number of
observations in column (1) because for 2.39 per cent of charter schools we could not find
information about the tuition fees.
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Table 1.5: Effect of the FSD on Test Scores
Linear specification Non parametric specification
FE1 FE2 FE-IV1 FE-IV2 FE-IV1 FE-IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Reading
Years under FSD 0.002 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Years under FSD = 1 0.023 0.022
(0.015) (0.015)
Years under FSD = 2 0.029** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.014)
Years under FSD = 3 0.116*** 0.114***
(0.021) (0.021)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.720***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 23614.36 24416.41 5136.66 5265.46
N. of students 596108 596108 596108 596108 596108 596108
B. Mathematics
Years under FSD -0.007** 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Years under FSD = 1 -0.014 -0.015
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 2 -0.003 -0.002
(0.017) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 3 0.057** 0.058**
(0.023) (0.023)
First stage coefficient 0.719*** 0.720***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 23460.87 24294.13 5140.07 5278.70
N. of students 596281 596281 596281 596281 596281 596281
Student-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores. Estimates in columns (1),
(3) and (5) are based on a parsimonious specification that only includes as controls school fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Estimates in other columns are based on a richer specification that features an additional set of controls.
Specifically, student-level controls include: gender, age at school entry, as well as the attendance rate and the status
(pass or repeat) at the end of grade 1. School-level controls include averages of the students’ characteristics at the
school level, as well as enrollment and average class size in first grade. The effect of the FSD is assumed to be linear
in exposure in columns (1) to (4), whereas it is allowed to vary in a fully non-parametric way in columns (5) and (6).
In specifications FE-IV1 and FE-IV2 the treatment (i.e. actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4)
is instrumented with the exposure a student would experience had she never transferred out of her first-grade school.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.






















Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Effects of the FSD on Test Scores by Students’ Socio-economic Background
Reading Mathematics
D = 1(NoUni.) D = 1(Books ≤ 50) D = 1(NoICT ) D = 1(NoUni.) D = 1(Books ≤ 50) D = 1(NoICT )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years under FSD 0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.003 0.011 0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Years under FSD × D 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 2781.84 11502.69 5644.29 2797.02 11528.94 5643.12
N. of students 532970 529879 517249 534473 531369 518676
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores by different measures of students’ socio-economic background. Every
column shows an enriched version of specification (1.2) where the treatment and all controls listed in the notes to Table 1.5, including school and year fixed
effects, are also interacted with a dummy D, capturing a relevant dimension of heterogeneity. In columns (1) and (4) D takes value 1 if no parent in the
household has some university education, and 0 otherwise. In columns (2) and (5) D takes value 1 if there are at most 50 books at home, and 0 otherwise. In
columns (3) and (6) D takes value 1 if there is not a computer or an Internet connection at home, and 0 otherwise. Actual years of exposure to the FSD are
instrumented with years of exposure a student would accumulate had she never transferred from the school where she attended first grade. Standard errors
are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.






















Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects of the FSD on Test Scores by School Type
Reading Mathematics
D = 1(NoUni.) D= 1(Books ≤ 50) D=1(NoICT ) D = 1(NoUni.) D=1(Books ≤ 50) D=1(NoICT )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years under FSD 0.019** -0.001 0.023 0.011 0.012 -0.007 0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016)
Years under FSD × no-fee charter 0.042** 0.047** 0.046** 0.045** 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Years under FSD × SES char. D 0.022 -0.003 0.009 0.024 0.010 0.015
(0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 828.30 605.18 609.12 632.25 839.28 602.71 606.90 630.61
N. of students 377856 319187 319234 319254 377719 320061 320108 320129
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores by the type of school (public or charter without tuition fees) that the student attended
in grade 1. Estimates in columns (1) and (5) are based on an enriched version of specification (1.2), where the treatment and all controls listed in the notes to Table 1.5,
including year fixed effects, are also interacted with a dummy taking value 1 if the school is a charter establishment without tuition fees, and 0 if it is public. In columns
(2) and (6) the treatment and all controls are further interacted with a dummy that takes value 1 if none of the parents has some university education, and 0 otherwise.
In columns (3) and (7) the treatment and all controls are further interacted with a dummy that takes value 1 if there are at most 50 books at home, and 0 otherwise. In
columns (4) and (8) the treatment and all controls are further interacted with a dummy that takes value 1 if either the computer or a connection to the Internet are not
available at home, and 0 otherwise. Actual years of exposure to the FSD are instrumented with years of exposure a student would accumulate had she never transferred
from the school where she attended first grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Appendices
1.A Public and Charter Schools
Public and charter schools are subject to different regulations. This translates into
charter schools enjoying more autonomy and flexibility over curriculum, budgetary and
personnel decisions.
Public schools are either managed by the Municipal Department of Education (DAEM )
or by private non-profit education corporations. While the director of the DAEM is
a teacher, corporations are led by a board of directors who do not need to be teach-
ers and whose president is the major of the municipality. Under both management
schemes decisions related to the allocation of resources and to hiring/firing school staff
are taken at the municipality level and school principals are not necessarily involved.
Charter schools are instead private organizations and all relevant decisions are taken
by the school authorities.
The working conditions of the employees of public schools are regulated by the Estatuto
de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n. The relevant regulation for charter schools is the
Co´digo del Trabajo, the labor code that applies to all firms in Chile. Appointments of
public school teachers are decided by a commission that is formed by the Major, the
director of the DAEM or the education corporations, as well as one randomly selected
teacher from the schools in the municipality. Priority is given to spouses of teachers
already working in the municipality. The salary of public school teachers is fixed ac-
cording to a national scale that takes into account experience, training, specific difficult
situations (such as teaching in rural, remote or deprived areas) and responsibilities. Fir-
ing is subject to many restrictions. It is possible only if one of the following conditions
are met: i) school enrollment decreases; ii) the national curriculum undergoes changes
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that justify the decision; iii) schools’ merges; iv) protracted poor performance (see
below). Teachers having tenured positions enjoy a greater job security.48 In any case,
firings have to be justified in the Annual Plan of Educational Development that needs
the approval of the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Education. Charter schools are
instead free to set their own recruitment and dismissal criteria. Wages and the other
working conditions are subject to the same regulations that apply to private firms.
There are also differences in the evaluation of teachers. The Estatuto de los Profesion-
ales de la Educacio´n originally set some criteria for assessing teachers performance,
but they were never fully implemented. In 2003 a new evaluation system was agreed.
Nevertheless it is quite lax and in practice very few teachers receive poor evaluations.
In principle, teachers could be fired if they fare unsatisfactorily in two or three consecu-
tive evaluations. School principals are not accountable based on the school performance
and they can be fired only in case of a grave fault, while poor evaluations can result in
assigning them to smaller schools. Charter schools can instead set their own evaluation
systems and the consequences in case of poor performance.
48The Estatuto de los Profesionales de la Educacio´n contemplates two type of contracts,
titular and contratado. The first type of contract affords a greater job security, as it offers a
tenured position.
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1.B Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check, we show that specification (1.2) delivers similar esti-
mates if we also control for a set of characteristics of teachers in the school s where the
student started first grade in year t. Specifically, we include as controls the share of
female teachers, the share of teachers with an education degree and teachers’ average
age.49 Appendix Table 1.B1 shows that results are virtually unchanged.
A possible concern not addressed by specification (1.2) is that other events may hap-
pen in a school around the time of FSD adoption and affect learning outcomes in the
following years. Our estimates would then also capture the effects of other changes to
the school environment.
The first potential confounder to check is infrastructure investment, as some schools
had to expand their infrastructure prior to switching to a single-shift scheme. Funds
disbursed for this purpose covered costs related to replicating the existing infrastructure
on a larger scale, not to improving it. Nonetheless, to address this issue, we replicate
our analysis on the sample of pupils who started first grade in schools that did not
receive public funds for expanding infrastructure. These establishments are unlikely to
have made substantial changes to their facilities prior to lengthening the school day.
Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table 1.B2 report estimates that are in a similar
range as those coming from the full sample of schools. An additional year of exposure
to the FSD raises reading test scores by 0.020σ. The effect on mathematics test scores
is virtually 0. According to this exercise, infrastructure investment does not appear to
be an important alternative driver of our estimates.
In 2008 Chile introduced a Preferential School Subsidy scheme (Subvencio´n Escolar
Preferencial, or PSS henceforth) which grants schools an additional subsidy for each
disadvantaged student they cater to.50 To check whether our estimates are also cap-
49These controls are not included in the baseline specification because they are not available
for the year 2002 and are missing for some schools in other years. In this regression specification,
we assume that the teaching staff in 2002 is the same as that observed in 2003, so as not to
drop one year of observations.
50The receipt of the subsidy is conditional upon schools developing a pedagogical plan that
outlines how additional funds are used to improve learning outcomes and upon allowing for an
external evaluation of the results achieved. See Santiago et al. [2013] for more info.
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turing the roll-out of the subsidy, we implement two exercises. First, we enrich spec-
ification (1.2) with controls for the individual exposure to the PSS scheme (i.e. the
number of grades during which the student received the subsidy) by grade 4 and the
average share of pupils benefiting from the PSS scheme in the schools attended by a
student in grades 1 to 4. Second, we estimate specification (1.2) on the sub-sample of
cohorts never exposed to the PSS (i.e. those starting primary education before 2005).
In both cases, coefficients are similar to those coming from the main specification and,
if anything, in the case of reading they are slightly larger (Table 1.B2, columns 3 and
5).
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Table 1.B1: Effect of the FSD on Test Scores including Teacher Controls
Linear specification Non parametric specification
FE2 FE2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2 FE-IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Reading
Years under FSD 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Years under FSD = 1 0.022 0.023
(0.015) (0.015)
Years under FSD = 2 0.030** 0.032**
(0.014) (0.014)
Years under FSD = 3 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.021) (0.021)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.723***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24416.41 24689.20 5265.46 5244.84
N. of students 596108 578112 596108 578112 596108 578112
B. Mathematics
Years under FSD 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Years under FSD = 1 -0.015 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 2 -0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.016)
Years under FSD = 3 0.058** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.023)
First stage coefficient 0.720*** 0.723***
(0.005) (0.005)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24294.13 24506.65 5278.70 5253.62
N. of students 596281 578281 596281 578281 596281 578281
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports the effect of the FSD on reading and mathematics test scores. Estimates in columns (1),
(3) and (5) are based on the specification with baseline controls. Student-level controls include: gender, age at school
entry, as well as the attendance rate and the status (pass or repeat) at the end of grade 1. School-level controls include
averages of the students’ characteristics at the school level, as well as enrollment and average class size. Estimates in
columns (2), (4) and (6) include also controls referring to teachers’ characteristics when the students attend grade 1.
Specifically, they are the share of female teachers, teachers’ average age and the share of teachers with an education
degree. The treatment in specifications FE2 is actual years of exposure to the FSD by the end of grade 4, while in
specifications FE-IV2 is instrumented with the exposure a student would experience had she never transferred out of
her first grade school. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.B2: Effect of the FSD on Test Scores - Robustness Checks
No infrastructure funds PSS
Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics Reading Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years under FSD 0.020** -0.001 0.027*** 0.011 0.026** 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013)
Number of students 379449 379691 596020 596190 291057 291085
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 9202.99 9259.78 21528.75 21474.33 11287.84 11198.08
Student-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table presents the results from a set of specifications that check the robustness of the main estimates of the
effects of the FSD on test scores. All specifications include school and year fixed effects, and actual exposure to the
FSD is instrumented with the exposure a student would accumulate had she never transferred from the school where she
attended first grade. In columns (1) and (2), specification (1.2) is estimated on the sub-sample of pupils in the master
sample who start first grade in schools that did not receive public funds for expanding their infrastructure. In columns
(3) and (4) specification (1.2) is enriched with two additional controls, on top of those listed in the notes to Table 1.5:
individual exposure to the Preferential Subsidy Scheme (PSS) policy by grade 4 and the average share of pupils benefiting
from the PSS in the schools attended by the student in grades 1 to 4. In columns (5) and (6) , specification (1.2) is
estimated on the sub-sample of cohorts never exposed to the Preferential Subsidy Scheme (i.e. cohorts starting primary
education between 2002 and 2004). Standard errors are clustered at the school level and are reported in parenthesis.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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1.C Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 1.C1: Evolution of the Number of Subjects Relative to 1 Year before the
FSD Adoption
(a) Spanish (b) Mathematics
(c) Foreign languages (d) Tutorials and workshops
(e) Sports (f) Total n. of subjects
Notes: Panels (a) to (f) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence
intervals, from the event study specification outlined in (1.1). The FSD is
adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different the number of
subjects taught is in event-year p relative to event-year -1, which is taken
as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in
the master sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school,
grade and year fixed effects, as well as their interactions. Standard errors are
clustered at the school-grade level.
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Figure 1.C2: Evolution of Transfers relative to 1 Year before the FSD Adoption
(a) Transfers out of the school
(b) Transfers into the school
(c) Net transfers (In - Out)
Notes: Panels (a), (b) and (c) plot coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence
intervals, from the event study specification outlined in (1.5). The FSD is
adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different the number of
transfers in grades 1 to 4 is in event-year p relative to event-year -1, which is
taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students
in the master sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Figure 1.C3: Evolution of Class Size relative to 1 Year before the FSD Adoption
Notes: The figure plots coefficients, alongside 95 per cent confidence intervals,
from the event study specification outlined in (1.5). The FSD is adopted in
event-year 0 and coefficients show how different the average class size in grades
1 to 4 is in event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference
year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the master sample
enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
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Table 1.C1: Characteristics of Students in the Master Sample who do and do not
Transfer
First grade FSD Exposure
Academic Performance
Attendance Repetition Real Potential
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Do not transfer between grades 1 and 4 94.64 0.02 0.52 0.51
Transfer between grades 1 and 4 93.44 0.05 1.35 0.42
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the average attendance rate in grade 1 for students
in the master sample and the fraction of them who repeat grade 1, distinguishing
pupils who never transfer between grades 1 and 4 from those who transfer. Columns
(3) and (4) display their average actual exposure to the FSD by grade 4 as well their
average “potential” exposure, i.e. the years of exposure a student would experience
had she never transferred out of her first-grade school.
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Table 1.C2: Support Received by Students Outside of School
Help with homework Tutoring
from household
head and head’ spouse
1 = Yes Hours 1 = Yes Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No university 0.328 0.557 0.050 0.124
University 0.483 0.791 0.119 0.280
Observations 6214 4564 2677 2666
Notes: The table shows the amount of support that stu-
dents receive outside of school, depending on whether
they live in a household where one among the household
head and the head’ spouse has some university educa-
tion (row “University”) or not (row “No university”).
The units of observation are the households heads and
their spouses (in households where these is at least one
child aged 5-18) when the question is whether they pro-
vide help with homework. The units of observations
are pupils aged 12-18 (younger children are not inter-
viewed) when the question is whether they receive tu-
toring outside of school. Information is drawn from the
2015 Chilean Time-Use Survey (Encuesta nacional sobre
uso del tiempo).
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Every class 20.04% 11.80%
Almost every class 50.39% 39.35%
Some classes 28.42% 46.33%
Never 1.15% 2.51%
N. of Teachers 3294 18494
B. Schools that had not adopted
the FSD by 2011
2011 2013
No FSD FSD
Every class 22.51% 18.81% 7.95%
Almost every class 51.88% 52.10% 31.82%
Some classes 24.50% 28.34% 59.09%
Never 1.11% 0.74% 1.14%
N. of Teachers 902 808 88
Notes: The table reports information about the fre-
quency of mathematics homework, drawn from the 2011,
2012 and 2013 waves of the teacher surveys administered
alongside the SIMCE test. Panel A compares the fre-
quency of homework in schools with and without the
FSD. Panel B focuses on schools that had not adopted
the FSD by 2011 and compare homework frequency in
2011 and 2013. In 2013, schools are divided according to
whether they switched to longer schedules by that year
(column 3) or not (column 2).
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Table 1.C4: Differences in School Autonomy between Public and Charter Schools
Public schools Charter schools
(1) (2)
Textbook use 95 98
Courses content 39 57
Courses offer 80 96
Formulate budget 31 97
Allocate budget 65 98
Hire teachers 28 99
Fire teachers 10 97
Set starting salaries 1 87
Increase salaries 1 87
Observations 62 85
Notes: The table reports the percentage of schools
in which the principal or the governing body have a
considerable responsibility over the listed tasks. Infor-
mation comes from the 2006 and 2009 school surveys
administered alongside PISA tests. The sample con-
sists of all public or charter schools in the Chilean
PISA sample that also offer primary education.
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Table 1.C5: Evolution of Teacher related Inputs relative to 1 Year before the
FSD Adoption
Contract HH. Teaching HH. ContractHH.N.ofClasses
TeachingHH.





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Event-year -5 5.801 7.693 -1.799*** -0.856* 0.219 -0.287 -0.067
(7.171) (6.583) (0.538) (0.462) (0.218) (0.279) (0.297)
Event-year -4 6.804 8.192 -1.170** -0.482 0.227 -0.311 -0.223
(6.436) (5.908) (0.483) (0.414) (0.195) (0.250) (0.267)
Event-year -3 -3.554 -2.088 -1.031** -0.835** -0.115 -0.267 -0.186
(5.992) (5.500) (0.450) (0.386) (0.182) (0.233) (0.248)
Event-year -2 0.725 0.638 -0.508 -0.413 0.050 -0.094 -0.075
(5.286) (4.852) (0.397) (0.340) (0.160) (0.205) (0.219)
Event-year 0 25.310*** 25.521*** 2.626*** 2.283*** 0.291** 0.904*** 0.867***
(4.764) (4.373) (0.357) (0.307) (0.145) (0.185) (0.197)
Event-year 1 68.160*** 63.904*** 5.487*** 5.166*** 0.796*** 2.550*** 2.326***
(4.870) (4.471) (0.365) (0.314) (0.148) (0.189) (0.202)
Event-year 2 76.502*** 72.051*** 6.371*** 5.946*** 0.930*** 2.900*** 2.641***
(5.071) (4.655) (0.380) (0.327) (0.154) (0.197) (0.210)
Event-year 3 74.470*** 71.325*** 6.676*** 6.286*** 0.745*** 3.339*** 3.085***
(5.312) (4.876) (0.399) (0.342) (0.161) (0.206) (0.220)
Event-year 4 78.879*** 75.229*** 7.339*** 6.847*** 0.784*** 3.661*** 3.311***
(5.581) (5.123) (0.419) (0.360) (0.169) (0.217) (0.231)
Event-year -5 × Ds -20.288 -19.524 -0.006 -1.341 -0.445 0.073 -0.648
(15.072) (13.835) (1.134) (0.974) (0.458) (0.585) (0.625)
Event-year -4 × Ds -17.040 -18.298 0.023 -0.904 -0.104 0.087 -0.371
(13.860) (12.722) (1.039) (0.892) (0.421) (0.538) (0.574)
Event-year -3 × Ds -5.540 -2.519 0.181 0.221 0.204 0.251 0.316
(12.935) (11.873) (0.970) (0.832) (0.393) (0.502) (0.536)
Event-year -2 × Ds -18.923 -18.884* -1.002 -0.909 -0.495 0.208 0.143
(11.976) (10.993) (0.897) (0.770) (0.364) (0.465) (0.496)
Event-year 0 × Ds -11.246 -9.220 -0.474 0.143 0.096 -0.746* -0.386
(10.282) (9.438) (0.771) (0.662) (0.312) (0.399) (0.426)
Event-year 1 × Ds -11.131 -10.071 -1.099 -0.717 0.700** -1.717*** -1.264***
(10.479) (9.619) (0.785) (0.674) (0.318) (0.407) (0.434)
Event-year 2 × Ds 1.279 -1.266 -0.262 -0.206 1.082*** -1.556*** -1.223***
(10.792) (9.906) (0.809) (0.695) (0.328) (0.419) (0.447)
Event-year 3 × Ds 20.155* 15.900 0.255 0.263 1.599*** -1.440*** -1.057**
(11.193) (10.275) (0.840) (0.721) (0.340) (0.435) (0.464)
Event-year 4 × Ds 45.760*** 40.727*** 1.330 1.148 2.317*** -1.382*** -1.057**
(11.666) (10.708) (0.875) (0.751) (0.354) (0.453) (0.483)
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of school-years 19074 19074 18828 18828 19074 19074 19074
Notes: The table reports coefficients from a richer version of the event study specification outlined in (1.5) where calendar year
fixed effects and event years are also interacted with a dummy Ds taking value 1 if the school is a no-fee charter school, and 0
otherwise. The FSD is adopted in event-year 0 and coefficients show how different total contract hours, teaching hours, contract
hours per class, teaching hour per class, total number of teachers, contract hours per teacher and teaching hours per teacher are in
event-year ρ relative to event-year -1, which is taken as the reference year. The sample consists of all schools where students in the
master sample enrolled in first grade. All specifications include school and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
school level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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Table 1.C6: Teachers opinion about the FSD
Public Schools Charter Schools
(1) (2)
Good or very good 44.99% 54.44%
Not bad, not good 32.99% 29.89%
Bad or very bad 22.02% 15.67%
Notes: The table reports the opinion of teachers about the FSD,
dividing them according to the school (public or charter) in which
they teach. Information is drawn from the 2005 wave of the En-
cuesta Longitudinal Docente implemented by the Centro de Mi-
crodatos of the Universidad de Chile.
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This paper investigates whether the decision to attend university depends on university
enrollment of close neighbors. I create a unique dataset combining detailed geographic
information and educational records from different government agencies in Chile, and
exploit the quasi-random variation generated by the rules that determine eligibility
for student loans. I find that close neighbors have a large and significant impact on
university enrollment of younger applicants. Potential applicants are 10 percentage
points more likely to attend university if a close neighbor enrolled the year before.
This effect is particularly strong in areas where university attendance is low and among
neighbors who are more likely to interact with each other; the effect decreases both with
physical and social distance and is weaker for individuals who have spent less time in
the neighborhood. I also show that the increase in university attendance is mediated by
an increase in applications rather than by an improvement on academic performance.
These results suggest that policies that expand access to university generate spillovers
on the peers of the direct beneficiaries. I show that in areas where university attendance
is low the indirect effect of student loans represents more than 15% of the direct effect
on enrollment.
Keywords: Neighbors’ Effects, University Access, University Enrollment.
JEL classification: I21, I24, R23, R28.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite high returns to schooling and governmental efforts to improve educational
attainment, university enrollment remains low among disadvantaged individuals in
both developing and developed countries. While not all of these individuals would
benefit from a university education, enrollment is low even among those with high
academic potential.1 This situation is partially explained by the absence of enough
funding opportunities, but there is growing evidence that the lack of information, sup-
port, and encouragement also plays an important role in schooling decisions [Hoxby
and Avery, 2013, Carrell and Sacerdote, 2017].2 This evidence also shows that the
barriers preventing students to take full advantage of their education opportunities are
higher in areas where university attendance is low, suggesting that the neighborhoods
where individuals live matter.3
This paper builds on these findings and investigates whether potential applicants’ de-
cision to attend university is affected by university enrollment of close neighbors. Al-
though the role of peers in education has been widely studied, this paper is among the
first looking at how they influence enrollment in higher education.4 By addressing this
question I contribute to understanding if neighborhood effects are driven at least in
1Figure 2.E1 in the appendix shows that in the case of Chile —the setting studied in this
paper— the gap in university enrollment persists along the ability distribution.
2Hoxby and Avery [2013] show that high achieving individuals from areas with low edu-
cational attainment in the United States apply to less selective schools than similar students
from other areas. This, despite the fact that better schools would admit and provide them with
more generous funding. This undermatching phenomenon has also been studied by Black et al.
[2015], Griffith and Rothstein [2009] and Smith et al. [2013]. There is also a vast literature
looking at the role of information frictions in schooling investment. Attanasio and Kaufmann
[2014], Hastings et al. [2015] and Jensen [2010] study these frictions in Mexico, Chile and Do-
minican Republic respectively. Bettinger et al. [2012] and Hoxby and Turner [2015] look at
them in the United States, and Oreopoulos and Dunn [2013] in Canada. Carrell and Sacer-
dote [2017] on the other hand, argues that interventions that increase university enrollment
work not because they provide additional information, but instead because they compensate
for lack of support and encouragement. Lavecchia et al. [2016] discusses these frictions and
different behavioral barriers that may explain why some individuals do not take full advantage
of education opportunities.
3This is also consistent with recent studies on neighborhood effects like Chetty et al. [2016]
and Chetty and Hendren [2018a] that show that exposure to better neighborhoods increases
the probability of college enrollment. Burdick-Will and Ludwig [2010] discusses the literature
on neighborhood effects and education attainment.
4Bifulco et al. [2014] studies how having classmates with a college-educated mother affects
college enrollment. Mendolia et al. [2018] investigates how peers’ ability affect performance on
high stake exams and on university attendance. Carrell et al. [2018] looks at the effect of having
disruptive peers at the elementary school on long-term outcomes, including college enrollment.
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part by exposure to better peers. This in contrast to only being driven by exposure to
better institutions (i.e. schools, public infrastructure, security). In addition, this ques-
tion is relevant from a policy perspective because these neighbors’ effects would imply
that programs that expand access to university generate externalities that should be
incorporated into the design and evaluation of this type of policies.
I study these neighbors’ effects in Chile, taking advantage of the fact that eligibility
for student loans depends on students scoring above a cutoff on the university admis-
sion exam and that eligibility for this type of funding increases university enrollment
[Solis, 2017]. Exploiting the discontinuity generated by this cutoff rule, I implement a
fuzzy RD using potential applicants’ enrollment as outcome and instrumenting their
neighbors’ enrollment with an indicator of their eligibility for student loans.
To conduct this analysis, I create a unique dataset that combines detailed geographic
information and educational records from multiple government agencies. This allows
me to identify potential applicants and their neighbors, and to follow them throughout
high school and in the transition to higher education.
A key challenge for the identification of neighbors’ effects is to distinguish between
social interactions and correlated effects. In this context, correlated effects arise be-
cause individuals are not randomly allocated to neighborhoods and because once in
the neighborhood, they are exposed to similar institutions and shocks. Since potential
applicants who have a close neighbor near the student loans eligibility cutoff are very
similar, the fuzzy RD used in this paper allows me to rule out the estimated effects to
be driven by differences in individual or neighborhood characteristics, eliminating in
this way concerns about correlated effects.
In addition, if peers’ outcomes have an effect on each other, this gives rise to what
Manski [1993] described as the “reflection problem”. This paper focuses on potential
applicants who decide whether or not to enroll in university one year after their neigh-
bors. Thus, neighbors’ decision should not be affected by what potential applicants
do one year later. This lagged structure and the fact that the variation on neighbors’
enrollment only comes from eligibility for funding allows me to abstract from the “re-
flection problem”.
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Based on this empirical analysis, I provide three sets of results. Firstly, I find that
having a close neighbor going to university has a large and significant impact on po-
tential applicants’ university enrollment, increasing it by around 10 percentage points.
I also show that this effect is stronger when individuals are more likely to interact.
Only the closest neighbors seem to matter and the effect quickly decays with distance,
completely disappearing after 200 meters. The effects also seem to be stronger among
neighbors who are closer in gender and socioeconomic status, and for individuals who
have lived in the neighborhood for longer.
Secondly, I show that having a close neighbor eligible for student-loans increases uni-
versity enrollment of potential applicants. I study how this indirect effect of eligibility
for funding changes depending on the university attendance rates observed at different
municipalities and find that it is stronger in low attendance areas, where it represents
more than 15% of the direct effect of student loans on enrollment. Neighbors are not
the only peers that may affect potential applicants. I also study what happens in the
case of siblings and find that a similar indirect effect arises in this context. Potential
applicants with an older sibling eligible for student loans are also more likely to enroll
in university.
Finally, I show that the increase in university enrollment documented for both neigh-
bors and siblings, is mediated by an increase in the number of potential applicants
taking the university admission exam and applying to university and to financial aid.
I find no effects on their attendance or on their academic performance during high
school.
These results are consistent with two broad classes of mechanisms. First, neighbors
may increase university enrollment of potential applicants by providing them with rel-
evant information about applications, returns and the overall university experience.
Second, they could also affect the costs of going to university. Although with the data
that I have available I cannot perfectly distinguish between them, I present suggestive
evidence that information is the mechanism behind the documented responses.
This paper contributes to existing research in several ways. Firstly, it contributes to
the literature on peers’ effects. Since the publication of the Coleman Report [Coleman,
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1966], peers’ effects in education have been widely studied.5 Although the majority
of these studies have focused in the classroom, others have looked at neighborhoods
[Goux and Maurin, 2007, Gibbons et al., 2013, 2017], and at the family [Goodman et al.,
2015, Dustan, 2018, Joensen and Nielsen, 2018].6 Others have studied peer effects in
higher education [Sacerdote, 2001, Zimmerman, 2003, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2006, Foster, 2006, Lyle, 2007, Carrell et al., 2009, Feld and Zo¨litz, 2017]. Few of them
find sizeable effects on academic performance. However, as pointed out by Hoxby and
Weingarth [2005] and further discussed by Lavy et al. [2012], Burke and Sass [2013]
and Imberman et al. [2012] this could be a consequence of assuming linear-in-means
average effects; indeed, when relaxing this assumption, they find large peers’ effects for
some groups of individuals. On the other hand, studies looking at “social”outcomes
like program participation, group membership, church attendance, alcohol consump-
tion, drug use, teenage pregnancy and criminal behavior find much bigger effects [Case
and Katz, 1991, Gaviria and Raphael, 2001, Sacerdote, 2001, Duflo and Saez, 2003,
Boisjoly et al., 2006, Maurin and Moschion, 2009, Mora and Oreopoulos, 2011, Dahl
et al., 2014].
This paper is novel not only because of the outcome and type of peers analyzed, but
also because in the Chilean setting I can overcome a challenge commonly faced by pre-
vious studies, which is how to define the relevant peer group. Defining it as the whole
class or looking at neighbors’ effects using a too large definition of neighborhood may
dilute the effects of the actual peers. The detailed information I have on neighbors
allows me to study how the effects evolve with physical and social distance.
Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature on underinvestment in higher educa-
tion. This literature has shown that especially in disadvantaged contexts, individuals
face constraints that prevent them of taking full advantage of the education opportu-
nities that they have available. The hypotheses most commonly studied for explaining
5See for instance Hoxby [2000], Boozer and Cacciola [2001], Hoxby [2002], Hanushek et al.
[2003], Angrist and Lang [2004], Burke and Sass [2013], Ammermueller and Pischke [2009],
Lavy and Schlosser [2011], Mora and Oreopoulos [2011], Imberman et al. [2012], Lavy et al.
[2012], Sojourner [2013], Bursztyn and Jensen [2015]
6These papers study the relation between education investment decisions of siblings. Good-
man et al. [2015] look at correlations between siblings’ college-major choices, Dustan [2018]
at the choice of high school and Joensen and Nielsen [2018] at the subjects taken during high
school. Although related to my work, the focus of these studies is on different margins.
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this phenomenon are liquidity and information constraints, but there is also evidence
that other behavioral constraints play a role.7 In this paper, I add a new element to
the analysis by investigating the role of neighbors and siblings on the university enroll-
ment decision. These peers could contribute to reduce some of the frictions previously
discussed. In addition, by exploiting variation that comes from a funding program, I
can study their indirect effects (i.e. effects of funding on the peers of the direct bene-
ficiaries).
Finally, it adds to the literature on neighborhood effects. This literature has shown
that exposure to a better neighborhood as a child reduces teenage pregnancy, improves
future earnings and increases the probability of college enrollment [Chetty et al., 2014,
2016, Chetty and Hendren, 2018a,b].8 However, from these results we cannot tell to
what extent the observed effects are driven by exposure to better peers or to better
institutions (i.e. schools, infrastructure, security).9 This paper focuses on the role of
peers by exploiting a source of variation that allows the identification of neighbors’
effects keeping the neighborhood where individuals live fixed.
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections. The second section describes the
Chilean higher education system, while the third describes the data. The fourth sec-
tion discusses the identification strategy, and the fifth the main results of the paper.
The sixth section looks at siblings and investigates responses of potential applicants in
other educational outcomes. The seventh section discusses mechanisms and relate the
main results of the paper to previous findings. Finally, section eight concludes.
7Examples of papers studying liquidity constraints include Dynarski [2000], Seftor and
Turner [2002], Dynarski [2003], Long [2004], van der Klaauw [2002], Solis [2017]; on the other
hand examples of papers investigating information frictions include Bettinger et al. [2012],
Busso et al. [2017], Dinkelman and Mart´ınez A. [2014], Hastings et al. [2015, 2016], Hoxby
and Turner [2015], Oreopoulos and Dunn [2013], Wiswall and Zafar [2013], Booij et al. [2012],
Nguyen [2008], Castleman and Page [2015]. Carrell and Sacerdote [2017] on the other hand,
argues that differences in support and encouragement are key to explain this. Lavecchia et al.
[2016] discusses the literature on behavioral constraints that may explain why some individuals
do not take full advantage of their education opportunities.
8This has been an active area of research in the last decade. Damm and Dustmann [2014],
Fryer and Katz [2013], Kling et al. [2005, 2007], Ludwig et al. [2012] are examples of papers
exploiting experimental or quasi experimental variation to study neighborhood effects on mental
health, wellbeing, criminal behavior, among others.
9 The policy implications of these two alternative explanations are very different. As
Burdick-Will and Ludwig [2010] point out, if neighborhood effects are mainly driven by the
quality of local institutions, then educational attainment could be improved by investing in
these institutions without having to move disadvantaged individuals to different areas.
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2.2 Higher Education in Chile
This section describes the higher education system in Chile. It begins characterizing
the institutions that offer this level of education; continues explaining the university
admission system and finishes discussing the main financial aid programs available in
the country.
2.2.1 Institutions and Inequality in the System
In Chile, higher education is offered by three types of institutions: vocational cen-
ters, professional institutes, and universities. Only universities can grant academic
degrees, and in 2017 they attracted 48.1% of the students entering higher education.
Despite the expansion experienced by the higher education system in the last decades,
inequality in access to university remains high.10 According to the national household
survey (CASEN), in 2015 individuals in the top decile of the income distribution were
3.5 times more likely to attend university than students in the bottom decile.11
Although part of this inequality can be explained by differences in academic poten-
tial measured by students’ performance in standardized tests in grade 10, Figure 2.1
shows that the gap in university enrollment persists along the ability distribution. This
figure also shows that while on average, low-income students are less likely to attend
university, in some municipalities their enrollment is higher in comparison to wealthier
students from other locations.
2.2.2 University Admission System
In Chile, there are public and private universities. All the public universities and 9
out of 43 private universities are part of the Council of Chilean Universities (CRUCH),
10According to figures of the Ministry of Education, the number of students going to univer-
sity was five times bigger in 2017, than in 1990. The number of students going to professional
institutes increased by 10 times over the same period. In the case of vocational centers, it
doubled.
11Figure 2.E2 in the appendix illustrates university attendance rates for the whole income
distribution. Also according to the CASEN, the main reasons for not attending higher education
among individuals between 18 and 24 years old are personal (49.7%) and economic (47.5%).
Academic performance is mentioned in less than 1.5% of the cases as a reason for not going to
higher education.
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an organization that was created to improve coordination and to provide advice to the
Ministry of Education in matters related to higher education. For-profit universities
are forbidden under the Chilean law.
The CRUCH universities and since 2012 other eight private universities select their
students using a centralized deferred acceptance admission system that only considers
students’ performance in high school and in a national level university admission exam
(PSU).12 The PSU is taken in December, at the end of the Chilean academic year, but
students typically need to register before mid-August.13 Since 2006 all the students
graduating from public and voucher schools are eligible for a fee waiver that in practice
makes the PSU free for them.14
The universities that do not participate in the centralized system have their own ad-
mission systems.15 Although they could use their own entrance exams, the PSU still
plays an important role in the selection of their students, mostly due to strong finan-
cial incentives for both the students and the institutions.16 For instance, the largest
financial aid programs for university require students to score above a cutoff in the
PSU.
12 The PSU has four sections: Language, mathematics, social sciences and natural sciences.
The raw scores obtained by students in each of these sections are adjusted to obtain a normal
distribution of scores with mean 500 and standard deviation 110. The extremes of the distri-
bution are truncated to obtain a minimum score of 150 and a maximum score of 850 in each
section. In order to apply, students need to take language, mathematics and at least one of
the other sections. Universities are free to set the weights allocated to these instruments for
selecting students. Students apply to their programs of interest using an online platform. They
are asked to rank up to 10 programs according to their preferences. Places are then allocated
using an algorithm of the Gale-Shapley family that matches students to programs using their
preferences and scores as inputs. Once a student is admitted in one of her preferences, all the
others are dropped.
13In 2017, the registration fee for the PSU was CLP 30,960 (USD 47).
14Around 93% of the high school students in Chile attend public or voucher schools. The
entire registration process operates through an online platform that automatically detects the
students’ eligibility for the scholarship.
15I observe enrollment in all the universities of the country, independently of the admission
system they use.
16Firstly creating a new test generate costs for both the institutions and the applicants.
Secondly part of the public resources received by higher education institutions depends on the
performance of their first-year students in the PSU. This mechanism was a way of rewarding
institutions that attracted the best students of each cohort. It was eliminated in 2016, but it
was in place during the period analyzed in this study.
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2.2.3 Financial Aid
In Chile, the majority of the financial aid comes from the government. There are
two student loans and multiple scholarship programs designed to fund studies in dif-
ferent types of higher education institutions. The allocation of these benefits is in
charge of the Ministry of Education. This section, briefly describes the programs that
fund university degrees, emphasizing the rules that generate the discontinuities that
are later exploited in this paper.
Students that need financial aid have to apply to it between October and November
using an online platform (this is before taking the PSU). After verifying if the infor-
mation provided by applicants is correct, the Ministry of Education informs them to
which benefits they are eligible. Something similar occurs once the PSU scores are
published; the Ministry of Education incorporates this new information to the system
and updates the list of benefits that students could receive based on their performance.
This allows them to consider the funding they have available before applying and en-
rolling in higher education.
There are two student loans programs: solidarity fund credit (FSCU) and state guar-
anteed credit (CAE). The former can be used solely in CRUCH universities, while
the latter can be used in any higher education institution.17 In order to be eligible for
these loans, students need to obtain an average PSU score (language and mathematics)
above 475 and come from households in the bottom 90% of the income distribution.18
Eligibility for student loan creates a discrete jump in the probability of university en-
rollment amongst financial aid applicants [Solis, 2017] . This is the discontinuity that
I exploit to study the indirect effect of university attendance on the neighbors and
siblings of the loans’ beneficiaries.
The majority of the scholarship programs are allocated following a similar logic; the
17Although both programs are currently very similar, during the period under study they
had several differences; for instance, while the annual interest rate of the FSCU was 2%, in the
case of the CAE it varied between 5% and 6%. On top of that, while the repayment of the
FSCU has always been income contingent, the CAE used to have fixed installments.
18In the case of the FSCU, they need to come from households in the bottom 80% of the
income distribution; the CAE, on the other hand, used to be focused on students in the bottom
90% of the income distribution, but since 2014 the loan is available to anyone that satisfies the
academic requirements.
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main difference is that the academic requirements are higher (i.e. PSU average above
550) and that they are focused on students from more disadvantaged backgrounds. I
do not use this discontinuity because it does not affect enrollment; once students have
access to subsidized credits such as CAE and FSCU, offering them a scholarship does
not make a difference in their decision to attend university. There are also a few pro-
grams that instead of requiring a minimum score in the PSU, allocate funding based
on high school performance. These programs are relatively small, both in terms of
beneficiaries and in terms of the support they offer.
Given that in Chile universities have complete freedom to define their tuition fees, the
government sets a reference tuition fee for each program and institution as a way to
control public expenditure. These reference tuition fees define the maximum amount
of funding that a student can receive from the government in a specific program.19
At the university level, the reference tuition fee is around 80% of the actual fee. This
means that students need to cover the additional 20% using their own resources, taking
a private loan or if available, applying to scholarships offered by their institutions.
2.3 Data
This section describes the sources of the data and the sample used to study the
effects of neighbors on potential applicants’ probability of enrolling in university.
2.3.1 Data Sources
This paper combines administrative data of different government agencies, includ-
ing the Chilean Ministry of Education and the Department of Evaluation, Assessment
and Educational Records (DEMRE) of the University of Chile, which is the agency in
charge of the PSU. In addition, it uses data from the Ministry of Social Development,
from the Education Quality Agency and from the Census.
This data makes it possible to follow students throughout high school. It contains infor-
mation on demographic characteristics, attendance and academic performance (GPA)
19The only exception to this rule is given by the CAE. In this case, students still cannot
receive more than the reference tuition fee through the CAE, but they can use it to complement
scholarships or the FSCU, up to the real tuition fee.
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for each individual in every grade. In addition, it registers the educational track chosen
by students and also schools characteristics such as their administrative dependence
(i.e. public, voucher, private) and the municipality where they are located. All this
information is available from 2002 onwards, meaning that the first cohort that I can
follow between grades 9 and 12 is the one completing high school in 2005.
I also observe all the students who register for taking the PSU. As discussed in Section
2.2, the PSU is free for students graduating from public and voucher high schools, so
the majority signs up for the test even if they do not plan to apply to university.20
Apart from observing the scores that students obtain in each one of the sections of this
exam, the data contains information on applications to the universities that participate
of the centralized admission system (see Section 2.2 for more details). This includes the
list of all the programs to which students apply and their admission status. The PSU
registers also contain demographic and socioeconomic variables of the students and
their families, including household income, parental education, parents’ occupations
and family size. These variables are later used to study if the identifying assumptions
of the RD are satisfied, and to perform heterogeneity analyses. These registers also
include students’ addresses and a unique identifier of parents. This information is used
to identify neighbors and siblings.21
The Ministry of Education keeps records of all the applications and the allocation of
financial aid. The type and amount of benefits are only observed for individuals who
enroll in higher education, what means that it is not possible to know if students not
going to higher education were actually offered funding. However, the eligibility rules
are clear and all the applicants satisfying the academic and socioeconomic requirements
should be offered a student-loan or a scholarship.
Finally, I also observe enrollment in higher education. These records contain individual-
level data of students attending any higher education institution in the country, and
20In the period that I study, more than 85% of the high school graduates appear in the
registers of the PSU.
21The information on demographic and socioeconomic variables, addresses and parents is not
available for all the students in the registers. Some of it can be recovered from the secondary
and higher education registers. The baseline specifications do not use controls. Observations
with missing values are not used when performing heterogeneity analyses.
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report the programs and institutions in which students are enrolled.22 This data, as
the data on financial aid, is available from 2006 onwards.
The neighbors’ and siblings’ samples combines information from all these datasets.23
The former includes students that appear in the PSU registers between 2006 and 2012,
while the latter students that appear in the PSU registers between 2006 and 2015. The
difference in the years included in each sample is just driven by data availability.
2.3.2 Sample Definition
This section describes the steps and restrictions imposed on the data to build the
estimation sample. The first step in this process is to match potential applicants ob-
served in time t with their neighbors observed in t− 1.
To make this possible, I geocoded students’ addresses. Since these addresses do not in-
clude postcodes, the geocoding process was very challenging, especially in regions with
high levels of rural population where the street names are not well defined. Therefore,
this study focuses on three regions where the identification of neighbors was easier
and that together represent more than 60% of the total population of the country:
Metropolitana of Santiago, Bio-b´ıo and Valpara´ıso.24
After geocoding the addresses, potential applicants of year t were matched to their
60 closest neighbors registered for taking the PSU in t − 1. Then, the demographic,
socioeconomic and academic variables from other datasets were added to potential ap-
plicants and their neighbors. Finally, each individual was linked to their respective
census block and neighborhood unit. Census blocks are the smallest geographic units
used in the census, and in urban areas they usually coincide with an actual block; the
neighborhood units correspond to subareas within a municipality.25 They were de-
22This dataset includes students enrolled in university, professional institutes and vocational
centers.
23Although the focus of this paper is on neighbors, I also investigate what happens with
potential applicants when an older sibling goes to university T years before her. The sample
used for this purpose is described in Section 2.A in the appendix.
24Even in these regions, it was not possible to geocode 100% of applicants’ addresses. I
identified addresses for near 85% of the sample. This implies that for some applicants, only a
subset of close neighbor was identified. Unless the missing neighbors are selected in a systematic
way, this should work against finding effects.
25Standard errors are clustered at this level.
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fined by the Ministry of Social Development to decentralize certain local matters and
to foster citizen participation and community-based management. After this process,
I end with a sample of more than 550,000 potential applicants and their respective
neighbors.
To build the estimation sample, I apply two additional restrictions. I only keep in-
dividuals graduating from regular education programs no more than 3 years before
registering for the PSU (i.e. no remedial programs), and individuals who were between
17 and 22 years old when taking the test. In addition, I drop applicant-neighbor pairs
in which the applicant completes high school before the neighbor. Finally, I also drop
the pairs in which applicants and neighbors are siblings. These restrictions made me
lose around one third of the observations.26
The main analyses focus on potential applicants and their closest neighbor, but I also
study how they are affected by other individuals that live close to them (i.e. n-th
closest neighbor, best neighbor among n and best neighbor within d meters). In all
these cases, I work only with potential applicants whose neighbors apply to financial
aid; these are the only neighbors that could change their university enrollment decision
based on eligibility for student-loans. As a consequence of this last restriction, another
third of the original sample is lost. Note that this restriction is only imposed on neigh-
bors, and does not affect potential applicants.27
The first two columns of table 2.1 present summary statistics for the sample of po-
tential applicants and their closest neighbors. The third column characterizes all the
students in the PSU registers between 2007 and 2012.
Potential applicants and their closest neighbors are very similar. The only relevant
differences are in academic variables. Neighbors, who by definition apply to financial
aid, are more likely to have chosen the academic track during high school. They also
obtain better scores in the PSU, a result that is in part driven by the fact that more
of them actually take the test. Despite the restrictions imposed to build this sample,
26Note that these restrictions do not affect the internal validity of the identification strategy.
27Once more this restriction does not affect the internal validity of the identification strategy.
The restriction is only imposed on the neighbors. Potential applicants are in my sample even
if they do not apply for funding.
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potential applicants look very similar to the rest of the individuals that appear in the
PSU registers.
2.4 Identification Strategy
The identification of neighbors’ effects is challenging. Families are not randomly
allocated to neighborhoods and once in the neighborhoods they face similar circum-
stances, which makes it difficult to distinguish between social interactions and corre-
lated effects. In addition, if peers’ outcomes have an effect on each other, this gives
rise to what Manski [1993] described as the “reflection problem”.
This paper studies how close neighbors going to university in year t−1 affect individu-
als that could apply to university in year t. Since neighbors decide whether to enroll or
not into university before the potential applicants, their decision should not be affected
by the decision of potential applicants. If the decision of the younger applicant does
not affect the decision of the older neighbor the “reflection problem”disappears.
To identify these neighbors’ effects I exploit the fact that eligibility for student loans
depends on the score obtained in the PSU. This allows me to implement a fuzzy RD
instrumenting neighbors’ university enrollment (Un) with an indicator variable that
takes value 1 if the student’s PSU score is above the student loans eligibility cutoff
(Ln). This means that the variation on neighbors’ university enrollment comes only
from eligibility for funding. Thus, even if the decision of the younger applicant would
affect the decision of the older neighbor, by using this instrument I am able to abstract
from the “reflection problem”.
In addition, since neighbors around the student loans eligibility threshold are very sim-
ilar, this approach also eliminates concerns related to correlated effects. 28
Using this strategy, I estimate the following specification:
Uat = α+ βnUnt−1 + µt + εat (2.1)
28Apart from neighbors, also the neighborhoods and the potential applicants who live near
them are similar.
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Where Uat is the university enrollment status of potential applicant a on year t and
Unt−1 is the university enrollment status of neighbor n on year t− 1.
Note, this specification only includes neighbor n. In order to interpret βn as local
average treatment effect (LATE) of neighbor n on potential applicant a, in addition
to the IV assumptions discussed by Imbens and Angrist [1994], we need to assume
that university enrollment of contemporaneous peers does not affects applicants’ own
university enrollment (Section 2.B in the appendix discuss this in detail).29
If this assumption is not satisfied, βn can be interpreted as a reduced form parameter
capturing not only the effect of neighbor n on potential applicant a, but also the effects
that other neighbors affected by n generate on a. This is still a relevant parameter
from a policy perspective.
For the RD estimation, I use optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico et al.
[2014b] and provide parametric and non-parametric estimates. 2SLS estimates come
from specifications that assume a flexible functional form for the running variable and
instrument Unt−1 with a dummy variable that indicates if neighbor n was eligible for
student loans on t− 1, Lnt−1. Non-parametric estimates come from local polynomials
regressions that use a triangular kernel to give more weight to observations closer to
the cutoff. The implementation of this approach follows Calonico et al. [2014a] and
Calonico et al. [2017].
Section 2.D in the appendix presents a series of analyses that investigates if the as-
sumptions required for the validity of the RD estimates are satisfied. First, it shows
that there are no discontinuities at the cutoff in a rich set of demographic, socioeco-
nomic and academic characteristics of potential applicants and their neighbors.
Second, it provides evidence that there is no manipulation of the running variable
around the cutoff. In order to study this, I implement the density discontinuity test
suggested by Cattaneo et al. [2018a].30
29Considering the timing of the application and enrollment process, individuals have limited
scope to respond to university enrollment of their contemporaneous peers. Figure 2.E4 shows
that this is the case and that contemporaneous peers do not seem to affect potential applicants’
enrollment
30In this setting, it is not easy to think of a way in which applicants could manipulate the
running variable. All the PSU process, from the creation to the correction of the tests, is carried
out under strict measures of security. In addition, final scores are the result of a transformation
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In addition to the robustness checks just mentioned, I also study if potential applicants’
decision of going to university has an effect on their older neighbors. As discussed ear-
lier, there should be no effect in this case, something that is corroborated by the results
of this exercise.
Finally, section 2.D also shows that the results are robust to different bandwidths
choices and that there are no jumps like the ones observed at the student loans eligi-
bility cutoff in other points where there should not be.
2.5 Results
This section discusses the main findings of the paper. It uses the definitions intro-
duced in Section 2.4 according to which potential applicants are individuals that could
go to university on year t, while the neighbors are individuals that applied to university
on year t − 1. This section begins by looking at what happens with potential appli-
cants’ enrollment probability when their closest neighbor is eligible for student loans
and goes to university.31 Then, it incorporates other close neighbors to the analysis
and studies how the effect evolves with physical distance. It concludes by investigating
heterogeneous effects by social distance and by the university enrollment rates observed
in potential applicants’ municipalities.
2.5.1 Effect of the closest neighbor on potential applicants’ enroll-
ment
In order to study how potential applicants’ enrollment probability changes when
their closest neighbor goes to university, I estimate a specification like the one presented
in equation 2.1, instrumenting neighbors’ university enrollment with their eligibility for
student loans.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.2 illustrates the first stage of this exercise. It shows that neigh-
bors’ probabilities of going to university increase by around 18 percentage points when
that adjusts raw scores so that they follow a normal distribution. This makes it difficult to know
ex ante the exact number of correct answers needed to be just above the cutoff. Considering
this, it seems very unlikely that potential applicants could manipulate their neighbors’ scores.
31Section 2.C in the appendix studies how potential applicants respond to what happens to
other neighbors, including the best among n and the best within d meters.
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they become eligible for a loan. This figure, significantly different from zero, captures
the direct effect of student loans on university enrollment. According to it, this type of
funding roughly doubles the probability of going to university for students with PSU
scores near the eligibility threshold.
Panel (b), on the other hand, illustrates the reduced form. It shows that potential
applicants whose closest neighbor is eligible for a student loan in year t− 1 are around
2 percentage points more likely to enroll in university on year t. This figure is statis-
tically different from zero and measures part of the indirect effect of offering funding
for university. According to this result, student loans not only have an effect on their
direct beneficiaries, but also on the close neighbors of these beneficiaries. This indirect
effect represents more than a 10% of the direct effect of student loans on university
enrollment.32
If this reduced form effect only works through neighbors taking-up the student loans
and going to university, the first stage and reduced form estimates can be combined to
estimate the effect of exposure to a close neighbor going to university on potential appli-
cant’s university enrollment. Table 2.2 presents estimates obtained using a parametric
and non-parametric approach. The first two columns show 2SLS estimates, while the
third and fourth show estimates obtained using linear and quadratic local polynomials
instead. According to these results, potential applicants’ probability of going to uni-
versity increases by more than 10 percentage points when their closest neighbor enrolls
in university. This figure is statistically different from zero, and represents around one
third of the enrollment probability of individuals at the cutoff.
This estimate would be an upper bound of the effect of neighbors’ enrollment on ap-
plicants’ enrollment if having a close neighbor eligible for funding makes potential
applicants more aware of funding opportunities, independently if the neighbor goes or
32Results in Table 2.E2 complement these analyses by investigating if the difference in en-
rollment persist one year after the shock. The estimates reported on this table are very similar
to the ones discussed in this section, suggesting that the compliers of the IV do not drop out
at higher rate than always takers. To study this I define two outcomes. The first indicates if
applicants enroll and remain enrolled in any university one year after they decides to enroll.
The second indicates if applicants enroll and remain in the same university one year after en-
rollment. Both outcomes are 0 for applicants who do not enroll and for applicants who enroll,
but dropout.
CHAPTER 2. NEIGHBORS’ EFFECTS 85
not to university.33 However, the information intervention implemented by Busso et al.
[2017] among grade 12 students in Chile, shows that in this setting learning about fund-
ing opportunities alone does not generate responses like the ones I find,34, alleviating
concerns related to this type of violations to the exclusion restriction.
2.5.2 How do neighbors’ effects evolve with distance?
This section investigates how neighbors’ effects evolve with physical and social dis-
tance. Both types of distance can be relevant if they affect the likelihood of interactions
between individuals.
All the results discussed so far have focused on the closest neighbor. However, there
could be other neighbors that are relevant for potential applicants. In order to study
this, I estimate the same baseline specification presented in Section 2.4, but replacing
university enrollment of the closest neighbor by university enrollment of the n-th clos-
est neighbor.
Thus, I estimate independent specifications to study how each one of the eight closest
neighbors affect potential applicants’ university enrollment. As discussed in Section
2.4 to interpret the results of this specification as the effect of neighbor n on potential
applicant a, we need to assume that university enrollment of contemporaneous peers
does not affects individuals’ university enrollment.35 If this assumption is not satis-
fied, then the estimated coefficient can be interpreted as a reduce form parameter that
captures not only the effect of neighbor n on applicant a, but also the effect that other
individuals affected by n have on a.36
33If the applicant becomes aware of the funding opportunities only when the neighbor uses
it and goes to university, then this would be a mechanism through which exposure works and
not a violation to the exclusion restriction.
34This intervention provided students with tailored information about funding opportunities
and labor market outcomes of graduates from different programs. They find no extensive
margin responses. They find no increase in enrollment to non-selective or selective institutions.
35I show that this indeed seems to be the case in Figure 2.E4.
36A more detailed discussion on this is presented in Section 2.B. An alternative approach to
study this would be to include the enrollment status of multiple neighbors simultaneously in
the same specification. In case of counting with instruments for the enrollment of each neighbor
it would be possible to proceed in a similar way as I do now. In my setting, this is not possible.
The instrument I have is valid only locally. In addition, it is relevant only for neighbors that
apply for financial aid. To estimate a specification like this one, I would need to find applicants
with many neighbors applying for funding and with PSU scores close enough to the eligibility
threshold. Unfortunately, this type of potential applicants are scarce in my sample.
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Panel A on Figure 2.3 reports OLS and RD estimates for this analysis. Each dot corre-
sponds to the estimates obtained from the eight independent regressions mentioned in
the previous paragraph. The horizontal axis, apart from reporting the relative distance
to the applicant, presents in parenthesis the average distance between the n-th closest
neighbor and applicant a. According to the figure, on average potential applicants live
at 40 meters from their closest neighbor registered for the PSU the previous year, and
at about 60 meters from the second closest one. The RD estimates, represented by
blue circles, quickly decay. The coefficient associated to the second closest neighbor is
around 5 percentage points, and in the case of the third closest neighbor it is below 3
percentage points. In addition, only the coefficient associated to the closest neighbor is
significantly different from zero. The pattern observed in the case of OLS is substan-
tially different. Although there is a small drop on the size of the coefficient, they are
very persistent.
In order to study how the effects evolve with physical distance, I estimate an additional
specification in which potential applicants and their ten closest neighbors are pooled
together. I present two set of results. The first one comes from splitting the sample
in three equal parts depending on the distance between potential applicants and their
neighbors. The second one comes from a specification that uses the whole sample and
adds an interaction between neighbors’ university enrollment and distance.
As illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2.3 the pattern of the RD estimates presented in
blue are consistent with the results on Panel A. The effect of neighbors on potential
applicants decays with distance, becoming non-significant at 100 meters and reaching
0 at 200 meters. As before, the OLS estimates are persistent, and in this case they
even seem to increase a little bit.
The difference between OLS and RD estimates illustrate the relevance of correlated
effects in this context. As discussed earlier, the composition of neighborhoods is not
random, which means that individuals who live relatively close to each other are similar
in many dimensions (i.g. household income, parental education). In addition, these
individuals live under similar circumstances, and are exposed to similar institutions
and shocks. Thus, it is not surprising to find a persistent correlation in outcomes of
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neighbors, even if they do not interact with each other.
In the context of peers’ effects, these results also highlight the importance of using an
appropriate reference group. The results discussed in this section suggest that inter-
actions between neighbors occur at a very local level. Therefore, using a too broad
definition of neighborhood could dilute the effect of the relevant peers (i.e. what hap-
pens with individuals living 200 meters apart does not seem to be relevant for potential
applicants).
The extent to which individuals interact with each other is not only determined by
physical distance. In the rest of this section I study how the effects evolve depending
on social distance and depending on time spent at the neighborhood. Given the results
just discussed, I focus my attention only on the closest neighbor and to study hetero-
geneity I split the sample in different sub groups.
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that the effects are bigger when potential applicants
are closer to their neighbors in socioeconomic status and gender. In the case of age, a
similar pattern emerges, but the differences is smaller. This could be due to the fact
that age differences between individuals registered for taking the PSU in consecutive
years are not huge.37 Although the precision of these estimates does not allow me to
rule out that they are equal, finding that the coefficients are larger when individuals
are closer in social terms is consistent with the idea that interactions between neighbors
are important for these effects to arise.
In line with these results, Table 2.4 shows that the effect seems to be stronger for
potential applicants who have lived for longer in the neighborhood and for the cases in
37Socioeconomic status is measured by an index that combines information on household
income, parental education, health insurance and high school administrative dependence. This
index is build by extracting the first component from a principal component analysis that in-
cluded household income, parental education, health insurance and high school administrative
dependence. Using this index, potential applicants and neighbors are classified in three socioe-
conomic groups; they are defined as similar if the absolute difference between the indexes of the
applicant and her closest neighbor are within 1 − σ of the index. Table 2.E1 in the appendix
present additional heterogeneity analyses. According to these results, students coming from
very disadvantaged backgrounds or who follow the vocational track during high school are less
responsive. This suggest that the effects are driven by potential applicants who are better
prepared for the PSU and for whom it is easier to score above the student loans eligibility
threshold and to be admitted in some university if they decide to apply. The estimated effect
is also bigger for females, although the difference with the effect estimated for males is not
statistically significant.
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which neighbors plan to continue living with their parents in case of going to univer-
sity (i.e. plan to remain in the neighborhood). The effect is also stronger for potential
applicants whose mothers do not work outside the household. The time spent by the
applicants and other members of their families at the neighborhood may strengthen
the relations between neighbors, increasing in this way the likelihood of exposure and
interactions.
2.5.3 Urban Segregation and Inequality in University Enrollment
As discussed in Section 2.2, access to university is very unequal in Chile. Given
the high levels of urban segregation that exist in the country, this also translates into
spatial inequality. The map in Figure 2.4 illustrates this for Santiago, Chile’s capital
city. The red areas in the map correspond to municipalities where on average 20% of
potential potential applicants go to university, while the green areas represent munici-
palities where this figure is above 50%.
According to the results discussed in previous section, programs that expand access to
university generate indirect effects on the close peers of the direct beneficiaries. The
estimates obtained when looking at potential applicants and their closest neighbor in-
dicate that the indirect effects of student loans represent a little bit more than 10% of
their direct effect. In order to estimate the full extent of these indirect effects, we would
need to investigate if they also emerge between other peers38 In addition, we would
need to consider that potential applicants who enroll in university as a consequence of
these indirect effect could also affect university enrollment of other individuals in the
future, making the indirect effect to grow over time.
So far, the analyses have assumed that direct and indirect effects are constant across
different regions. However, they may change depending on the number of individuals
that usually goes to university in these areas. I study this by estimating the direct
and indirect effect of student loans independently for low, mid and high attendance
municipalities.39
38According to the results discussed in Section 2.5.2, in the context of neighbors these spillover
effects seem to be very local. Section 2.6.1 studies indirects effects between siblings.
39The map in Figure 2.4 illustrates the geographic distribution of these three groups for
Santiago, Chile’s capital city.
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Figure 2.5 presents the results of this exercise. The top panel shows first stage esti-
mates, the panel in the middle reduced form estimates, and the panel at the bottom
2SLS estimates. These last estimates capture the effects of neighbors’ enrollment on
potential applicants’ enrollment.
The pattern illustrated in this figure shows that the direct effect (i.e. the share of
individuals who take up student loans and go to university) is bigger in areas where
university attendance rates are higher. The reduced form results and the exposure ef-
fects on the other hand seem stronger in low and mid attendance areas. Indeed, in high
attendance areas these coefficient are non-significant and are considerably smaller.40
Although the standard errors of these estimates do not allow me to conclude that they
are statistically different, these results shows that indirect effects are relevant in low
and mid attendance areas. They represent roughly a 15% of the direct effects, indicat-
ing that exposure to neighbors who are eligible for funding and go to university affects
the enrollment of potential applicants. This suggests that policies that increase expo-
sure to these type of neighbors would also increase enrollment in areas where university
attendance is relatively low.
A back of the envelope calculation shows that in case of increasing exposure to university-
going neighbors in low attendance municipalities to the levels observed in those with
high attendance, the gap in university enrollment would drop by around 5 percentage
points (i.e. enrollment in low attendance areas would rise from 20% to 25%).41
The previous exercise does not say anything about how to increase exposure. An al-
ternative would be to relax the criteria defining eligibility for funding in areas where
attendance is low. However, not everyone who is offered funding goes to university.
According to the first stage results, in these areas eligibility for student loans increases
40To enter my estimation sample, potential applicants need to have neighbor with a PSU
score close enough to the eligibility threshold. In areas with very high attendance, this is not
very common. In order to obtain three samples of similar size, the high attendance areas include
places where university attendance varies between 40% and 75%. The potential applicants of
high attendance municipalities that appear in my estimation sample come from places where
attendance is closer to the lower bound of this range.
41This exercise assumes that local treatment effects are a good representation of average
treatment effects. In addition, it ignores general equilibrium responses. This figure comes from
multiplying the difference in exposure between high and low attendance municipalities, and the
2SLS estimate of the effect of exposure for low attendance municipalities.
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the probability of enrollment by about 15 percentage points. Assuming that this num-
ber is a good approximation of how individuals below the current eligibility cutoff
would respond in case of being offered funding, the direct effect of a policy that lowers
the cutoff by 50 points can be computed multiplying the share of people with scores
in the new eligibility range and the first stage coefficient. In municipalities with low
university attendance, a policy like this this would increase enrollment by 3 percentage
points. Given that the indirect effect is proportional to the direct effect, this would
make the indirect effect small as well. One year after the student loans expansion, the
increase in enrollment generated by the indirect effect would be equal to 0.5 percent-
age points. Assuming that these additional individuals going to university also affect
the enrollment of other applicants in the future, the increase in enrollment that the
indirect effect would be generating after five years would be equal to 0.6 percentage
points, representing a 20% of the direct effects.42 Note that policies with larger direct
effects generating a more significant increase in exposure would also have more relevant
indirect effects in absolute terms.
A final consideration to think about the design of policies to expand access to univer-
sity is that depending on the mechanisms behind these neighbors’ effects, there could
be more efficient ways of providing potential applicants with what university going
neighbors give them. I discuss mechanisms in Section 2.7.
2.6 Siblings and Other Educational Outcomes
This section starts by investigating if indirect effects as the ones discussed in pre-
vious sections also arise among siblings. Then it studies how university enrollment of
neighbors and siblings affect other educational outcomes of potential applicants, to un-
derstand what are the margins that they adjust that result on the increase I document
in university enrollment.
42To obtain this last figure, I assume that each individual induced to enroll in university as a
consequence of exposure also affect other potential applicants. Thus, the indirect effects after
5 years can be computed as IE = 0.03 · 1−β51−β
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2.6.1 Siblings Effects
Neighbors are not the only peers that may affect university enrollment of potential
applicants. If indirect effects as the ones described in previous sections also arise in
other settings, this is something that we would like to incorporate to the evaluation
and design of policies that seek to expand access to university.
As discussed in Section 2.3, apart from identifying neighbors, my data allows me to
identify siblings. I use this data to study how having an older sibling going to university
affects potential applicants’ university enrollment. To do this, I estimate the same
specification used in the case of neighbors, but replacing neighbors by siblings.
Although the siblings’ sample is similar to the neighbors’ sample, it is worth mentioning
that it covers a longer period of time —2006 to 2015— and that the potential applicants
in this sample (i.e. the younger siblings) obtain higher PSU scores than potential
applicants in the neighbors sample.
The top panel of Figure 2.6 shows that siblings who are eligible for student loans are
around 16 percentage points more likely to enroll in university than to those who are
not eligible. This figure, statistically different from zero, represents the direct effect of
student loans in this group.
The second panel presents the reduced form. It shows that potential applicants with
an older sibling eligible for student loans are around 2.5 percentage points more likely
to go to university than those whose older sibling are not eligible. This indirect effect is
slightly bigger than in the case of neighbors. This result is consistent with the idea that
exposure is relevant. If interactions between siblings are more intense than between
neighbors, this could explain the difference in the coefficient.43
As in the case of neighbors, if these effects are purely going through older siblings taking
up the loans and going to university, the first stage and reduced form results can be
combined to obtain an estimate of the effect of exposure to siblings going to university.
Table 2.5 presents these results. The first two columns show 2SLS estimates, while
the third and fourth columns show estimates obtained using linear and quadratic local
43The samples used to estimate neighbors and siblings are different. This could also be
behind the differences in the effects documented for neighbors and siblings.
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polynomials. According to these figures, having an older sibling going to university
increases potential applicants’ probability of going by 15 percentage points. As in the
case of the reduced form, this coefficient is also bigger than in the case of neighbors.
In this setting however, satisfying the exclusion restriction is more challenging. Apart
from the transmission of information about funding opportunities, having an older
sibling going to university with a student loans could affect the household budget
constraint. This could explain at least some part of the response observed in younger
siblings.
However, it is important to consider that student loans only cover a share of the tuition
fees.44 This means that students and their families still need to pay part of them, in
addition to other costs involved in going to university, including the foregone earnings
of labor. If families have limited resources, then sending one child to university, even
with a student-loan, should reduce the chances of going for the younger ones.45
There could also be scenarios where the student loans could relax the household budget
constraint in a more significant way.46 Thus, it cannot be ruled out that at least some
part of the effects found for siblings are driven by changes in household resources.
2.6.2 Other Educational Outcomes
This section looks at changes on the academic performance and on the application
decisions of potential applicants. This allows us to identify the margins that potential
applicants adjust and that mediate the increase in enrollment documented in previous
sections. To study this, I employ once more the fuzzy RD used in previous sections,
but this time to investigate how these other outcomes change when a close neighbor or
an older sibling goes to university.
44student loans cover up to the reference tuition fee set by the government. See Section 2.2
for more details.
45An exception to this could be given by siblings whose age difference is big enough to
allow the older one to graduate before the younger one applies to university. In this case, the
older sibling could help to fund the younger sibling studies. However, I do not find differences
depending on the age gap between siblings. These results are not presented in the paper, but
are available upon request.
46This would be the case if for instance parents were able to save or borrow to pay for exactly
one university degree; or if having one child in university would change their willingness to
borrow.
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According to the results presented in table 2.6, potential applicants with a close peer
(i.e. closest neighbor or sibling) going to university are more likely to take the PSU,
and to apply for financial aid and to university; 47 they are also more likely to be eligi-
ble for student loans and to take them up. I find no effects on attendance or academic
performance during high school, 48 and the documented improvement on PSU scores
is driven by the extensive margin response mentioned earlier.49
Although the coefficients on the application responses are not always precisely esti-
mated, they represent an important fraction of the changes in potential applicants’
enrollment. This suggests that the increase in enrollment is driven by a change in the
decision to apply. This is consistent with the results on undermatching discussed by
Hoxby and Avery [2013] and Black et al. [2015], suggesting that there are students who
despite having the potential to be admitted into university and to receive funding for
it do not apply.
2.7 Discussion
The results presented in this paper show that exposure to close peers that enroll
in university increases the probability of potential applicants’ enrollment and that the
effects are stronger when potential applicants and their peers are more likely to inter-
act.
These results are consistent with two broad classes of mechanisms. Firstly, neighbors
and siblings could affect potential applicants’ university enrollment by expanding their
access to relevant information. Alternatively, they could affect the costs of going to
university.
There is vast evidence that information frictions affect individual schooling decisions
in both developing and developed countries. Jensen [2010] for instance shows that pro-
47I only observe applications to universities that use the centralized admission system de-
scribed in section 2.2. These are the applications I use as outcome.
48In Chile, the GPA scale goes from 1.0 to 7.0. The minimum GPA to pass to the next grade
or to finish high school is 4.0.
49I replaced missing scores in the PSU by 0 (or -475 after centering the PSU scores around
the student loans eligibility threshold). Thus, if potential applicants with neighbors or siblings
going to university are more likely to take the admission test, this automatically creates an
increase on average performance (i.e. they are less likely to have -475 points in the PSU).
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viding information on returns to education to grade 8 students in Dominican Republic
increased the years of high school completed.
Students seem to face similar information frictions in the case of higher education.
Hoxby and Turner [2015] study this in the US and shows that in low-income areas,
even high achieving students know little about costs, quality and the overall college
experience. The situation in Chile is similar. Hastings et al. [2016] document that
students from disadvantaged groups have limited and imprecise information on returns
to education. These results suggest that university enrollment could be increased by
tackling these information constraints.50
An alternative way in which neighbors and siblings could affect potential applicants’
enrollment is by affecting the costs of going to university. This would be the case for
instance if they face a social sanction for going to university. Austen-Smith and Fryer
[2005] formalizes this idea and shows that individuals may choose to underinvest in ed-
ucation to gain acceptance in their social group. Along this line, Bursztyn and Jensen
[2015] finds that students respond to peers pressure and that when effort is observable
they adjust it according to the prevalent social norm (i.e. reduce effort when peers
view it as something bad, increase effort when peers value it). This is not the only way
in which peers could affect the costs and benefits of going to university. They could
also be affected if for instance individuals enjoy spending time with their peers or if
they are competitive and want to surpass their peers achievements.51
Although I cannot perfectly distinguish between these two classes of mechanisms, not
finding responses on high school attendance or an improvement on academic perfor-
mance, suggests that individuals are not experiencing relevant changes on the costs and
benefits of going to university. If this were the case, we would expect them to increase
the effort they make to be admitted in college, something that does not seem to be
occurring. The results seem more consistent with the transmission of information.
50Providing relevant information on returns to higher education though is challenging. As
shown by Hastings et al. [2015] these returns can be very different depending on the institution
and program attended. n addition, if higher education institutions charge fees, then information
about funding opportunities may also be relevant.
51Costs and benefits nest multiple ways in which these peers’ effects may arise. Changes in
aspirations, models of competition, the existence of social norms or models of interdependent
preferences can be accommodated to this framework.
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However, interventions providing Chilean students with tailored information about
funding opportunities and returns to higher education —like Busso et al. [2017] and
Hastings et al. [2015] — do not find extensive margin responses and even when looking
at the type of institution and program that students attend, they do not find large ef-
fects. Similarly, Bettinger et al. [2012] finds no relevant responses in college enrollment
to a pure information intervention in the United States. However, when complementing
the information with personalized support to fill the application for financial aid, they
find that college enrollment increases by a similar magnitude to the one documented
in this paper. Also in the United States, Carrell and Sacerdote [2017] designed an
intervention to investigate what makes programs that foster college attendance effec-
tive. They argue that what makes these programs effective is not the information that
they provide, but rather their ability to compensate for the lack of encouragement and
support that students receive at home or at the school.
According to these results, expanding information on funding and returns to educa-
tion has not been very effective in increasing university enrollment. Nevertheless, the
information transmitted by peers could be different to the one traditionally provided
in information interventions. It may be different on its content,52 but it might also be
more relevant because it comes from someone closer.53
With the data that I have available, I cannot tell exactly what potential applicants
learn from their peers. This is a potential avenue for future research that would also
contribute to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms behind my results.
52Apart from learning about funding and returns to education, potential applicants may re-
ceive information about the application process, the likelihood of being successful and other
elements related to the whole university experience. Hoxby and Turner [2013] shows that pro-
viding high achieving applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds with this type of information
and an application fee waiver changes the set of colleges to which they apply. This reduces the
gap on the type of college to which high achieving students from different backgrounds attend
by 5 percentage points.
53Nguyen [2008] finds that individuals are able to process information on returns to educa-
tion in a sophisticated way, and that they respond differently depending on who provides the
information.
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2.8 Conclusions
Recent studies have shown that especially in disadvantaged contexts individuals
face constraints that prevent them from taking full advantage of the education oppor-
tunities that they have available. In the context of university enrollment, financial
constraints are relevant, but there is growing evidence that the lack of information,
support, and encouragement also plays an important role in this context. In both de-
veloping and developed countries, these constraints seem to be more relevant in areas
where exposure to university is lower.
This paper investigates whether potential applicants’ decision to attend university is
affected by university enrollment of close neighbors. To address this question, I use rich
administrative data from Chile and take advantage of the variation generated by the
rules that define eligibility for student loans. Exploiting this quasi-random variation,
I implement a fuzzy RD that allows me to eliminate concerns about correlated effects
and to abstract from the ‘reflection problem’.
I find that neighbors have a large and significant impact on the university enrollment
of potential applicants. Having a close neighbor going to university increases their
enrollment probability by about 10 percentage points. I also show that this effect is
stronger when the interactions between neighbors are more likely to occur. Indeed, only
the closest neighbors seems to matter, and the effects decline quickly with distance,
disappearing after 200 meters. The effect also seems to be stronger when potential
applicants and their neighbors are closer in terms of gender and socioeconomic status
and when they have spent more time in the neighborhood. The fact that neighbors’
effects are very local highlights the relevance of using an appropriate reference group
when studying peers’ effects.
In addition, I show that student loans generate indirect effects on close peers of their
direct beneficiaries. In the case of neighbors, this indirect effect seems to be stronger
in municipalities with low university attendance rates, where it represents a 15% of the
direct effect of student loans on enrollment. I find that a similar indirect effect arises
in the context of siblings. These externalities should be incorporated to the evaluation
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and design of funding programs, and could also be relevant in the context of other
policies that seek to expand access to university.
My main results are consistent with two broad classes of mechanisms, both related to
some of the constraints that may affect individuals’ schooling decisions. First, neigh-
bors may increase university enrollment of potential applicants by providing them with
relevant information about applications, returns and the overall university experience.
Second, they could also affect the costs and benefits of going to university. Although
with the data that I have available I cannot perfectly distinguish between them, find-
ing no increase on potential applicants’ effort or academic performance suggests that
information is the mechanism behind my results.
Note however that interventions providing students with information on funding op-
portunities and returns to education have not been very effective at increasing college
enrollment. This suggests that the information that potential applicants receive from
their peers is different. It may be different on its content, but it could also be more
relevant because it comes from someone closer. Investigating what potential applicants
learn from their university-going neighbors and siblings seems a promising avenue for
future research. Addressing this question would also contribute to gaining a better
understanding of the mechanisms behind peers effects in this and other settings.
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Figure 2.1: University Enrollment by Household Income, Ability Level and Mu-
nicipality
Notes: This figure illustrates the share of low and high income stu-
dents enrolling in the university by ability level and municipality. Blue
triangles represent the shares of low-income students, while red circles
represent the shares of high-income students. The figure also presents
quadratic fits of university enrollment on ability. The red line comes
from a quadratic fit of high-income students attendance shares, while
the blue from a similar exercise for low-income students. Ability is
measured by students performance in grade 10 mathematics standard-
ized test. University enrollment is measured 3 years later; if students
do not repeat or dropout, this is one year after they complete high
school. The sample includes students taking the standardized test in
2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Shares are computed only for municipali-
ties for which at least 10 students were observed in each income-ability
group.
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Figure 2.2: First Stage and Reduced Form of Neighbors’ RD
(a) First Stage: Neighbors’ Probability of going to University
(b) Reduced Form: Potential Applicants’ Probability of going to Uni-
versity
Notes: This figure illustrates the first stage and reduced form of the neighbors’
RD. The first panel shows how neighbors’ probability of going to university
evolves with the score they obtain in the PSU. The second panel shows how
potential applicants’ probability of going to university evolves with the PSU
score of their closest neighbor. The PSU score is centered around the student-
loans eligibility threshold. Each dot represents the share of neighbors (panel
1) or potential applicants (panel 2) going to university at different ranges
of neighbors’ PSU scores. The red lines come from linear regressions of the
outcome on the running variable on each side of the eligibility threshold, and
the shadow around them to 95% confidence intervals. The blue bars in the
background illustrate the distribution of the neighbors’ scores in the PSU.
The range used for these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths computed
following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants by Distance
(a) Evolution of Effects by Distance Rank
(b) Evolution of Effects by Physical Distance
Notes: This figure illustrates how the effects of different neighbors on potential
applicants evolve with distance. These coefficients come from specifications
that include a potentially different linear function of the running variable on
each side of the cutoff. The estimation uses optimal bandwidths computed
following Calonico et al. [2014b] for the main specification.
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Figure 2.4: University Attendance across Municipalities in Santiago
Notes: The figure illustrates the share of potential applicants going to uni-
versity in different municipalities of Santiago between 2006 and 2012. In red
areas the average attendance is 20%, in yellow areas 33% and in green areas
50%.
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Notes: The figure illustrates how neighbors’ effects evolve depending
on the level of attendance of the municipality of potential applicants.
The dots represent coefficients from three different samples: low, mid
and high attendance municipalities. The specification used controls
by a linear polynomial of the running variable. The bandwidth used
correspond to the optimal bandwidths computed for the whole sam-
ple. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors
are clustered at the neighborhood unit level.
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Figure 2.6: First Stage and Reduced Form of Siblings’ RD
(a) First Stage: Siblings’ Probability of going to Univeristy
(b) Reduced Form: Potential Applicants’ Probability of going to Uni-
versity
Notes: This figure illustrates the first stage and reduced form of the siblings
RD. The first panel shows how siblings’ probability of going to university
evolves with the score they obtain in the PSU. The second panel shows how
potential applicants’ probability of going to university evolves with the PSU
score of their older sibling. The PSU score is centered around the student-
loans eligibility threshold. Each dot represents the share of siblings (panel 1)
or potential applicants (panel 2) going to university at different ranges of PSU
scores. The red lines correspond come from linear regression of the outcome
on the running variable on both sides of the eligibility threshold. The shadow
around them to 95% confidence intervals. The blue bars in the background
illustrate the distribution of the siblings’ scores in the PSU. The range used for
these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths that were computed following
Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Neighbors Potential Applicants Whole country
(1) (2) (3)
1. Demographic characteristics
Female 0.56 0.53 0.54
Age when taking the PSU 18.30 17.72 18.08
2. Socioeconomic characteristics
Low Income (≤ 288K CLP) 0.57 0.54 0.57
Mid Income (≤ 864K CLP) 0.36 0.36 0.30
High Income (> 864K CLP) 0.07 0.10 0.13
Parental ed. = primary ed. 0.07 0.08 0.13
Parental ed. = secondary ed. 0.55 0.55 0.52
Parental ed. = other 0.01 0.01 0.01
Parental ed. = vocational he 0.09 0.07 0.06
Parental ed. = professional he 0.09 0.08 0.05
Parental ed. = university 0.20 0.21 0.23
3. Academic characteristics
Public high school 0.37 0.36 0.41
Charter high school 0.58 0.57 0.49
Private high school 0.05 0.07 0.10
Education track = academic 0.74 0.65 0.66
Education track = vocational 0.26 0.35 0.34
High school GPA 5.72 5.57 5.48
Score in the PSU (centered at the cutoff) 47.76 -9.90 -20.40
4. Family structure
Family size 4.46 4.62 4.48
Household head = father 0.61 0.61 0.59
Household head = mother 0.31 0.31 0.28
Household head = other 0.08 0.08 0.13
Distance to closest neighbor (km) 0.05 0.05
Age difference 1.56 1.56
Observations 193,101 193,101 1,316,117
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present summary statistics for potential applicants and their
closest neighbors. Column (3) for all potential applicants in the country.
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Table 2.2: Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants’ University Enrollment
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 CCT-1 CCT-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.104*** 0.134*** 0.118** 0.104*
(0.037) (0.047) (0.053) (0.062)
First stage 0.178*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.172***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Reduced form 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.008)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 83,894 133,911 83,894 133,911
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (55-73.5) (75.5-133.5) (55-73.5) (75.5-133.5)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 423.32 271.34
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors on potential applicants’
university enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 present two stages least squares estimates
using a linear and quadratic polynomial of PSU respectively. Columns 3 and 4 use
instead local polynomials following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Optimal bandwidths
are used in all the specifications. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neigh-


























Table 2.3: Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants by Social Distance
Socioeconomic Status Gender Age
Same Different Same Different 1 year > 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.153*** 0.049 0.130** 0.084 0.113** 0.092
(0.048) (0.060) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.067)
First stage 0.188*** 0.168*** 0.183*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.226***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018)
Reduced form 0.029*** 0.008 0.024** 0.014 0.019** 0.021
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of potential applicants 42680 42404 43378 41706 50979 18283
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 270.55 251.63 310.81 262.93 281.18 155.32
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors on potential applicants’ university enrollment
by different measures of social distance. Columns 1 and 2 study how the effects change with differences in
socioeconomic status, columns 3 and 4 with gender and finally columns 5 and 6 with age. All specifications
include a linear polynomial of the closest neighbor or sibling PSU score; it is allowed to be different on both
sides of the student-loans eligibility threshold. Optimal bandwidths are used in all the specifications and
were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b]. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood


























Table 2.4: Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants by Time at the Neighborhood
Time at the neighborhood Neighbors remain-leave Mother works outside the hh.
≥ 4 years < 4 years Remain Leave No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.134*** 0.041 0.118*** 0.068 0.182*** 0.066
(0.051) (0.100) (0.044) (0.080) (0.055) (0.054)
First stage 0.191*** 0.218*** 0.177*** 0.202*** 0.174*** 0.179***
(0.012) (0.024) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
Reduced form 0.026*** 0.009 0.021*** 0.014 0.032*** 0.012
(0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of potential applicants 42509 8283 61327 16705 38696 41220
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 264.90 80.98 306.68 119.53 240.93 290.35
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors on potential applicants’ university enrollment by different
characteristics of potential applicants and their neighbors. Columns 1 and 2 show how the effects change depending on the
time potential applicants have lived in the neighborhood. Columns 3 and 4 compare potential applicant whose neighbors
say that they will remain or leave the neighborhood in case of going to university. Columns 5 and 6 compare potential
applicants depending on mothers’ occupation. All specifications include a linear polynomial of the closest neighbor or sibling
PSU score; it is allowed to be different on both sides of the student-loans eligibility threshold. Optimal bandwidths are
used in all the specifications and were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b]. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered
at neighborhood unit level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Table 2.5: Effect of Siblings on Potential Applicants’ University Enrollment
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 CCT-1 CCT-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sibling goes to university (t-T) 0.137** 0.172** 0.145** 0.168**
(0.053) (0.068) (0.064) (0.079)
First stage 0.170*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.160***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Reduced form 0.023*** 0.027**
(0.009) (0.011)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 56,767 94,205 56,767 94,205
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (37.5-73.0) (59.5 - 128.0) (37.5-73.0) (59.5 - 138.0)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 359.64 222.09
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of siblings on potential applicants’ uni-
versity enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 present two stages least squares estimates using a
linear and quadratic polynomial of PSU respectively. Columns 3 and 4 use instead local
polynomials following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Optimal bandwidths are used in all the
specifications. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level. ∗p−value < 0.1
∗ ∗ p− value < 0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗p− value < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Effect of Neighbors and Siblings on Potential Appli-
cants’ Academic Performance and Application Behavior
Neighbors Siblings
(1) (2)
Panel A - Academic Performance
High school GPA 0.000 0.119*
(0.001) (0.066)
High school attendance 0.009 0.018
(0.009) (0.016)
PSU Performance 34.970** 32.137*
(15.405) (17.373)
Panel B - Application Behavior
Take PSU 0.065** 0.068**
(0.025) (0.032)
Apply to financial aid 0.053 0.125**
(0.042) (0.052)
Eligible for financial aid 0.051** 0.071
(0.022) (0.064)
Take up financial aid 0.085** 0.121**
(0.034) (0.059)
Apply to CRUCH universities 0.054 0.228***
(0.041) (0.063)
Active application to CRUCH universities 0.059 0.103*
(0.039) (0.061)
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors and siblings on potential
applicants’ academic performance and application behavior. Column 1 presents the
results for neighbors (n = 81, 587) and column 2 for siblings (n = 45, 372). All
specifications include a linear polynomial of the closest neighbor or sibling PSU score;
it is allowed to be different on both sides of the student-loans eligibility threshold.
Optimal bandwidths are used in all the specifications and were computed following
Calonico et al. [2014b]. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood
unit level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
Appendices
2.A Siblings Sample
Although the focus of this paper is on neighbors, I also investigate what happens
with potential applicants when an older sibling goes to university T years before her.
The sample that I use for this purpose is similar to the one used to study neighbors
effects, but it includes students that appear in the PSU registers between 2006 and
2015.
When registering for the PSU, potential applicants report their parents national id
number. Using this information, I managed to identify 273,806 pairs of siblings. Pro-
ceeding in the same way as with neighbors, I restrict the sample to 17-22 years old
students completing high school in regular educational programs no more than 3 years
before registering for the PSU. These restrictions reduce the sample size by 13.8%. I
further restrict the sample to potential applicants whose siblings apply to financial aid;
they are the only ones that could change their decisions based on students-loan eligi-
bility. As before, this restriction is not imposed on potential applicants, but it reduces
the sample size and I end up working with roughly half of the original observations.
Table 2.A1 presents the summary statistics for this sample.
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Low Income 0.52 0.51
Mid Income 0.38 0.38
High Income 0.09 0.11
Parental ed. = primary ed. 0.07 0.07
Parental ed. = secondary ed. 0.51 0.51
Parental ed. = other 0.01 0.01
Parental ed. = vocational he 0.09 0.08
Parental ed. = professional he 0.09 0.12
Parental ed. = university 0.23 0.21
3. Academic characteristics
Public high school 0.40 0.34
Charter high school 0.55 0.60
Private high school 0.05 0.05
Education track = academic 0.77 0.76
Education track = vocational 0.23 0.24
High school GPA 5.84 5.75
Score in the PSU (centered at the cutoff) 52.89 20.90
4. Family structure
Family size 5.03 4.77
Household head = father 0.73 0.70
Household head = mother 0.23 0.26
Household head = other 0.04 0.04
Age difference 3.89 3.89
Observations 135,658 135,658
Notes: ColumnS (1) and (2) present summary statistics for potential ap-
plicants and their siblings.
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2.B Identification Strategy: Further Discussion
Traditionally, peers’ effects have been modeled using a linear-in-means function.
This implicitly assumes that all peers are equally important. Since in this case, there





βnτUnτ + εit (2.2)
Where, Na is the set of relevant neighbors for potential applicant a and Unt is a dummy
variable indicating if the n− th neighbor goes to university in t.
As discussed in section 2.4 neighbors decide whether to enroll or not into university
before potential applicants. Thus, their decision should not be affected by what poten-
tial applicants do after them. This implies that Na does not include younger neighbors
(i.e. neighbors that could potentially apply to university in the future).54
This paper focuses on the effects of neighbors going to university one year before po-
tential applicants. To highlight this, equation 2.2 can be rearranged as follows:
Uat = α+ βmt−1Umt−1 +
∑
n∈Na\Umt−T
βnτUnτ + εit (2.3)
The coefficient βmt−1 can be consistently identified if Cov(Umt−1, εit) = 0. This implies
that there are no correlated effects, and that potential applicant at does not affect the
decision of neighbor mt− 1.
There are many reasons why we could want to estimate a more parsimonious function.
For instance, if we do not observe all the relevant neighbors, or if the type of variation
used to identify these effects imposes some restrictions that prevent us from using all
the information available.
Consider the following simplified specification:
Uat = α+ βmt−1Umt−1 + vit (2.4)
54If younger applicants’ decision enter equation 2.2, instrumenting enrollment of the older
neighbor with student-loan eligibility would be enough to solve the reflection problem.
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In this case, to consistently estimate βmt−1 we need Cov(Umt−1, vit) = 0. This means
that in addition to the conditions discussed for equation 2.3, we need (Cov(Uat, Unτ ) ·
(Cov(Umt−1, Unτ )) = 0 ∀ {n, τ} 6= {m, t − 1}. To discuss the implications of this
additional condition we can analyze three cases:
• Contemporaneous applicants: τ = t
• Neighbors in t-1: τ = t− 1
• Neighbors in t-T: τ = t− T (with T > 1).
Note that for the first two cases, the absence of contemporaneous peers’ effects is suf-
ficient.55 To satisfy the assumption in the third case we would need to assume that
neighbors applying two or more years before potential applicants do not directly affect
them (i.e. they are not part of the structural equation).
This last assumption can be relaxed if as in this case we have an instrument for uni-
versity enrollment. Instead of assuming that neighbors two or more years apart do not
enter the structural equation, we would need to assume that (Cov(Zmt−1, Unτ−T )) = 0.
If the decisions of contemporaneous and younger peers enter equation 2.2, βn can still
be interpreted as a reduce form parameter capturing not only the effect of the n− th
closest neighbor on a, but also the effects that other neighbors affected by n could have
generate on a. This is still a relevant parameter from a policy perspective.
A fuzzy RD can be thought as a particular case of IV. This means that my estimates
will be consistent under the following assumptions:
A1. Independence:
The instrument Ln needs to be independent of the enrollment decision of both, the
potential applicant and her neighbor. In my setting, this will only be true around the
student loans eligibility treshold and after conditioning on neighbors’ performance in
the PSU.
A2. Relevance:
The instrument Ln needs to change the enrollment decision of neighbors Un. First-
55We are already assuming that younger applicants’ decision are not part of equation 2.2.
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stage regressions in section 2.5 show that this is indeed the case.56
A3. Exclusion:
The instrument only affects potential applicants enrollment Ui through the change it
induces in neighbors’ university attendance. This implies that neighbors eligibility for
student loans does not have a direct effect on the enrollment decision of potential ap-
plicants.
A4. Monotonicity:
Finally, the monotonicity assumption requires eligibility for student loans to weakly in-
crease neighbors enrollment. In this setting, it is difficult to think in any reasons that
would make individuals to decide not to enroll in university because they are eligible
for financial aid.57
According to Imbens and Angrist [1994], under this set of assumptions the IV estimates
are consistent and can be interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATEs). In
this setting, this means that my estimates will capture the effect of having a neighbor
near the student loans eligibility threshold going to university.
56In line with the results of Solis [2017] I find that being eligible for student loans roughly
doubles the probabilities of going to university at the eligibility cutoff.
57Note that if for some reason individuals dislike student loans or other types of funding,
they could reject them and pay the tuition fees with their own resources.
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2.C Other Neighbors Definitions
The results discussed on section 2.5 focus on the closest neighbor. However, there
could be other neighbors that are relevant for potential applicants. To investigate this,
I identify the best neighbor among the closest 3 and 5, and the best living within 75
and 100 meters from potential applicants.
When implementing these exercises, the sample size decreases with the radius being
analyzed. The student-loans cutoff is relatively low (percentile 40 in the PSU distri-
bution); this makes it more difficult to find individuals that being the best of a group
are at the same time close enough to the cutoff. This not only affects the precision of
the estimates, but also the composition of the sample used to estimate the effects of
interest.
The characteristics of areas where the best neighbor in 100 meters is close enough to
the cutoff may be very different to those where the best in 200 meters is close. Thus,
these results do not tell us much about how neighbors effect evolve with distance. Each
estimate comes from a different sample, what means that apart from distance to the
relevant neighbor many other things may be changing.
Table 2.C1 presents the results of these analysis. When looking at the effect of the best
neighbor among 3 or the best neighbor within 75 meters the coefficient obtained is in
the same range as the one discussed in the main section. In this case they are only
significant at a 90% level what in part reflects the fact that sample sizes are smaller
in this case. When looking at the best neighbor among the closest 5, the coefficient is
bigger and significant at a 95% level. This result is consistent with the idea that the
effects of exposure are stronger when there are fewer people going to university. Finally,
when looking at the effect of the best neighbor within 100 meters, the coefficient drops
and becomes not statistically different from 0.
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Table 2.C1: Effects of other Close Neighbors on Potential Applicants’ University
Enrollment
Best among ”n” closest Best within ”d” meters
3 closest 5 closest 75 meters 100 meters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of attending U(2). 0.091* 0.140** 0.098* 0.057
(0.048) (0.071) (0.055) (0.059)
Score in the PSU 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.207*** 0.145*** 0.212*** 0.221***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 58594 24504 50439 32361
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 219.41 87.24 200.82 148.32
Dep. var mean 0.254 0.220 0.260 0.247
Notes: The table presents results for specifications that study the effect of other
close neighbors on potential applicants’ university enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 look
at the effect of the best neighbor among the closest 3 and 5, while columns 3 and 4
look at the effect of the best neighbor within 75 and 50 meters. All specifications
include a linear polynomial of PSU which slope is allowed to differ at both sides
of the cutoff. All specifications use optimal bandwidths computed according to
Calonico et al. [2014b]. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood
unit level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
CHAPTER 2. NEIGHBORS’ EFFECTS 117
2.D Robustness Checks
In this section, I study if the identification assumptions of my empirical strategy
are satisfied. I start by investigating if there is evidence of manipulation in the running
variable, and then I check if other variables that could be related to the decision of
going to university present jumps around the student loans eligibility threshold. I
continue showing the results of placebo exercises and the robustness of my estimates
to different bandwidths choices. I finish this section discussing some issues that could
emerge due to missing observations.
2.D.1 Manipulation of the running variable
A common concern in the context of a regression discontinuity is if individuals can
strategically manipulate the running variable affecting in this way their treatment sta-
tus.
In this case, it would mean that potential applicants have the ability of affecting the
average PSU score of their older neighbors and siblings. As discussed in section 2.2, the
PSU is a national level test which application and marking processes are completely
centralized. In addition, given that the scores of students in each section of the test are
normalized, students do not know ex ante the exact number of correct answers they
need to be above the eligibility cutoff.
All this makes it very difficult, even for the students taking the test to manipulate their
score around the threshold. Considering this, it seems very unlikely that potential ap-
plicants can strategically affect it.
In the context of neighbors, a way in which potential applicants could change the score
they obtain in the PSU would be to move to a different neighborhood. However, the
results on movers and no-movers presented in section 2.5 do not support this hypoth-
esis. In addition, in the next section I show that there are no jumps in neighbors’
characteristics around the cutoff; so, if potential applicants are moving to areas where
neighbors are more likely to be eligible for student loans, they are not using any of the
socioeconomic and academic variables I study to select them.
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I further investigate manipulation by looking at the density of the PSU scores around
the eligibility threshold implementing the test suggested by Cattaneo et al. [2018a].
Figures 2.D1 and 2.D7 show that there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of
a continuous density of neighbors PSU scores around the eligibility threshold. In the
case of neighbors, the p-value of the test is 0.7791, whereas in the case of siblings it is
0.5968. Therefore, the results I find do not seem to be driven by manipulation of the
running variable.
2.D.2 Discontinuities in potential confounders
A second concern in the context of an RD is the existence of other discontinuities
around the cutoff that may explain the differences we observe in the outcome of inter-
est.
Taking advantage of a rich vector of demographic, socioeconomic and academic vari-
ables, I study if there are discontinuities in any of them around the threshold.
Figure 2.D2 summarizes these results for neighbors, and figure 2.D8 for siblings. They
illustrate the estimated discontinuities at the cutoff and their 95% confidence intervals.
To estimate these discontinuities I use optimal bandwidths following Calonico et al.
[2014a]. In both figures, the left panel looks at characteristics of the older peer, and
the right panel at characteristics of potential applicants.
I do not find any significant difference in older peers and potential applicants charac-
teristics around the threshold. In the case of neighbors, there is a close-to-significant
difference in parental education. Neighbors to the right of the cutoff seem to come
from households where the parents are more likely to have attended higher education;
in the case of potential applicants, this difference is clearly not significant. In addition,
the magnitudes of these coefficients are quite small and the differences in university
enrollment documented in section 2.5 are robust to the inclusion of neighbors’ parental
education as control. Indeed, they are robust to the inclusion of all the variables in
these figures. 58
58This specification is not presented here, but is available upon request.
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2.D.3 Placebo exercises
This setting allows me to perform placebo exercise to study if the potential ap-
plicants’ enrollment decision has any effect on the decision of their older neighbors
or siblings. Given the timing of both decisions, we should not find any effect; what
happens with potential applicants in t, should not change the probabilities of going to
university of their older peers in t-T.
Figures 2.D3 and 2.D9 illustrate the results when performing this exercise in the same
sample I use in when estimating the main results. Table 2.D1 presents the estimated
coefficients of this exercise; table 2.D2 presents the results of a similar exercise but
using a different sample. This time, I include neighbors and siblings who do not apply
to financial aid and keep in the sample only potential applicants who apply to financial
aid. It is reassuring not finding discontinuities around the eligibility threshold; both,
the levels and slopes seem to be continuous around it. As in section 2.5, tables 2.D1
and 2.D2 present the estimated coefficient using two stages least squares and local
polynomials. The coefficients are small and never significant.
In addition to this robustness check, I also study if there are significant discontinu-
ities in points different to the student loans eligibility threshold. Since in these points
there is no first stage, we should not find jumps like the ones we observe around the
threshold. Figure 2.D4 presents these results for neighbors and siblings. As can be
appreciated, none of these jumps is significant.
2.D.4 Different bandwidths
In this section, I study how sensible are my results to the bandwidth choice. Opti-
mal bandwidths try to balance the loss of precision suffered when narrowing the window
of data points used to estimate the effect of interest, with the bias generated by using
points that are too far from the relevant cutoff.
Figures 2.D5 and 2.D10 presents the estimated coefficients when using bandwidths
that go from 0.4 to 1 times the optimal bandwidth. These results correspond to spec-
ifications that use polynomial of degree 1 on both sides of the eligibility threshold.
Changing the bandwidths does not make an important difference on the estimated
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coefficients.
2.D.5 Missing students
In this section, I discuss how missing information about applicants and their older
peers could affect my results. As mentioned in Section 2.3, to identify neighbors I rely
on the geocoding process of addresses; since the addresses I use do not include post-
code, finding them was not always possible. This is especially the case in rural areas,
where there is no precise information on the names of all the roads and locations. In
this geocoding process, I loss around 15% of my sample.
To analyze how serious this threat could be, I present an additional exercise just focus-
ing in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago; in this area the geocoding rate of success
was higher. Table 2.D3 presents the results to this exercise.
The coefficients obtained in both cases are slightly bigger than the ones I discuss in
the rest of the paper. However, they are not significantly different from them. In part,
this can reflect differences between students in the academic and vocational track of
high school and between students from urban and rural areas.
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Figure 2.D1: Density of Neighbors’ PSU Scores around the Student Loans Eligi-
bility Threshold)
Notes: This figure illustrates the density of neighbors PSU scores
around the student loans eligibility thresholds. The density and its
confidence intervals on each side of the cutoff were estimated following
Cattaneo et al. [2018a]. This chart complements the formal test they
suggest to study discontinuities in the distribution of the running
variable around the relevant threshold. In this case its p − value is
0.7791. This means there is no statistical evidence to reject the null
hypothesis of a smooth density around the threshold.
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Figure 2.D2: Discontinuities in other Covariates at the Cutoff
(a) Potential Applicants (b) Neighbors
Notes: This figure illustrates the coefficients obtained when studying disconti-
nuities in other variables that could potentially affect the outcome of interest.
The left panel presents the results for potential applicants, while the right
panel for neighbors. Apart from the coefficients, the figures illustrate 95% con-
fidence intervals. The dashed red line correspond to 0. The coefficients were
obtained using optimal bandwidths that were computed following Calonico
et al. [2014b].
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Figure 2.D3: Placebo Exercise: Effect of Potential Applicants (t) on Neighbors
(t-1)
Notes: This figure illustrates the reduced form of a placebo exercise.
It shows how neighbors’ probability of going to university evolves
with the PSU score of potential applicants. The PSU score is cen-
tered around the student-loans eligibility threshold. Each dot rep-
resents the share of neighbors going to university at different ranges
of potential applicants PSU scores. The red lines correspond to lin-
ear approximations of these shares, and the shadow around them to
95% confidence intervals. The blue bars in the background illustrate
the distribution of the potential applicants’ scores in the PSU. The
range used for these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths that
were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Figure 2.D4: Neighbors and Siblings Placebo Cutoffs
(a) Neighbors
(b) Siblings
Notes: This figure illustrates the reduced form coefficients for the different
cutoffs. The top panel illustrates the results for neighbors, and the panel at
the bottom for siblings. Apart from the coefficients, the figures illustrate 95%
confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood unit
level.
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Figure 2.D5: Neighbors’ Effects with Different Bandwidths
Notes: This figure illustrates the coefficients obtained when studying
neighbors’ effects using different bandwidths. The dots represent the
coefficients, and the lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.D6: First Stage and Reduced Form of Neighbors’ RD (P2)
(a) First Stage: Neighbors’ Probability of going to Univeristy
(b) Reduced Form: Potential Applicants’ Probability of going to Uni-
versity
Notes: This figure illustrates the first stage and reduced form of the neighbors
rd. The first panel shows how neighbors’ probability of going to university
evolves with the score they obtain in the PSU. The second panel shows how
potential applicants’ probability of going to university evolves with the PSU
score of their closest neighbor. The PSU score is centered around the student-
loans eligibility threshold. Each dot represents the share of neighbors (panel
1) or potential applicants (panel 2) going to university at different ranges of
PSU scores. The red lines correspond to quadratic approximations of these
shares, and the shadow around them to 95% confidence intervals. The blue
bars in the background illustrate the distribution of the neighbors’ scores in
the PSU. The range used for these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths
that were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Figure 2.D7: Density of Siblings’ PSU Scores around the Student Loans Eligibility
Threshold)
Notes: This figure illustrates the density of siblings PSU scores around
the student loans eligibility thresholds. The density and its confidence
intervals on each side of the cutoff were estimated following [Cattaneo
et al., 2018a]. This chart complements the formal test they suggest
to study discontinuities in the distribution of the running variable
around the relevant threshold. In this case the test statistic is 0.4479
and the p−value is 0.5968. This means there is no statistical evidence
to reject the null hypothesis of a smooth density around the threshold.
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Figure 2.D8: Discontinuities in other Covariates at the Cutoff - Siblings
(a) Potential Applicants (b) Siblings
Notes: This figure illustrates the coefficients obtained when studying disconti-
nuities in other variables that could potentially affect the outcome of interest.
The left panel presents the results for potential applicants, while the right
panel for siblings. Apart from the coefficients, the figures illustrate 95% con-
fidence intervals. The dashed red line correspond to 0. The coefficients were
obtained using optimal bandwidths that were computed following Calonico
et al. [2014b].
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Figure 2.D9: Placebo Exercise: Effect of Potential Applicants (t) on Siblings
(t-T)
Notes: This figure illustrates the reduced form of a placebo exercise.
It shows how siblings’ probability of going to university evolves with
the PSU score of potential applicants. The PSU score is centered
around the student-loans eligibility threshold. Each dot represents
the share of siblings going to university at different ranges of potential
applicants PSU scores. The red lines correspond to linear approxima-
tions of these shares, and the shadow around them to 95% confidence
intervals. The blue bars in the background illustrate the distribution
of the potential applicants’ scores in the PSU. The range used for
these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths that were computed
following Calonico et al. [2014b].
CHAPTER 2. NEIGHBORS’ EFFECTS 130
Figure 2.D10: Siblings’ Effects with Different Bandwidths
Notes: This figure illustrates the coefficients obtained when studying
siblings’ effects using different bandwidths. The dots represent the
coefficients, and the lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.
CHAPTER 2. NEIGHBORS’ EFFECTS 131
Figure 2.D11: First Stage and Reduced Form of Siblings RD (P2)
(a) First Stage: Siblings’ Probability of going to Univeristy
(b) Reduced Form: Potential Applicants’ Probability of going to Uni-
versity
Notes: This figure illustrates the first stage and reduced form of the siblings
rd. The first panel shows how siblings’ probability of going to university
evolves with the score they obtain in the PSU. The second panel shows how
potential applicants’ probability of going to university evolves with the PSU
score of their sibling. The PSU score is centered around the student-loans
eligibility threshold. Each dot represents the share of siblings (panel 1) or
potential applicants (panel 2) going to university at different ranges of PSU
scores. The red lines correspond to quadratic approximations of these shares,
and the shadow around them to 95% confidence intervals. The blue bars in
the background illustrate the distribution of the siblings’ scores in the PSU.
The range used for these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths that were
computed following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Table 2.D1: Effect of Potential Applicants on Neighbors and Siblings University
Enrollment
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 CCT-1 CCT-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Neighbors
Potential applicant goes to university (t+1) 0.027 -0.006 -0.029 -0.029
(0.072) (0.091) (0.115) (0.116)
Constant 0.754*** 0.751***
(0.015) (0.019)
First stage coefficient 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.104***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 76,349 101,222 76,349 101,222
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (60.5-60.5) (71.5-92.5) (60.5-60.5) (71.5-92.5)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 267.64 169.22
Panel B - Siblings
Potential applicant goes to university (t+T) 0.011 -0.040 -0.002 0.001
(0.072) (0.078) (0.086) (0.093)
Constant 0.741*** 0.730***
(0.017) (0.018)
First stage coefficient 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 41,185 85,787 41,185 85,787
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (38-47.5) ( 80-110.5) (38-47.5) (80-110.5)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 294.94 264.19
Notes: The table presents the results of a placebo exercise in which I estimate the effects of poten-
tial applicants (t) on neighbors university enrollment (t-1). Columns 1 and 2 present two stages
least squares estimates using a linear and quadratic polynomial of PSU respectively. Columns
3 and 4 use instead local polynomials following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Optimal bandwidths
are used in all the specifications. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood unit
level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Table 2.D2: Placebo - Effect of Potential Applicants on Neighbors and Siblings
University Enrollment (II)
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 CCT-1 CCT-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Neighbors
Potential applicant goes to university (t+1) 0.019 0.017 0.017 -0.033
(0.048) (0.064) (0.069) (0.083)
Constant 0.394*** 0.395***
(0.013) (0.016)
First stage coefficient 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 97,987 112,389 97,987 112,389
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (48.0-84.5) (74.0-87.5) (48.0-84.5) (74.0-87.5)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 571.14 322.57
Panel B - Siblings
Potential applicant goes to university (t+T) 0.043 0.005 0.016 -0.018
(0.057) (0.079) (0.081) (0.094)
Constant 0.449*** 0.444***
(0.016) (0.021)
First stage coefficient 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.152***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 35,394 64,136 35,394 64,136
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (45.0-50.0) ( 68.0-108.5) (45.0-50.0) (68.0-108.0)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 347.16 234.42
Notes: The table presents the results of a placebo exercise in which I estimate the effects of potential
applicants (t) on neighbors university enrollment (t-1). Columns 1 and 2 present two stages least
squares estimates using a linear and quadratic polynomial of PSU respectively. Columns 3 and 4 use
instead local polynomials following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Optimal bandwidths are used in all the
specifications. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood unit level. *p-value<0.1
**p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Table 2.D3: Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants University Enrollment
(Metropolitan Region of Santiago)
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 CCT-1 CCT-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.129** 0.168** 0.151** 0.128
(0.060) (0.075) (0.075) (0.092)
First stage coefficient 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.137*** 0.140***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 56,225 75,120 56,225 75,120
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Bandwidth (55.0-84.0) (73.5-113.0) (55.0-84.0) (73.5-113.0)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 151.92 88.51
Notes: The table presents the results of analysis similar to those presented in table 2.2
for focusing in RM. Columns 1 and 2 present two stages least squares estimates using
a linear and quadratic polynomial of PSU respectively. Columns 3 and 4 use instead
local polynomials following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Optimal bandwidths are used in
all the specifications. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood unit
level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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2.E Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 2.E1: Share of Students going to University vs Performance in Mathe-
matics Standardized Test
Notes: This figure illustrates how the gap in university enrollment
observed across income groups evolves with ability. Ability is mea-
sured by students performance in grade 10 mathematics standardized
test. University enrollment is measured 3 years later; if students
do not repeat or dropout, this is one year after they complete high
school. The blue dots correspond to low-income students, while the
red squares correspond to high-income students. Low-income stu-
dents come roughly from households in the bottom 20% of the income
distribution, while high-income students from households in the top
20%. The statistics in this table are based on the sample of students
in grade 10 in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.
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Figure 2.E2: Share of Students going to University vs Household Income (2015)
Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between the
share of 18 to 24 years old individuals going to university
in 2015 and their household income. It was build using
data from the Chilean national household survey, CASEN
(http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen-
multidimensional/casen/basedatos.php).
Figure 2.E3: Distribution of Distance between Potential Applicants and their
Closest Neighbor
Notes: This figure illustrates the distribution of distance between
potential applicants’ household and their closest neighbor. Potential
applicants are individuals that appear in the PSU registers between
2007 and 2012. Their neighbors are individuals that appear in the
PSU registers one year before them.
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Figure 2.E4: Reduced Form of Neighbors’ RD: Neighbors applying the Same year
and Two years before Applicants
(a) Neighbors apply on the same year
(b) Neighbors apply two years before
Notes: This figure illustrates reduced forms similar to the one presented in
Figure 2.2, but this time focusing on the closest neighbor applying to university
the same year as the applicant (panel 1) and two years before the applicant
(panel 2). Both panels show how potential applicants’ probability of going to
university evolves with the PSU score of their neighbors. The PSU score is
centered around the student-loans eligibility threshold. Each dot represents
the share of potential applicants going to university at different ranges of
neighbors’ PSU scores. The red lines come from linear regressions of the
outcome on the running variable on each side of the eligibility threshold, and
the shadow around them to 95% confidence intervals. The blue bars in the
background illustrate the distribution of the neighbors’ scores in the PSU.
The range used for these plots corresponds to optimal bandwidths computed


























Table 2.E1: Heterogeneity in the Effects of Closest Neighbor on Potential Applicants’ Enrollment
Socioeconomic Status High School Track Gender
Bottom 30% Between 30%-70% Top 30% Academic track Vocational track Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.033 0.150** 0.113 0.130** 0.046 0.083* 0.131**
(0.039) (0.065) (0.095) (0.053) (0.036) (0.050) (0.054)
First stage 0.192*** 0.174*** 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.168***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Reduced form 0.006 0.026** 0.018 0.023** 0.008 0.016* 0.022**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
N. of potential applicants 31279 30899 22906 52943 32141 39684 45400
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 259.58 211.11 116.53 282.26 227.30 299.66 276.96
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors on potential applicants’ university enrollment depending on socioeconomic,
academic and demographic variables. Columns 1 to 3 study how the effect of neighbors and siblings on potential applicants change depending
on the socioeconomic status of potential applicants. Socioeconomic status is measured through an index that incorporate income level, parental
education, health insurance and the high school administrative dependence. Columns 4 and 5 do the same, but distinguishing by the high
school track followed by potential applicants. Finally, columns 6 and 7 look at heterogeneous effects by gender. All specifications include years
fixed effects and a linear polynomial of the closest neighbor or sibling PSU score; it is allowed to be different on both sides of the student-loans
eligibility threshold. Optimal bandwidths are used in all the specifications and were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b]. In parenthesis,
standard errors clustered at neighborhood unit or household level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Table 2.E2: Persistence of the Effect of Neighbors on Potential Applicants’ Uni-
versity Enrollment
Pr. of remaining in the:
System University
2SLS-1 2SLS-2 2SLS-1 2SLS-2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbor goes to university (t-1) 0.106*** 0.084** 0.116** 0.088*
(0.037) (0.036) (0.048) (0.047)
First stage 0.178*** 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.168***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Reduced form 0.019*** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.015*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Years fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of students 85084 134796 85084 134796
PSU Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 425.27 269.38 425.27 269.38
Notes: The table presents the estimated effects of neighbors on potential
applicants’ permanence in the system 1 year after enrollment. Columns 1 and
2 look at permanence in any university, while columns 3 and 4 in the same
university in which potential applicants enrolled in their first year. In both
cases, the outcome is 1 for applicants who enroll and remain enrolled one year
later; it is 0 for applicants who do not enroll at all or who enroll but dropout
after their first year. 2SLS estimates come from specifications that control
for linear or quadratic polynomial of PSU which slopes are allowed to change
at the cutoff. Bandwidths are the same used in the specifications presented
in Table 2.2. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at neighborhood unit
level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Abstract
This paper investigates how the probability of applying and enrolling in a particular
university (or program) changes if an older sibling enrolls in it. We study this in Chile
and Croatia taking advantage of the deferred acceptance admission systems (DA) that
universities use in both countries to select their students. Exploiting the quasi-random
variation generated by thousands of admission cutoffs, we find that individuals are
more likely to apply and to enroll in a university (or program) if an older sibling is
admitted and enrolls in it before. These siblings’ spillovers persist even when, due
to age differences, siblings are unlikely to attend university at the same time. We
discuss five classes of mechanisms that could drive these results and present evidence
consistent with the transmission of information being a relevant driver. Individuals
are more likely to follow their older siblings when they enroll in programs with higher
retention rates and where graduates perform better in the labor market. Older siblings’
experience in university also seems to be important, suggesting that individuals learn
through siblings if specific programs or universities are a good match for them.
Keywords: Siblings’ Effects, University Choice, Program Choice.
JEL classification: I21, I24.
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3.1 Introduction
The growth experienced by higher education in the last decades has generated great
interest in understanding how individuals choose if and where to continue their educa-
tion after high school. Although individual returns to schooling remain high, there is
vast evidence that these returns mask substantial heterogeneity1 and that some indi-
viduals face constraints that prevent them from making optimal choices when applying
to university.2
The role of family —especially of parents— and peers in education have been widely
studied. However, we know far less about how siblings affect human capital investment
decisions. In this paper, we investigate how individuals’ application and enrollment
decisions are affected by the program and university attended by their older siblings.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first studying the causal relationship between
siblings’ university and program choices.
We study this in Chile and Croatia, exploiting the fact that in both countries universi-
ties select their students using centralized deferred acceptance admission systems (DA)
that allocate applicants to programs based on their declared preferences and on a score
that combines academic performance in high school and in a national level admission
exam. These selection systems give rise to admission cutoffs in all oversubscribed pro-
grams (i.e. programs with more applicants than available seats). Taking advantage of
the variation generated by these cutoffs, we instrument enrollment with an indicator
of admission and use a fuzzy RD to investigate how having an older sibling enrolling
1Oreopoulos and Petronijevic [2013] presents a review of works studying returns to higher
education. Hastings et al. [2013] and Reyes et al. [2013] document heterogeneous returns to
postsecondary education in Chile, one of the countries we study in this paper.
2Hoxby and Avery [2013] show that high achieving individuals from areas with low educa-
tional attainment in the United States apply to less selective schools than similar students from
other areas. This, despite the fact that better schools would admit them and provide more gen-
erous funding. This undermatching phenomenon has also been studied by Black et al. [2015],
Griffith and Rothstein [2009] and Smith et al. [2013]. There is also a vast literature looking
at the role of information frictions in schooling investment. Attanasio and Kaufmann [2014],
Hastings et al. [2015] and Jensen [2010] study these frictions in Mexico, Chile and Dominican
Republic respectively. Bettinger et al. [2012] and Hoxby and Turner [2015] look at them in the
United States, and Oreopoulos and Dunn [2013] in Canada. Carrell and Sacerdote [2017] on
the other hand, argues that interventions that increase university enrollment work not because
they provide additional information, but because they compensate for lack of support and en-
couragement. Lavecchia et al. [2016] discusses these frictions and different behavioral barriers
that may explain why some individuals do not take full advantage of education opportunities.
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in a specific university (or program) affects individuals’ probabilities of applying and
enrolling in the same university (or program).
A key challenge for the identification of siblings’ effects is to distinguish between social
interactions and correlated effects. In our setting, correlated effects arise because sib-
lings share genetic characteristics and grow up under very similar circumstances. Thus,
it is not surprising to find a high correlation between their outcomes. Our empirical
strategy compares individuals whose older siblings are marginally admitted or rejected
from a specific program. Since these individuals are very similar both in observable
and unobservable characteristics, we can rule out concerns about correlated effects.
In addition, if siblings’ outcomes simultaneously affect each other, this gives rise to
what Manski [1993] described as the reflection problem. In our setting individuals
apply and enroll in university after their older siblings. The lagged structure of their
decisions and the fact that the variation that we exploit in older siblings’ enrollment
comes only from the admission cutoffs, allow us to abstract from the reflection problem.
Studying this is not only relevant to understand how family networks and in particu-
lar siblings affect human capital investment decisions, but also because these siblings’
effects may have important policy implications. First, in the context of policies that
change the pool of students admitted to specific programs and institutions (i.e. af-
firmative action), these spillovers would imply that these type of policies, in addition
to having an effect on their direct beneficiaries, would also have an indirect effect on
other members of their network. Second, if the reason why individuals respond to their
older siblings’ choices is incomplete information, this would mean that there is space to
improve the match between students and institutions by providing better information.
Our findings show that despite the differences that exist between Chile and Croatia,
in both countries siblings’ spillovers are very similar. Individuals whose older siblings
“marginally enroll”in their target university are 10 percentage points more likely to
apply to the same university.3 While in Chile this translates into an increase of 5
percentage points (50%) in the probability of enrolling in the older sibling’s target uni-
3We use the term “marginal enrollment”to highlight the fact that these results come from a
fuzzy RD that compares individuals whose older siblings were marginally admitted or rejected
from specific programs (or universities).
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versity, in Croatia this figure is close to 10 percentage points (33%). We also find that
in both countries individuals are more likely to apply and enroll in the target program
of their older siblings when they “marginally enroll”in it. In Chile, we document an in-
crease of around 2.5 percentage points (50%) in applications and 0.3 percentage points
(33%) in enrollment; the same figures for Croatia are 4.5 percentage points (35%) and
1.5 percentage points (75%) respectively. In addition, we show that the effects are
stronger for individuals who resemble their older siblings in terms of gender and aca-
demic potential.
Our main results are consistent with five broad classes of mechanisms. First, the ef-
fects could be driven by the convenience of attending university together. Second, they
could be driven by competition between siblings or by changes in parental expectations.
Third, having an older siblings enrolling in a specific pogram or institution could affect
aspirations. Fourth, the results could be driven by path dependence or by an increase
in the salience of the older sibling’s program. Finally, the effects could be the result
of the transmission of information between siblings. We investigate all of these alter-
natives, and present suggestive evidence that information is an important mechanism
behind the effects we find.
This paper contributes to existing research in several ways. First, it adds to the lit-
erature studying how family and peers influence educational attainment; Bjo¨rklund
and Salvanes [2011] reviews the literature studying the role of family, while Sacerdote
[2011] and Sacerdote [2014] review the literature studying the role of peers. Despite
all the attention that these topics have received in the economic literature, little is
known about how siblings affect human capital investment decisions. Dustan [2018]
and Joensen and Nielsen [2018] are among the first looking at siblings’ effects, but they
focus on high school. The former uses a similar approach to the one used in this paper
to study siblings’ spillovers on the choice of high school in Mexico, while the latter
exploits quasi-random variation induced by a policy change in Denmark to investigate
how the decision to take advanced mathematics and science courses during high school
affect younger siblings’ course choice.
Goodman et al. [2015] investigates the relationship between siblings’ university choice;
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they study this in the United States and find that the correlation between siblings’ ap-
plications are much stronger than among similar classmates. However, the lack of an
exogenous source of variation on older siblings’ choices prevents them from obtaining
causal estimates. Barrios-Fernandez [2018] studies neighbors’ and siblings’ spillovers in
the access to university in Chile, and finds that having a close neighbor or sibling going
to university increases the probability of reaching this level of education, especially in
areas where university attendance has traditionally been low. Our paper complements
this work by exploiting a different source of variation and by focusing on the choice of
university and program, rather than in the decision to attend university.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that studies how individuals choose
universities and programs to apply and enroll. This has been an active area of research
in the last decades, and has looked at the role of costs, information and more recently
at some behavioral responses.4 This paper adds a new element by analyzing the role
of family networks on these choices.
The rest of the paper is organized in seven sections. Section 3.2 describes the univer-
sity systems of Chile and Croatia, Section 3.3 the data, and Section 3.4 the empirical
strategy and the samples we use. Section 3.5 presents the main results and Section 3.6
places them in the context of previous findings and discusses potential mechanisms.
Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Institutions
This section describes the university admission systems of Chile and Croatia, em-
phasizing the rules that generate the discontinuities that we later exploit to identify
spillovers among siblings.
4Papers investigating costs and liquidity constraints include Dynarski [2000], Seftor and
Turner [2002], Dynarski [2003], Long [2004], van der Klaauw [2002], and Solis [2017]; papers
studying the role of information include Bettinger et al. [2012], Busso et al. [2017], Dinkelman
and Mart´ınez A. [2014], Hastings et al. [2015, 2016], Hoxby and Turner [2015], Oreopoulos and
Dunn [2013], Wiswall and Zafar [2013], Booij et al. [2012], Nguyen [2008], Castleman and Page
[2015]. Carrell and Sacerdote [2017] argues that differences in support and encouragement are
key to explain differences in college enrollment. Lavecchia et al. [2016] discusses the literature
on behavioral constraints that may explain why some individuals do not take full advantage of
their education opportunities.
CHAPTER 3. SIBLINGS’ EFFECTS 145
3.2.1 University Admission System in Chile
In Chile, there are public and private universities. All the public universities and 9
out of 43 private universities are part of the Council of Chilean Universities (CRUCH),
an organization that was created to improve coordination and to provide advice to the
Ministry of Education in matters related to higher education.
The CRUCH universities, and since 2012 a group of eight private universities, select
their students using a deferred acceptance admission system that only considers stu-
dents’ performance in high school and in a national level university admission exam
(PSU).5 The PSU is taken in December, at the end of the Chilean academic year, but
students typically need to register before mid-August.6 Since 2006 all students gradu-
ating from public and voucher schools are eligible for a fee waiver that makes the PSU
free for them.7
Universities publish the list of programs and vacancies offered for the next academic
year well before the PSU examination date. Concurrently, they inform the weights
allocated to high school performance and to each section of the PSU to compute the
application score for each program.
With this information available and after receiving their PSU scores, students apply to
their programs of interest using an online platform. They are asked to rank up to 10
programs according to their preferences. Places are then allocated using an algorithm
of the Gale-Shapley family that matches students to programs using their preferences
and scores as inputs. Once a student is admitted to one of her preferences, the rest of
her applications are dropped. As shown in Figure 3.1, this system generates a sharp
discontinuity in admission probabilities in each program with more applicants than
vacancies.
5 The PSU has four sections: language, mathematics, social sciences and natural sciences.
The raw scores obtained by students in each of these sections are adjusted to obtain a nor-
mal distribution of scores with mean 500 and standard deviation 110. The extremes of the
distribution are truncated to obtain a minimum score of 150 and a maximum score of 850 in
each section. In order to apply to university, students need to take language, mathematics and
at least one of the other sections. Universities are free to set the weights allocated to these
instruments for selecting students.
6In 2017, the registration fee for the PSU was CLP 30,960 (USD 47).
7Around 93% of high school students in Chile attend public or voucher schools. The en-
tire registration process operates through an online platform that automatically detects the
students’ eligibility for the fee waiver.
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Universities that do not use the centralized system have their own admission processes.8
Although they could use their own entrance exams, the PSU still plays an important
role in the selection of their students, mostly due to the existence of strong finan-
cial incentives for both students and institutions.9 For instance, the largest financial
aid programs available for university studies require students to score above a certain
threshold in the PSU.
The coexistence of these two selection systems means that being admitted to a univer-
sity that uses the centralized platform does not necessarily translate into enrollment.
Once students receive an offer from a university they are free to accept or reject it
without any major consequence. This also makes it possible for some students origi-
nally rejected from a program to receive a later offer. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the
admission to a program translates into enrollment.
3.2.2 University Admission System in Croatia
In Croatia, there are 49 universities. Since 2010, all of them select their students
using a centralized admission system managed by the National Informational System
for University Application (NISpVU).
As in the case of Chile, NISpVU uses a deferred acceptance admission system that
focuses primarily on students’ performance in high school and in a national level uni-
versity exam.10 The national exam is taken in late June, approximately one month
after the end of the Croatian academic year. Students however, are required to submit
a free of charge online registration form by mid-February.
8From 2007, we observe enrollment in all the universities of the country independently of
the admission system they use.
9Firstly, creating a new test would generate costs for both the institutions and the applicants.
Secondly, for the period studied in this paper, part of the public resources received by higher
education institutions depended on the PSU performance of their first-year students. This
mechanism, eliminated in 2016, was a way of rewarding institutions that attracted the best
students of each cohort.
10In rare cases, certain universities are allowed to consider additional criteria for student
assessment. For example, Academy of Music assigns 80% of admission points based on an
in-house exam. These criteria are known well in advance, and are clearly communicated to
students through NISpVU. Students are required to take the obligatory part of the national
exam, comprising mathematics, Croatian and foreign language. In addition, students can
choose to take up to 6 voluntary subjects. Students’ performance is measured as a percentage
of the maximum attainable score in a particular subject.
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Universities disclose the list of programs and vacancies, together with program specific
weights allocated to high school performance and performance on each section of the
national exam roughly half a year before the application deadline. This information
is transparently organized and easily accessible through an interactive online platform
hosted by NISpVU.
Students are free to submit a rank of up to 10 programs from the moment they reg-
ister in the online platform. The system allows them to update these preference until
mid-July, moment in which students are allocated to programs based on their last list
of preferences. As in Chile, vacancies are allocated using a Gale-Shapley algorithm,
giving rise to similar discontinuities in admission probabilities (Figure 3.1).
Before the final deadline, the system allows students to learn their position on the
queue for each one of the programs to which they apply. This information is regu-
larly updated to take into account the changes that applicants make in their list of
preferences. In this paper we focus on the first applications submitted by students
after receiving their scores in the national admission test. Since some of them change
their applications before the deadline, admission based on these applications does not
translate one-to-one into enrollment (Figure 3.1).11
Two important differences with the Chilean system, are that in Croatia all universities
use the centralized admission system and that rejecting an offer is costly for students.12
3.3 Data
In this paper we exploit administrative data provided by different public agencies
from Chile and Croatia. In both countries, the main data sources are the agencies in
charge of the centralized university admission system: DEMRE in Chile, and NISpVU
and ASHE in Croatia.
From DEMRE we got access to individual level data of all the students registered to
11We focus on the first applications students submit after learning their exam performance
to avoid endogeneity issues in admission results that may arise from some students learning
about the system and being more active in modifying their applications before the deadline.
12Enrollment tuition fees are covered by the Ministry of Science and Education. If a student
rejects an offer, eligibility for tuition waiver is lost.
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take the PSU between 2004 and 2015. This data contains information on students’
performance in high school and in the different sections of the university admission
exam. It also contains information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
of individuals and on their applications and enrollment to the universities that select
students through the centralized admission system. To identify siblings, we exploit
the fact that when registering for the exam, students provide the national id number
of their parents. Using this unique identifier we can match all siblings that correctly
reported this number for at least one of their parents.13
In the case of Chile, we complement this information with registers from the Ministry of
Education and from the National Council of Education. In this data we observe enroll-
ment for all the institutions offering higher education in the country between 2007 and
2015, information that allows us to build program-year specific measures of retention
for the cohorts entering the system in 2006 or later. In these registers, we also observe
some program and institution characteristics, including past students’ performance in
the labor market (i.e. employment and annual earnings). Finally, using the registers
of the Ministry of Education we are also able to match students to their high schools
and observe their academic performance before they start higher education.
NISpVU and ASHE provided us with similar data for Croatia. These individual regis-
ters contain information on students’ performance in high school and in the different
sections of the university admission exam, and on applications and enrollment to all
Croatian universities between 2012 and 2018. These registers include the home address
of students, information that we exploit to identify siblings. We define as siblings two
individuals living in exactly the same address at the moment of registration for the
university admission exam.
Using this data, we were able to identify around 190, 000 pairs of siblings in Chile and
13, 000 in Croatia in which the older sibling had at least one active application to an
oversubscribed program (i.e. admitted or in the waiting list). Their characteristics, as
well as the characteristics of the rest of the students registered for taking the university
admission exams in the same period, are presented in Table 3.1.
13For the period that we study 79.2% of the students in the registers report a valid national id
number for at least one of their parents. 77.0% report the national id number of their mother.
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In both countries, the sample of siblings is very similar to the rest of the population
in terms of demographic characteristics. The bigger differences arise when looking at
socioeconomic and academic variables. In Chile, individuals whose older siblings had
at least one active application come from wealthier and more educated households. In
both countries, they are more likely to have followed the academic track in high school
and to perform better in high school and in the university admission test.
These differences are not surprising. After all, the siblings samples contain individuals
from families in which at least one child had an active application to a selective pro-
gram (i.e. oversubscribed programs) in the past. On top of this, the institutions that
use the centralized admission system in Chile are on average more selective than the
rest. Thus, individuals with active applications to these universities are usually better
candidates than the average student in the whole population of PSU takers.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The identification of siblings’ effects is challenging. In the first place, since siblings
share genetic characteristics and grow up under very similar circumstances, it is not
surprising to find that their outcomes —including the program and university that
they attend— are highly correlated. Thus, a first identification challenge consists in
distinguishing these correlated effects from the effects generated by interactions among
siblings. In addition, if siblings’ outcomes simultaneously affect each other, this gives
rise to what Manski [1993] described as the reflection problem. In our setting, given
that older siblings decide to apply and enroll in university before their younger sib-
lings, this is less of a concern (i.e. decisions that have not yet taken place should not
affect current decisions). However, there could still be cases in which siblings decide
together the university and program that they want to attend and therefore we need
an empirical strategy to address this potential threat.
To overcome the identification challenges described in the previous paragraph, we ex-
ploit thousands of cutoffs generated by the DA systems that Chilean and Croatian
universities use to select their students. Taking advantage of the discontinuities cre-
ated by these cutoffs on admission probabilities, we use a Regression Discontinuity
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(RD) design to investigate how older siblings’ admission to their target university (or
program) affects the probabilities that their younger siblings apply and enroll in the
same target university (or program).
Since individuals whose older siblings are marginally admitted or rejected from a spe-
cific program are very similar, the RD allows us to rule out the estimated effects to
be driven by differences on individual or family characteristics, eliminating in this way
concerns about correlated effects. Moreover, considering that the variation that we
exploit in the program in which older siblings enroll comes only from their admission
status and cannot be affected by the choices that their younger siblings will make in
the future, we can abstract from the reflection problem.14
As discussed in Section 3.2, rejecting an offer does not have any major consequence for
Chilean students. As a result, there is a non-negligible share of applicants that despite
being admitted to a particular university or program, decide not to enroll. Thus, when
studying how older siblings’ actual enrollment affects their younger siblings, we use a
fuzzy RD in which older siblings’ enrollment in a specific program is instrumented with
an indicator of admission.
In the case of Croatia, we follow a similar approach. Although in this setting rejecting
an offer is costly, we use a fuzzy and not a sharp RD because as explained in Section
3.2, we focus our attention on the first application students submit after receiving their
results in the university admission exam. Since some individuals modify their applica-
tions in the weeks following the exam results, admission to the first set of preferences
does not translate one-to-one into enrollment.15
This paper investigates how individuals’ probabilities of applying and enrolling in spe-
cific programs and universities change when their older sibling is marginally admitted
and enrolls in them. The basic idea behind our empirical design consists in defining for
each institution and program, the sample of older siblings who are marginally admitted
and marginally rejected from them, and then compare the outcomes of their younger
14We show that this is indeed the case in a series of placebo exercises that we present in
Figures 3.B6 and 3.B7 in the Appendix.
15We focus on the first applications submitted after learning the exam scores to avoid endo-
geneity issues in admission results that may arise by some type of students being more active
in modifying their applications in the weeks following the exam.
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siblings. Next, we discuss the restrictions used to identify the groups of marginal older
siblings in each case.
3.4.1 University Sample
This section describes the restrictions applied to the data in order to build the
sample used to study how individuals’ probabilities of applying and enrolling in a
specific university change when their older sibling is marginally admitted and enrolls
in it.
As discussed earlier, the assignment mechanism used in Chile and Croatia results in
cutoff scores for each program with more applicants than available seats; these cutoffs
correspond to the lowest score among the admitted students. Let cjut be the cutoff
for program j in institution u in year t. If the program j in institution u is ranked
before the program j′ offered by institution u′ in student i’s preference list, we write
(j, u)  (j′, u′).16 Denoting the application score of individual i as aijut, we can define
marginal students in the university sample as those whose older siblings:
1. listed program j in institution u as a choice, such that all programs preferred to
j had a higher cutoff score than j (otherwise assignment to j is impossible):
cjut < cj′u′t ∀ (j′, u′)  (j, u).
2. listed program j in institution u as a choice, such that programs not preferred to
j are dictated by an institution different from u (otherwise being above or below
the cutoff would not generate variation on the institution attended).
3. had a score sufficiently close to j’s cutoff score to be within a given bandwidth
bw around the cutoff:
|aijut − cjut| ≤ bw.
This sample includes individuals whose older siblings were rejected from (j, u) (aijut <
cjut) and those whose older siblings scored above the admission cutoff (aijut ≥ cjut).
Since the application list in general contains more than one preference, this means that
the same individual may belong to more than one program-institution marginal group.
16This notation does not say anything about the optimality of the declared preferences. It
only reflects the order stated by individual i.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the probability of admission and enrollment in a given institution
around the admission cutoff in Chile and Croatia.
3.4.2 Program Sample
In addition to studying the effect of the institution attended by older siblings, we
investigate how individuals’ probabilities of applying and enrolling in a specific program
change when their older sibling is marginally admitted and enrolls in it. The sample
used in this case is very similar to the one described in Section 3.4.1. The only difference
is that in this case only the first and third restrictions are applied. This means that
in the Program Sample, the institution attended by older siblings does not necessarily
change by being above or below the admission cutoff. As far as the program in which
they are admitted changes, they will be in the sample.
3.4.3 Identifying Assumptions
As in any other RD setting, the validity of our estimates relies on two key as-
sumptions. First, individuals should not be able to manipulate their application scores
around the admission cutoff. The structures of the university admission systems in
Chile and Croatia make the violation of this assumption unlikely. However, to confirm
this we study if the distribution of the running variable (i.e. older sibling’s application
score centered around relevant cutoff) is continuous at the cutoff. We do this by im-
plementing the test suggested by Cattaneo et al. [2018b] whose results are presented
in Figure 3.2. As expected, we do not detect discontinuities on the distribution of the
running variable at the cutoff. Strictly speaking, the density of the running variable
needs to be continuous around each admission cutoff. In our analysis, we pool them
together because there are thousands of cutoffs in our samples and studying them in-
dependently would be impractical.
Second, in order to interpret changes in individuals’ outcomes as a result of the ad-
mission status of their older siblings, there cannot be discontinuities in other potential
confounders at the cutoff (i.e. the only relevant difference at the cutoff must be older
siblings’ admission). We study this by taking advantage of the availability of a rich
set of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Figure 3.B1, in Appendix 3.B
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shows that this is indeed the case. Once more, this analysis is done by pooling together
all the admission cutoffs in our samples.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, to study the effect of older siblings’
enrollment (instead of admission) on younger siblings’ outcomes we use a fuzzy RD.
This approach can be thought as an IV strategy, meaning that in order to interpret our
estimates as a local average treatment effects (LATE) we need to satisfy the assump-
tions discussed by Imbens and Angrist [1994].17 In this setting, in addition to the usual
IV assumptions, we also need to assume that receiving an offer for a specific program
does not make the probability of enrolling in a different program bigger than in the
absence of the offer (in Appendix 3.A we discuss this in detail). Given the structure of
the admission systems that we study, this additional assumption does not seem very
demanding.18
An additional issue related to the interpretation of our estimates is that as noted by
Cattaneo et al. [2016], by pooling together different cutoffs, our estimates correspond
to a weighted average of LATEs across programs. This weighted average gives more
importance to programs with more applicants in the vicinity of the admission cutoff.
Since there could be heterogeneity on the characteristics of individuals around each
admission cutoff, and also on the effect of admission and enrollment at each admission
cutoff, we need to be careful with the interpretation of this weighted average.
In order to understand what is driving our results we perform a detailed heterogeneity
analysis along multiple dimensions including both individual and program character-
istics. In addition, Tables 3.B3 and 3.B4 in Appendix 3.B, study how different our
17Independence, relevance, exclusion and monotonicity. In this setting, independence is
satisfied around the cutoff. The existence of a first stage is shown in Figure 3.1. The exclusion
restriction implies that the only way through which older siblings’ admission to a program
affects younger siblings’ outcomes, is by the increase it generates in older siblings’ enrollment
in that program. Finally, the monotonicity assumption means that admission to a program
weakly increases the probability of enrollment in that program (i.e. being admitted into a
program does not reduce the enrollment probability in that program).
18In the case of Chile, where not all universities use the centralized admission system and
where rejecting an offer is not costly for students, this assumption could be violated if for
instance universities that do not use the centralized admission system offer scholarships or
other types of incentives to attract students marginally admitted to universities that do use
it. Although it does not seem very likely for the universities out of the centralized system to
define students’ incentives based on marginal offers to other institutions, we cannot completely
rule out this possibility. In the case of Croatia, where students lose their funding in case of
rejecting an offer, violations to this assumption are much less likely.
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results are when we re-weight observations around each cutoff by the inverse of the
total number of applicants around it. Although the estimates are slightly smaller in
this case, the main conclusions still hold.
A final consideration for the interpretation of our results relates to the findings of
Barrios-Fernandez [2018]. According to it, the probability of attending university in-
creases with close peers’ enrollment. If marginal admission to the programs that we
study translates into an increase in total university enrollment, then our estimated
results could simply reflect that individuals whose older siblings attend university are
more likely to enroll. We address these concerns in Table 3.B5 of Appendix 3.B where
we study if older siblings’ marginal admission increases their own and their younger
siblings’ total enrollment. In the case of Chile, we only find a small increase on total
enrollment of older siblings. This result is not surprising. As discussed in Section 3.2,
the universities that use the centralized admission system in Chile are on average more
selective than the rest. This means that individuals rejected from these institutions still
have many other alternatives available. In the case of Croatia, we find that marginal
admission translates into a more significant increase in older siblings total enrollment.19
However, we do not find an extensive margin response among younger siblings in any
of the two settings.20
In Appendix 3.B, we also present multiple additional robustness checks. We show that
as expected, changes in the admission status of younger siblings do not have an effect
on older siblings; that our estimates are robust to different bandwidth choices and that
when replacing the actual cutoffs by placebo ones, there are no significant effects on
any of the outcomes that we study.
19In Section 3.5 we perform heterogeneity analyses along multiple dimensions. We find that
the effects in both countries are driven by individuals whose older siblings are admitted to more
selective institutions. Individuals on the margin of admission to selective institutions are less
likely to suffer a change on their total enrollment since in case of rejection they still have many
alternatives available.
20Our results for Chile are still consistent with the findings of Barrios-Fernandez [2018]. The
variation that he exploits generates a much bigger difference on older siblings enrollment than
the one we document here.
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3.5 Results
This section begins by providing additional details about the empirical approach
used to estimate the effects of interest. It then discusses how individuals’ probabilities
of applying and enrolling in a specific university or program change when their older
siblings are marginally admitted and enroll in it. It continues by looking at how these
effects vary with individual and program characteristics. The section concludes by
investigating how individuals’ academic performance is affected by the admission and
enrollment results of their older siblings.
3.5.1 Method
In all the specifications used in this paper, we pool together observations from
all over-subscribed programs and center older siblings’ application scores around the
relevant admission cutoff. The following expression describes our baseline specification:
yijutτ = βadmittedijuτ + f(aijuτ ; γ) + µt + µjuτ + εijutτ (3.1)
where,
yijutτ is the outcome of interest of the younger sibling of the siblings-pair i applying to
university in year t and whose older sibling was near the admission cutoff of program
j in university u in year τ .
admittedijuτ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the older sibling of the siblings-
pair i was admitted to program j offered by university u on year τ (aiujτ ≥ cujτ )
f(aiujτ ; γ) is a function of the application score of the older sibling of the siblings-pair
i for program j offered by university u on year τ .
µt and µjuτ are younger sibling’s application year and cutoff-older sibling’s application
year fixed effects; and εijut is an error term.
We estimate parametric and non-parametric versions of this specification. For the
parametric approach, f(aiujtτ ; γ) corresponds to linear or quadratic polynomials of
aiujτ whose slopes are allowed to change at the cutoff. For the non-parametric approach
we follow Calonico et al. [2014b, 2018] and use local polynomials of degree 1 and 2.
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In all cases, we use optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico et al. [2014b]
(Figures 3.B2 and 3.B3 in Appendix 3.B illustrates how sensible are our estimates to
the choice of bandwidth). In Tables 3.B1 and 3.B2 of Appendix 3.B we also present
a parametric specification in which we allow the slope of the running variable to be
different for each admission cutoff.21 The estimates obtained with this specification
are very similar to the ones we discuss in this section.
Since all the specifications that we use focus on individuals whose older siblings are
near an admissions cutoff, our estimates represents the average effect of older siblings’
marginal admission compared to the counterfactual of marginal rejection from a target
program.22
To study the effect of enrollment —instead of the effect of admission— we instrument
older siblings’ enrollment (enrollsijuτ ) with the indicator of admission (admittedijuτ ).
Standard errors must account for the fact that each older sibling may appear several
times in our estimation sample if she is near two or more cutoffs. To deal with this
situation we use cluster standard errors at family level.
To study heterogeneous effects, we add to the baseline specification an interaction
between older siblings’ admission and the characteristic along which heterogeneous
effects are being investigated (i.e. admittedijuτ × xijutτ ). This interaction is also used
as an instrument for the interaction between older sibling’s enrollment and xijutτ . In
both cases, xijutτ is also included as a control.
3.5.2 Mean Effects
This section discusses how older siblings’ admission and enrollment in specific uni-
versities (or programs) affect their younger siblings’ university (or program) choices.
When investigating effects on university choice, we use the University Sample defined
in Section 3.4.1. For studying the effects on program choice, we use the Program Sam-
ple.
21The estimation of these specifications is costly in computing time. In addition to the
fixed effects included in the baseline specification, we include interactions between the running
variable aijuτ and µjuτ , and also between aijuτ , µjuτ and admittedijutτ .
22Strictly speaking, our estimates represent a weighted average of multiple LATEs. See
Section 3.4.3 for additional details.
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The RD estimates illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 give consistent causal evidence
that students are more likely to apply and to enroll in a university and program if an
older sibling was admitted before. The precise reduced form coefficients represented in
these figures are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. These tables summarize the reduced
form and IV-estimates obtained from the parametric and non-parametric specifications
discussed in Section 3.5.1.
As shown in Figure 3.1, although admission does not translates one-to-one into en-
rollment, there is a strong relation between these two variables. Thus, under the
assumptions discussed in section 3.4.3, we can combine the reduced forms and first
stages to obtain fuzzy RD estimates for the effect of older siblings’ enrollment in their
target university and program on the probabilities that their younger siblings apply
and enroll in them.
In the case of Chile, having an older sibling “marginally enrolling”23 in a specific uni-
versity increases the likelihood of applying to it in the first preference by around 8
percentage points (50%) and in any preference by around 10 percentage points (30%).
These changes in applications also translate into an increase of around 5 percentage
points (50%) in the probability of enrolling in that university. The results for Croatia
are very similar. Younger siblings are 8 percentage points (25%) more likely to apply
to a specific university in the first preference and 10 percentage points (18%) more
likely to apply to it in any preference if their older sibling “marginally enrolls”in it.
This increase in applications translates into a 9 percentage points (30%) increase in
the probability of enrollment.
When focusing instead on the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment on a specific
program, the results follow a similar pattern. In the case of Chile, individuals are 0.8
percentage points (40%) more likely to apply to that program in the first preference, 2.8
percentage points (55%) more likely to apply to it in any preference, and 0.3 percentage
points (30%) more likely to enroll in it (this last figure is not statistically significant).
For Croatia, the same figures are 1.4 percentage points (45%), 4.3 percentage points
23“Marginally enrolling”means that the individual was marginally admitted to the program
in which he enrolled. We emphasize this to remind the reader that the estimates come from
comparing individuals whose older siblings were marginally admitted and marginally rejected
from specific programs.
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(33%) and 1.6 percentage points (80%) respectively and they are all statistically sig-
nificant.
These results show that despite the differences that exist between Chile and Croatia in
size, location, culture and history, individuals respond to their older siblings’ human
capital investment decisions in a very similar way.
3.5.3 Effects by Sibling Similarity: Demographic and Academic Char-
acteristics
This section studies if the effects discussed in Section 3.5.2 change depending on
how close siblings are in terms of gender, age and academic potential. To measure
similarity in academic potential, we use the absolute difference in the high school GPA
of siblings. In Croatia, we observe high school GPA only for students completing their
secondary education before 2015; this explains the smaller sample used in this part of
the analysis for Croatia.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 summarize the results of this section. The probability of applying
to the target university of older siblings after they “marginally enroll”in it does not
seem to be differentially affected by the gender of siblings (column 1 of Table 3.4). The
coefficient capturing the differential effect for siblings of the same gender is not statis-
tically significant neither in Chile nor in Croatia. When looking at changes in actual
enrollment, we find a positive, but only marginally significant difference between same
gender and opposite gender siblings (column 4 of Table 3.4). In Chile, the estimated
difference represents a 30% of the main effect, while in Croatia it represents more than
50% of the main effect.
The differences by siblings’ gender are clearer when looking at changes in the probabil-
ities of applying and enrolling in the older siblings’ target programs. Both effects —on
applications and on enrollment— are bigger for same gender individuals (columns 1 and
4 of Table 3.5). The difference in the effect on the application probability represents
50% of the main effect in Chile, and 90% of the main effect in Croatia. The differences
on the effects on enrollment are even bigger. In Chile, the effect on enrollment is only
significant for siblings of the same gender; for them the effect is eight times bigger than
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for siblings of opposite gender. In the case of Croatia, the effect we find for siblings
of the same gender is almost three times the effect found for siblings of the opposite
gender.
We find no evidence of heterogeneous effects by age difference (columns 2 and 4 in
Tables 3.4 and 3.5). The only statistically significant difference arises when studying
changes on the probability of applying to the older siblings’ target university in Chile
(column 2 in Table 3.4). However, the coefficient capturing the differential effect is
very small. According to it, the effect decreases by 0.6 percentage points with age
difference. Since the main effect is 12.5 percentage points, this means that the age
difference between siblings would need to be bigger than 20 years to make the mean
effect disappear.
The difference in academic potential between siblings seems to make a bigger difference
on the size of the effects (columns 3 and 6 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5). All the coefficients
measuring heterogeneous effects are significant, except for the ones estimated when
studying the effects on the probability of applying and enrolling in older siblings’ tar-
get university in Croatia. As discussed at the beginning of this section, in Croatia
we observe high school GPA only for a subsample of individuals. This considerably
reduces the sample size affecting our ability to detect significant effects.
In the case of Chile, a difference of 1-σ (128.26) in siblings’ high school GPA score
makes the effect on the probability of enrolling in the target university and in the
target program of the older sibling to practically disappear. In the case of Croatia,
a difference of 1-σ (0.57) in siblings’ high school GPA reduces the total effect in uni-
versity and program enrollment by around 30% and 50% respectively (only the second
difference is statistically significant).
Table 3.6 provides additional details on how the effects differ by the gender of sib-
lings. For these analyses we split the sample in two groups depending on the gender of
the older sibling and estimate a specification that includes an interaction between the
treatment and a dummy variable that indicates if the younger sibling is female.
Although splitting the sample results in a loss of precision, we end with a pretty con-
sistent general picture. In both countries, males respond more to what happens with
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their older siblings when they are also males. Females seem to be less responsive than
males to what happens with male older siblings. Interestingly, in the case of Chile, the
response of females does not seem to dramatically change with the gender of the older
sibling (i.e. they respond in a similar way to what happens with older brothers and
sisters).
The results discussed in this section suggest that the effects are stronger when younger
and older siblings are of the same gender, especially in the case of males. In addi-
tion, our results show that the effects are bigger when siblings are similar in academic
potential.
3.5.4 Effects by Program and University Quality
This section studies how the effects documented in Section 3.5.2 change depend-
ing on the quality of the target university or target program of the older sibling. We
measure quality in terms of students’ academic potential, first year dropout rates, grad-
uates’ employability and graduates’ wages.24
Student quality is the only variable studied in this section that we are able to build for
both countries. We define the quality of the students in a program in a given year using
the average performance of admitted students on the university admission exams. The
rest of the variables are available only for Chile. We compute dropout rates for each
university and program using individual level data provided by the Ministry of Educa-
tion. This data allows us to compute dropout rates for all cohorts entering university
since 2006.25 Variables measuring labor market performance of former students are
available at program level and are computed by the Ministry of Education with the
support of the Chilean Tax Authority.26
24Employability is measured one year after graduation, whereas wages are measured four
years after graduation. We observe them only once for each program-university. This means
that in our analysis these variables do not change over time.
25The cohorts of older siblings applying to university in 2004 and 2005 are assigned the
dropout rates observed for their target programs and universities in 2006. Since some programs
disappear from one year to the next, this means that we are not able to complete information
for all programs offered in 2004 and 2005.
26 These figures are only available for programs that were being offered in 2018 and that had
more than 4 cohorts of graduates. In addition, the Tax Authority only reports employment
and earnings statistics for programs in which they observe at least 10 graduates.
CHAPTER 3. SIBLINGS’ EFFECTS 161
The main results of this section are summarized in Table 3.7. The estimates show that
the effects on the probabilities of applying and enrolling in the target university and
program of older siblings decrease with dropout rates (column 1), and increase with
employment rates (column 2) and earnings (column 3) of former graduates.
To put these differences in context, an increase of 1-σ (0.138) in the share of individuals
that dropout from a university after the first year (i.e. enroll in a different university
or do not enroll at all in the second year), reduces the effect on the probability of
applying to the target university of the older sibling by almost 30% and the effect on
the probability of enrolling in it by a little less than 40%. Although the coefficients
capturing these differences when focusing on the target program of older siblings are
not statistically significant, they are still relevant in size. An increase of 1-σ (0.173)
in the share of individuals that drop out from a program after the first year reduces
the effect on the probabilities of applying and enrolling in the older siblings’ target
program by 20% and 40% respectively. In the case of employment rates, an increase of
1-σ (0.094) translates into an increase of 0.24 and 0.28 percentage points on the effects
on application and enrollment in older sibling’s target university. The same figures
when focusing on older siblings’ target programs are 0.017 and 0.05 percentage points.
Finally, when looking at earnings, a similar picture emerges. Our results indicate that
an increase of 1-σ (0.384 MM CLP) in earnings translate into an increase of 5.26 and
3.57 percentage points on the effect of applying and enrolling in older siblings’ target
university and of 1.61 and 0.34 percentage points on the effect of applying and enrolling
in older siblings’ target program.
The results obtained when looking at heterogeneity by student quality are very similar.
As shown in Figure 3.5, younger siblings are more likely to apply to older siblings’ target
universities and programs when the admitted students perform better in the university
admission exam. The coefficients presented in this figure come from a specification like
3.1 estimated in three independent samples. The levels of selectivity correspond to the
bottom, middle and top third of programs according to the average score obtained by
their students in the admission exam.27
27Since our sample only includes programs with positive waiting lists, none of the estimates
really includes non-selective programs. This is particularly relevant in the case of Chile, where
the less selective institutions are not part of the sample at all.
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3.5.5 Effects on Human Capital
We end this section by looking at a different set of outcomes. Until this point
the analyses have focused on changes in the applications and enrollment of younger
siblings. Here, we study if having an older sibling marginally admitted into a specific
program affects students’ academic performance during high school or in the univer-
sity admission exam. Since not all students take the university admission exam, we
replace missing values by zero. This means that our estimates capture differences in
the actual performance in the exam, but also differences in the probability of taking
it. The bandwidths used in this section are the same used in section 3.5.2.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show that older siblings’ “marginal enrollment”in their target pro-
gram or university does not generate significant changes on younger siblings’ high school
performance, or in their performance in the university admission exam.
These results hold for both countries and in the university and in the program sample,
indicating that the differences documented in the previous sections in terms of applica-
tions and enrollment are not driven by an improvement in younger siblings’ academic
performance.
3.6 Discussion
The results presented in Section 3.5 show that the path followed by older siblings in
higher education affects the choice of university and program of their younger siblings.
These results are consistent with the findings of Dustan [2018] and Joensen and Nielsen
[2018], that show that similar spillovers exist in the choice of high school in Mexico
and in the decision to take advanced mathematics and science courses in secondary
education in Denmark. Our findings are also in line with Goodman et al. [2015], who
documents that the correlation between university choices of siblings is stronger than
the ones observed among similar classmates in the U.S., and with Barrios-Fernandez
[2018] who studies externalities in university enrollment in Chile. This last work finds
that especially in areas where university attendance is low, having an older neighbor or
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sibling going to university increases the enrollment probability of younger applicants.28
Although documenting the existence of sibling spillovers in university and program
choices in two settings as different as Chile and Croatia is interesting in itself, from
a policy perspective it is important to also investigate the mechanisms behind these
responses. In the rest of this section, we discuss five classes of mechanisms that could
be relevant in this context.
A first possibility to explain why individuals are more likely to apply and enroll in the
university and program in which their older siblings enroll, is that it may be convenient
to go to university together. Attending the same university may reduce commuting
and living costs for siblings and could make their overall university experience more
enjoyable.29 Figure 3.6 shows that the effect persists even among siblings whose age
difference implies that they would spend very little or no time at all together in uni-
versity. Along the same line, Figure 3.7 shows that the effects are significant, both
when older siblings continue living with their parents and when they move and live
by themselves. These results suggest that in our setting, convenience is not the only
driver of our results.30
A second possibility highlighted by previous research is competition and changes in
parental expectations. Indeed, Joensen and Nielsen [2018] argues that the fact that
their results are driven by siblings who are close in age and in academic performance
is evidence in favor of competition being the main driver of their results. As discussed
in the previous paragraph, in our case the results persist even among siblings whose
age difference is five years or more. In addition, Table 3.6 shows that although the ef-
fects between brothers seem to be stronger, effects between sisters and different-gender
siblings are also significant. If competition only arises between same-gender siblings
28Note that while Barrios-Fernandez [2018] focuses on the extensive margin (i.e. enroll or
not in university), here we analyze the specific choice of university and program. In Appendix
3.B we show that in the case of Chile, admission of older siblings to selective universities does
not generate a change in overall enrollment of younger siblings. This is not surprising, because
older siblings rejected from the programs we study, still have many other options available.
29They may enjoy each other’s company, and for younger siblings it may also be useful to
have someone close who understands how everything works.
30In some settings, the admission systems give some advantage to siblings of current or
former students. This however is not a concern in our case; Chile and Croatia use a centralized
admission system that select students based only on their academic performance in high school
and in a national level admission exam.
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or only between siblings close in age, then competition cannot be the only driver of
our results. Dustan [2018] on the other hand, claims that finding no heterogeneous
effects depending on the difference between selectivity in the target high school and in
the high school to which students would go in case of rejection, is evidence against a
parental expectations channel. The intuition behind this argument is that if counter-
factual high schools are similarly selective, then having a child admitted in one or the
other should affect parental expectations in a similar way. Thus, if as shown in table
3.10, the effects persist when there is no difference in selectivity between older siblings’
counterfactual universities or programs, we can rule out the effects being driven by a
change in parental expectations.31
A third alternative that we consider is path dependence or changes in the salience of
the alternative chosen by the older sibling. As shown in section 3.5.4, we find that the
effects are stronger when the quality of the university or program of the older sibling
is higher. This suggests that younger siblings do not follow their older siblings every-
where (i.e. they care about the quality of the program). This last result is consistent
with an information channel in which individuals learn about the quality of specific
programs or universities through their older siblings.
The results discussed in the previous paragraph are also consistent with an aspirations
channel. Seeing an older sibling going to a high-quality institution or program may
motivate younger siblings to work harder to achieve something similar. However, not
finding heterogeneous effects depending on the selectivity of the counterfactual pro-
grams of older siblings (Table 3.10) and as in Barrios-Fernandez [2018], finding no
effect on younger siblings’ academic performance, goes against this story. If students’
aspirations are affected, we would expect to see them exerting more effort preparing for
university, something that in our case is not reflected in their high school or university
31To study heterogeneous effects by differences in the selectivity of counterfactual universities
and programs, we first identified the counterfactual program of each older sibling. For admitted
students, this corresponds to the next preference in their application list to which they would
have been admitted. To rejected students, this corresponds to the program in which they
enrolled. In both countries, Chile and Croatia, selectivity of a program is measured by the
average performance of their students in the admission exam. The specifications presented in
Table 3.10 augment the baseline specification including an interaction between the treatment
and the difference in selectivity between the counterfactual programs, and by controlling by
this difference. In the case of Chile the standard deviation of the selectivity measure is close
to 100, in the case of Croatia it is equal to 0.129.
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admission exam performance.
Finally, older siblings may facilitate the access to relevant information for their younger
siblings. As discussed by Barrios-Fernandez [2018], older siblings can transmit differ-
ent types of information. They may provide information about the application pro-
cess, about costs and funding opportunities, about universities and programs quality
or about the experience of going to university.
Table 3.11 provides evidence consistent with the idea that individuals learn from their
older siblings’ experience if a specific program or university would be a good match
for them. Siblings are similar in many dimensions, and therefore if older siblings have
a bad experience in a specific program or university, their younger siblings may infer
that applying and enrolling in that program is not a good choice for them. In our data,
the best available proxy for older siblings’ experience at university is dropout. We use
this information to implement two types of analysis.
First, taking advantage of the fact that we observe retention for all the cohorts enrolling
in university since 2006, for each individual in our sample we predict program-specific
dropout risks. To predict these risks we use a cross-validation Logistic Lasso regression
that includes a rich vector of demographic, socioeconomic and academic character-
istics.32. Then, using this predicted risk we estimate the specifications presented in
columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.11.
Second, following Dustan [2018], we estimate similar specifications in which we include
an interaction between the treatment and a dummy variable that indicates if the older
sibling dropouts from the program or university in which she enrolls,33 and with a
variable that controls by the main effect of dropout (columns 2 and 5 of Table 3.11).34.
The results of this exercise should be interpreted with caution. Dropping out from a
program or university is not random, and although by adding the indicator of dropout
32The variables included in these regressions are the ones described in Table 3.1. For the
estimation of these models we use 5 folds and we choose the models that minimize the mean-
squared prediction error.
33Note that the program or university in which older siblings enroll are not necessarily the
ones to which they are applying to.
34In this case, we study dropout in the 4 years following enrollment. To be able to do this,
we restrict the sample to sibling pairs in which the older sibling applies to university before
2011.
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in the specification we capture some of the differences that may exist between indi-
viduals who remain and leave a program, there could still be differences that we are
not able to control for.35 In addition, the dropout variable can only be built for older
siblings who actually enroll in the system. Table 3.B5 in Appendix 3.B shows that
marginal admission does not translate into relevant increases in older siblings’ total
enrollment. However, this change affects the composition of the sample used for this
analysis. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.11 present the results of a similar specification
that incorporates additional terms and allows us to study if the timing of older siblings’
dropout affects the responses of their younger siblings.36
Although these two exercises are quite different, and having in mind the caveats dis-
cussed for the second exercise in the previous paragraph, we find pretty consistent
results. The predicted risk of dropout and actual dropout reduce the probability of
individuals applying and enrolling in the programs and universities attended by their
older siblings. As expected, if individuals apply to university after their older siblings
drop out, the likelihood of applying and enrolling in the same university and program
is lower than if they apply before the dropout occurs. However, even in this last case
there is a decrease in the estimated effects. This suggests that even before the dropout
takes place, younger siblings learn that the experience their older siblings are having
in a specific program or university has not been great.
Even though the evidence discussed in this section does not allow us to perfectly dis-
tinguish the mechanisms that drive our results, it suggests that information and in
particular information about the university experience of someone close, might play a
relevant role in the choice of university and program.
35In addition, note that with this specification we are studying if the effects found when
comparing admitted and rejected individuals who remain in the programs in which they enroll,
are bigger than the ones found when comparing admitted and rejected individuals who dropout
from the program in which they enroll. In general, admitted and rejected individuals enroll in
different programs.
36This specification also includes controls for the age difference between siblings.
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3.7 Conclusions
This paper studies how the probability of applying and enrolling in a specific univer-
sity or program is affected by the admission and enrollment outcomes of older siblings.
By investigating this, we contribute to understanding the role played by family net-
works on human capital investment decisions after high school.
We study this in Chile and Croatia, taking advantage that in both countries univer-
sities select their students using a centralized deferred acceptance admission system
that allocates students to programs only taking into account their declared preferences
and their performance in high school and in national level admission exams. These
admission systems create thousands of discontinuities that we exploit in a fuzzy RD
framework to study the causal effect of the university and program attended by older
siblings on individuals’ application and enrollment decisions. This variation allows us
to address the main identification challenges that arise in the context of peers’ effects
(i.e. correlated effects and the reflection problem).
Our findings show that despite the differences that exist between Chile and Croatia, in
the two countries siblings’ effects are statistically and economically significant. In both
settings, older siblings enrollment in a particular university increases the probability
that their younger siblings apply to it by around 10 percentage points. These figures
translate into an increase of 5 percentage points (50%) in the probability of enrolling
in the same university in Chile, and 10 percentage points (33%) in Croatia. We also
find that in both countries younger siblings are more likely to apply and enroll in the
program in which their older siblings enroll. In Chile, we document an increase of
around 2.5 percentage points (50%) in applications and 0.3 percentage points (33%)
in enrollment; the same figures for Croatia are 4.5 percentage points (35%) and 1.5
percentage points (75%).
These results are consistent with five classes of mechanisms. We discuss mechanisms
related to convenience, competition and parental expectations, aspirations, path depen-
dence and salience, and information. We provide suggestive evidence that information
about the quality of universities and about the quality of the student-program match
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is an important driver of our results.
Our findings have important policy implications. They suggest that especially in con-
texts of incomplete information, policies that change the composition of the admitted
students to a given university or program have an indirect effect on the siblings and
potentially on other members of the networks of the direct beneficiaries. They also
suggest that providing information about the experience that individuals would have
in specific universities or programs, could improve their application and enrollment
decisions.
Still further research is required to identify the type and accuracy of the informa-
tion transmitted by siblings, and to find effective ways of closing the information gaps
between applicants with different levels of exposure to university.
Acknowledgments
We thank Karun Adusumilli, Josh Angrist, Esteban Aucejo, Christopher Avery,
Michal Bauer, Randall K. Filer, Sebastian Gallegos, Alan B. Krueger, Jacob N. Shapiro,
Peter Blair, Taryn Dinkelman, Joshua Goodman, Jan Hanousek, Xavier Jaravel, Stepan
Jurajda, Vasily Korovkin, Camille Landais, Alexandre Mas, Alan Manning, Sandra
McNally, Guy Michaels, Daniel Munich, Andreas Menzel, Christian Ochsner, Steve
Pischke, Mariola Pytlikova´, Johannes Spinnewijn, Daniel Reck, Steven Rivkin, Jan
Za´pal and Kresimir Zigic for many useful comments. We are also grateful to partic-
ipants at LSE, Princeton University and CERGE-EI internal seminars, and at Umag
Conference 2017 “Economics in a Changing World”. Finally, we thank the Ministries
of Education of Chile and Croatia, the DEMRE, AZVO and ASHE for giving us access
to administrative data.
CHAPTER 3. SIBLINGS’ EFFECTS 169
Figure 3.1: Older Siblings’ Admission and Enrollment Probability in Target Pro-
gram at the Admission Cutoff (First Stage)
(a) Admission - Chile (b) Admission - Croatia
(c) Enrollment - Chile (d) Enrollment - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates older siblings’ admission and enrollment probabilities
around the admission cutoffs of their target programs in Chile and Croatia. Figures
(a) and (c) illustrate these probabilities for the case of Chile, while figures (b) and
(d) for Croatia. Red lines represent local linear polynomials and 95% confidence
intervals. In all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwidths used for the local
polynomials correspond to optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico
et al. [2014b] for the estimation of discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent
sample means of the dependent variable for bins of width 5.
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Figure 3.2: Density of Older Siblings’ Application Scores at the Target Program
Admission Cutoff
(a) Chile
(b) Croatia - First Set of Applications
Notes: This figure illustrates the density of older siblings’ application scores around
the cutoff. Figure (a) illustrates this density for Chile, while figure (b) for Croatia.
Red lines represent local quadratic polynomials and the shadows in the back 95%
confidence intervals. In all cases, triangular kernels are used. Bandwidths are
estimated according to Cattaneo et al. [2018b]. The p-values associated to the null
hypothesis of no jumps at the cutoff are 0.379 and 0.393 respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
University (Reduced Form - P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates the probability that younger siblings apply to and
enroll in the target university of their older siblings in Chile and Croatia. Figures
(a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of
Croatia. Red lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 1 and 95% confidence
intervals. In all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwiths used to build
these figures correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al.
[2014b]. Blue dots represent sample means of the dependent variable for bins of
width 5.
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Figure 3.4: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
Program (Reduced Form - P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates the probability that younger siblings apply to and
enroll in the target program of their older siblings in Chile and Croatia. Figures
(a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of
Croatia. Red lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 1 and 95% confidence
intervals. In all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwiths used to build
these figures correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al.
[2014b] for estimating the discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent sample
means of the dependent variable for bins of width 5
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Figure 3.5: Probability of Younger Siblings Applying to Older Siblings’ Target
Program or University depending Program Selectivity (P1)
(a) University - Chile (b) University - Croatia
(c) Program - Chile (d) Program - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how the selectivity of the programs in which older
siblings marginally enroll, affects younger siblings’ probability of applying to the
target university or program of older siblings. Figures (a) and (c) illustrate these
probabilities for the case of Chile, while figures (b) and (d) for Croatia. The
dots represent estimates from a parametric specification like the one discussed in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Controls and bandwiths are the same used in these tables.
Each coefficient comes from a different sample; the samples were created using the
average admission score as criteria. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Standard errors are clustered at family level.
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Figure 3.6: Probability of Younger Siblings Applying to and Enrolling in Older
Siblings’ Target University or Program by Age Difference (P1)
(a) Applies to target University (b) Enrolls in target University
(c) Applies to target Program (d) Enrolls in target Program
Notes: This figure illustrates the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in
their target university or program on the probability that younger siblings apply
to and enroll in the same target university or program by age difference in Chile.
Figures (a) and (b) focus on the university choice, while figures (c) and (d) on
the program choice. The dots represent estimates from a parametric specification
like the one discussed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Controls and bandwiths are the same
used in these tables. Each coefficient comes from a different sample; the samples
were created using age difference as criteria. The lines represent 95% confidence
intervals. Standard errors are clustered at family level.
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Figure 3.7: Probability of Younger Siblings Applying to and Enrolling in Older
Siblings’ Target University or Program by Older Siblings’ Place of Residence (P1)
(a) Applies to the same University (b) Enrolls in the same University
(c) Applies to the same Program (d) Enrolls in the same Program
Notes: This figure illustrates the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in
their target university or program on the probability that younger siblings apply
to and enroll in the same target university or program by older siblings’ place of
residence in Chile. Figures (a) and (b) focus on the university choice, while figures
(c) and (d) on the program choice. The dots represent estimates from a parametric
specification like the one discussed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Controls and bandwiths
are the same used in these tables. Each coefficient comes from a different sample;
the samples were created using older siblings’ place of residence as criteria. The
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at family
level.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Chile Croatia
Siblings Sample Whole Sample Siblings Sample Whole Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Demographic characteristics
Female 0.522 0.520 0.572 0.567
(0.499) (0.499) (0.494) (0.495)
Age when applying 18.787 19.829 18.878 19.158
(0.607) (2.484) (0.621) (0.963)
Family group 4.800 4.625 2.784 1.9251
(1.507) (1.607) (1.287) (1.198)
Siblings in HE 1.065 0.364 1.053 0.251
(0.695) (0.635) (0.233) (0.391)
Will live with parents 0.651 0.626
(0.477) (0.484)
Will live with relatives 0.109 0.127
(0.311) (0.333)
Will live independently 0.240 0.247
(0.427) (0.431)
B. Socioeconomic characteristics
High income (≥ CLP 850M) 0.279 0.128
(0.449) (0.334)
Mid income (CLP 270M - 850M) 0.400 0.325
(0.490) (0.469)
Low income (≤ CLP 270) 0.321 0.546
(0.467) (0.498)
Parental ed: ≤ high school 0.100 0.254
(0.300) (0.435)
Parental ed: high school 0.334 0.386
(0.472) (0.487)
Parental ed: vocational HE 0.146 0.115
(0.353) (0.319)
Parental ed: university 0.411 0.234
(0.492) (0.423)
Health insurance: private 0.354 0.211
(0.478) (0.408)
Health insurance: public 0.553 0.684
(0.497) (0.465)
Health insurance: other 0.093 0.105
(0.290) (0.307)
C. Academic characteristics
High school: private 0.198 0.104
(0.398) (0.306)
High school: voucher 0.508 0.485
(0.500) (0.500)
High school: public 0.287 0.401
(0.452) (0.490)
High school: gymnasium 0.846 0.673 0.439 0.4162
(0.361) (0.469) (0.496) (0.496)
High school: technical 0.154 0.327 0.561 0.5842
(0.361) (0.469) (0.496) (0.496)
Takes admission test 0.953 0.868 0.865 0.8352
(0.211) (0.338) (0.342) (0.372)
High school GPA score 556.773 519.997 268.373 265.298
(128.255) (139.417) (65.766) (66.600)
Admission test avg. score 523.252 443.032 312.800 286.247
(142.840) (187.849) (102.568) (112.787)
D. Institutional characteristics
Universities 33 33 49 49
Programs × year 10,994 12,137 2,631 5,146
Observations 187,677 2,823,897 12,947 199,475
Notes: The table present summary statistics for Chile and Croatia. Columns (1) and (3) describe the siblings
sample used in this paper, while columns (2) and (4) describe all the students registered to take the university
admission test in the same period of time covered by our sample.
1 In Croatia, Family group counts number of siblings within a family.
2 In Croatia, high school and state exam information is available from 2011 to 2015. This sample has 155,587
observations (corresponding siblings sample has 8,398 observations).
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Table 3.2: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Siblings’ Target
University
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Local Polynomial 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.057*** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009)
2SLS 0.072*** 0.081*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Reduced Form 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 73331 152301 73331 152301 73331 152301
Outcome mean 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.29 0.10 0.10
Optimal bandwidth 15.75 42.30 13.18 31.40 18.62 47.40
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 5441.60 5905.71 5441.60 5905.71 5441.60 5905.71
Panel B - Croatia
Local Polynomial 0.080*** 0.090** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.100***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024) (0.029)
2SLS 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.084*** 0.090***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.023)
Reduced Form 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Observations 12950 17312 12950 17312 12950 17312
Outcome mean 0.32 0.32 0.55 0.56 0.29 0.29
Optimal bandwidth 76.24 115.75 79.65 130.98 87.92 114.18
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 6459.56 4214.09 6459.56 4214.09 6459.56 4214.09
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents non-parametric, parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older
siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target university on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling
in the same university. The non-parametric specification controls for a linear and quadratic local polynomial of
older siblings’ application score centered around the target program admission cutoff and for older and younger
siblings application years fixed effects. A triangular kernel is used to give more weight to observations around the
cutoff. The parametric specification controls for a linear and quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application
score centered around the target program admission cutoff. The slope of the running variable is allowed to change
at the cutoff. In addition, the parametric specification controls for target program-year, older siblings application
year, and younger siblings application year fixed effects. Optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico
et al. [2014b] are used in non-parametric specifications. Parametric specifications use bandwiths of 15 and 35 for
linear and quadratic specifications in the case of Chile; the same figures for Croatia are 80 and 120. In parenthesis,
standard errors clustered at family level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.3: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
Program
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Local Polynomial 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
2SLS 0.008*** 0.007** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Reduced Form 0.004*** 0.003** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.001
0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 136364 214840 136364 214840 136364 2148409
Outcome mean 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Optimal bandwidth 28.08 38.51 19.11 35.56 32.10 42.68
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 13867.40 9520.72 13867.40 9520.72 13867.40 9520.72
Panel B - Croatia
Local Polynomial 0.014*** 0.013** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006)
2SLS 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005)
Reduced Form 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 34882 47366 34882 47366 34882 47366
Outcome mean 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.02
Optimal bandwidth 72.66 118.67 69.04 105.58 86.87 123.04
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 13693.44 10147.08 13693.44 10147.08 13693.44 10147.08
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents non-parametric, parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older
siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target program on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in
the same program. The non-parametric specification controls for a linear or quadratic local polynomial of older
siblings’ application score centered around the target program admission cutoff and for older and younger siblings
application years fixed effects. A triangular kernel is used to give more weight to observations around the cutoff. The
parametric specification controls for a linear or quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered
around the target program admission cutoff. The slope of the running variable is also allowed to change at the
cutoff. In addition, the parametric specification controls for target program-year, older siblings application year,
and younger siblings application year fixed effects. Optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico et al.
[2014b] are used in non-parametric specifications. Parametric specifications use bandwiths of 20 and 35 for linear
and quadratic specifications in the case of Chile; the same figures for Croatia are 80 and 120. In parenthesis,
standard errors clustered at family level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
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Table 3.4: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target Uni-
versity by Siblings’ Similarity
Applies Enrolls
Same Gender ∆ Age |∆ HS GPA| Same Gender ∆ Age |∆ HS GPA|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling enrolls 0.094*** 0.125*** 0.170*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.091***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Interaction 0.014 -0.006** -0.001*** 0.013* -0.002 -0.001***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.0001)
Observations 73331 73030 71865 73331 73030 71865
Bandwidth 15 15 15 15 15 15
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2719.59 2709.63 2664.69 2719.59 2709.63 2664.69
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.114*** 0.142** 0.195*** 0.065*** 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.052) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
Interaction -0.007 -0.011 -0.053 0.037* -0.011 -0.068
(0.020) (0.007) (0.055) (0.019) (0.007) (0.055)
Observations 12950 12950 2588 12950 12950 2588
Optimal bandwidth 80 80 80 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 3229.53 3225.45 648.63 3229.53 3225.45 648.63
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target
university on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same target university. These specifications
use the same set of controls and bandwiths used in the parametric specifications described in Table 3.2. Controls also
include the main effect of the variable studied in each column. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level.
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.5: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target Pro-
gram by Siblings’ Similarity
Applies Enrolls
Same Gender ∆ Age |∆ HS GPA| Same Gender ∆ Age |∆ HS GPA|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.056*** 0.001 0.002 0.012***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Interaction 0.010*** -0.001 -0.0003*** 0.005*** 0.0003 -0.0001***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.00002) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.00001)
Observations 136364 135777 133703 136364 135777 133703
Optimal bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 6933.23 6906.31 6789.42 6933.23 6906.31 6789.42
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.075*** 0.007 0.013** 0.053***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.025) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
Interaction 0.023** -0.003 -0.057** 0.013*** -0.0002 -0.048***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.025) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011)
Observations 36757 36757 8567 36757 36757 8567
Optimal bandwidth 80 80 80 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 7220.18 7249.86 1567.76 7220.18 7249.86 1567.76
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target
program on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same target program. These specifications
use the same set of controls and bandwiths used in the parametric specifications described in Table 3.3. Controls also

























Table 3.6: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target University and Program by Older Sibling’s Gender
University Sample Program Sample
Applies Enrolls Applies Enrolls
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.123*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.027* 0.042*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Older sibling’s enrollment x Female 0.001 0.032* -0.020* 0.015 -0.019*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.000
(0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 32302 39129 32302 39129 61982 73014 61982 73014
Bandwidth 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 1337.94 1278.86 1337.94 1278.86 3530.69 3310.96 3530.69 3310.96
Outcome mean 0.30 0.31 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.126*** 0.098*** 0.080** 0.044 0.069*** 0.031** 0.038*** 0.006
(0.037) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) (0.006)
Older sibling’s enrollment x Female -0.001 -0.027 -0.014 0.046* -0.044*** 0.007 -0.031*** 0.004
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005)
Observations 5008 7545 5008 7545 14203 22239 14203 22239
Bandwidth 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 1405.97 1651.53 1405.97 1651.53 4025.07 3662.68 4025.07 3662.68
Outcome mean 0.56 0.55 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.02
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target university
or program on the probability that their younger siblings apply to and enroll in the same target university or program. These
specifications use the same set of controls and bandwiths used in the parametric specifications described in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Controls also include a dummy variable indicating if younger sibling is female. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family
























Table 3.7: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Siblings’ Target University and Program by University and Program Quality
(Chile)
Applies Enrolls
1st Year Dropout Employment Earnings (CLP MM) 1st Year Dropout Employment Earnings (CLP MM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - University
Older sibling enrolls 0.138*** 0.069** -0.009 0.068*** 0.006 -0.031
(0.017) (0.029) (0.057) (0.011) (0.019) (0.038)
Interaction -0.288** 0.026* 0.137** -0.194** 0.030*** 0.093**
(0.085) (0.016) (0.064) (0.058) (0.011) (0.043)
Observations 68042 69927 70791 68042 69927 70791
Bandwidth 15 15 15 15 15 15
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2388.57 2183.69 2552.83 2388.57 2183.69 2552.83
Panel B - Program
Older sibling enrolls 0.030*** 0.004 -0.006 0.005* -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Interaction -0.035 0.019*** 0.042** -0.014 0.006** 0.009
(0.027) (0.005) (0.021) (0.013) (0.003) (0.010)
Observations 120987 129847 131534 120987 129847 131534
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 6016.47 5732.57 6535.15 6016.47 5732.57 6535.15
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target university or program on their
younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same target university or program. These specifications use the same set of controls and
bandwiths used in the parametric specifications described in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Controls also include the main effect of the variable studied in each
























Table 3.8: Effect of Older Siblings’ Admission to Target University on Younger Siblings’ Academic Performance - University Sample
Admission Exam Applies HS GPA Language Mathematics Social Sciences Natural Sciences Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.0001 0.0281* 2.6730 0.4852 4.3694 -2.7605 7.2810 0.0127
(0.0063) (0.0158) (4.0182) (4.2362) (4.4129) (8.9849) (8.7522) (0.0152)
Observations 73741 73741 73741 73741 73741 73741 73741 73741
Optimal bandwidth 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00 5446.00
Outcome mean 0.96 0.58 557.13 526.32 534.91 316.71 341.28 0.38
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment -0.0233 -0.1864 -5.2831 -2.3687**
(0.0311) (0.1291) (3.5691) (1.1262)
Observations 4170 4170 4170 4170
Optimal bandwidth 80 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2008.20 2008.20 2008.20 2008.20 2008.20
Outcome mean 0.82 3.22 87.68 22.74
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target university on the younger
siblings’ probability of taking the admission exam and applying to university (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 to 7 present the effects on high school
GPA and on the different sections of the admission exam. Finally, column 8 presents the effects on university enrollment. These specifications use
the same set of controls and bandwiths used in the parametric specifications described in Table 3.2. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at
























Table 3.9: Effect of Older Siblings’ Admission to Target Program on Younger Siblings’ Academic Performance - Program Sample
Admission Exam Applies HS GPA Language Mathematics Social Sciences Natural Sciences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.0024 0.0140 1.4624 3.2740 4.9477* 5.4777 0.1609
(0.0041) (0.0100) (2.5570) (2.7056) (2.8092) (5.6988) (5.5170)
Observations 136364 136364 136364 136364 136364 136364 136364
Optimal bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 13867.40 13867.40 13867.40 13867.40 13867.40 13867.40 13867.40
Outcome mean 0.96 0.58 556.91 524.23 533.33 314.52 344.03
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment -0.0128 -0.0681 -1.9475 -0.9588
(0.0174) (0.0719) (2.0214) (0.6419)
Observations 12443 12443 12443 12443
Optimal bandwidth 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 4498.48 4498.48 4498.48 4498.48
Outcome mean 0.83 3.22 89.12 23.45
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target program on the
younger siblings’ probability of taking the admission exam and applying to university (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 to 7 present the effects
on high school GPA and on the different sections of the admission exam. These specifications use the same set of controls and bandwiths
used in the parametric specifications described in Table 3.2. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level. *p-value<0.1
**p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.10: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target Pro-
gram and University by Difference in Counterfactual Programs’ Selectivity
Same University Same Program
Applies Enrolls Applies Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Chile
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.1081*** 0.0438*** 0.0283*** 0.0049*
(0.0169) (0.0112) (0.0055) (0.0026)
Interaction -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Observations 45082 45082 99652 99652
Optimal bandwidth 15 15 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 3153.69 3153.69 7674.01 7674.01
Panel B - Croatia
Older sibling’s enrollment 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.034*** 0.013***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.009) (0.004)
Interaction 0.052 0.052 -0.019 0.016
(0.075) (0.074) (0.035) (0.017)
Observations 10693 10693 34510 34510
Optimal bandwidth 80 80 80 80
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2607.33 2607.33 6854.73 6854.73
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older sib-
lings’ marginal enrollment in their target university and program on younger sib-
lings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same university and program.
The specifications include the same controls and use the same bandwidths described
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In addition, these specifications control by the difference in
the selectivity of older siblings’ target program and the chosen program in case
of rejection. The effect is allowed to change with this difference in selectivity. In
parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05
***p-value<0.01
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Table 3.11: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Siblings’ Target Uni-
versity and Program by Older Siblings’ Dropout and Dropout Risk
Applies Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Same University
Older sibling enrolls (OE) 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.064*** 0.074*** 0.045***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017)
OE × Older Sibling Drops-out (OD) -0.111* -0.069*** -0.047** -0.090** -0.044*** -0.038**
(0.064) (0.021) (0.0227) (0.044) (0.014) (0.016)
OE × OD × Applies after OD -0.044** -0.011
(0.017) (0.012)
Observations 70212 24753 24753 70212 24753 24753
Bandwidth 15 15 15 15 15 15
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2616.67 8968.55 1014.73 2616.67 8968.55 1014.73
Panel B - Same Program
Older sibling enrolls (OE) 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.007*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
OE × Older Sibling Drops-out (OD) 0.028 -0.015** -0.007 -0.006 -0.005* -0.003
(0.022) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004)
OE × OD × Applies after OD -0.015** -0.005
(0.006) (0.003)
Observations 130613 49823 49823 130613 49823 49823
Bandwidth 20 20 20 20 20 20
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 6645.64 19800.34 2851.33 6645.64 19800.34 2851.33
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment
in their target university and program on younger siblings’ probabilities of applying to and enrolling in the
same target program. The controls and bandwidths used in these specifications are the same described
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In addition, columns (1) and (4) control by older siblings’ predicted probability of
dropping out from their target program. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) control for a dummy variable that
indicates if the older sibling actually drops out from the program in which she enrolls. The samples used
in these last columns only include individuals whose older siblings enroll in a program. All specifications
allow for a differential effect depending on the dropping out probability or actual drop out. Columns (3)
and (6) also include an interaction to study how the timing of older siblings’ drop out affects younger
siblings’ application and enrollment decisions. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level.
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01
Appendices
3.A Identification Strategy: Further Discussion
This section discusses the assumptions under which our identification strategy pro-
vides us with a consistent estimator of the effects of interest. As discussed in Section
3.4.3, a fuzzy RD can be thought as an IV. In what follows, and for ease of nota-
tion, we drop time and individual indices t, i, τ and focus our analysis on a specific
university-program u. Following this notation, the treatment in which we are interested
is:
ATE = E[Yu|Ou = 1]− E[Yu|Ou = 0],
where Yu is the probability of younger sibling applying to program u, and Ou
takes value 1 if the older sibling enrolls in program u and 0 otherwise. In an RD
setting, in order to overcome omitted variable bias, we focus only on older siblings
who are in a bandwidth bw neighborhood of the university-program u cutoff. For this
purpose, denote with admu the dummy variable indicating whether older siblings with
an application score equal to au, were admitted to university-program u with cutoff cu,
and define the following operator:
Eˆ[Yu] = E[Yu| |au − cu| ≤ bw, admu ≡ 1au≥cu ].
In other words, Eˆ is an expectation that restricts the sample to older siblings who are
around the cutoff cu and whose risk of assignment is solely determined by the indicator
function 1au≥cu . Finally, to eliminate concerns related to selection into enrollment, we
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use admu as an instrument for Ou. Denote with Ijk a dummy variable that takes value
1 if the younger sibling enrolls in program j when his older sibling enrolls in k, and
let’s introduce the following notational simplification:
R(z) := R|Z=z,
where R ∈ [Yu, Ou, Ijk]. Introduce now the usual LATE assumptions discussed by
Imbens and Angrist [1994], adapted to our setting:
1. Independence of the instrument:
{Ou(1), Ou(0), Ijk(1), Ijk(0)} ⊥ admu, ∀j, k
2. Exclusion restriction:




(a) Admission weakly increases the likelihood of attending program u
Ou(1)−Ou(0) ≥ 0
(b) Admission weakly reduces the likelihood of attending non-offered program
j 6= u
Oj(1)−Oj(0) ≤ 0, ∀j 6= u
In addition to the usual monotonicity assumption that requires that admission
to program u cannot discourage students from enrolling in program u, we need
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to assume an analogous statement affecting other programs j 6= u. In particular,
we assume that receiving an offer for program u does not encourage enrollment
in other program j 6= u.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1− 4:
Eˆ[Yu|admu = 1]− Eˆ[Yu|admu = 0]
Eˆ[Ou|admu = 1]− Eˆ[Ou|admu = 0]
=∑
k 6=u Eˆ[Iuu − Iuk|Ou(1) = 1, Ok(0) = 1]× P (Ou(1) = 1, Ok(0) = 1)
P (Ou(1) = 1, Ou(0) = 0)
.
Proof. Start with simplifying the first term of the Wald estimator:
Eˆ[Yu|admu = 1] = Eˆ[Yu(1)× admu + Yu(0)× (1− admu)|admu = 1] by assumption 2
= Eˆ[Yu(1)] by assumption 1.
Applying analogous transformation to all four Wald estimator terms, we obtain:
Eˆ[Yu|admu = 1]− Eˆ[Yu|admu = 0]





The numerator of equation 3.2, after applying law of iterated expectations, becomes:
Eˆ[Yu(1)− Yu(0)] = (3.3)
∑
k 6=u




Eˆ[Iuu − Iuk|Ou(1) = 0, Ou(0) = 1, Ok(1) = 1]




Eˆ[Iuk − Iuj |Ok(1) = 1, Oj(0) = 1]× P (Ok(1) = 1, Oj(0) = 1).
Assumption 4.1. implies that there are no defiers, cancelling the second term in
the above equation. In addition, assumption 4.2. implies that instrument does not
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encourage enrollment into program j 6= u, cancelling the third term.
Similarly, by the virtue of the assumption 4.1., the denominator of equation 3.2
becomes:
Eˆ[Ou(1)−Ou(0)] = P (Ou(1) = 1, Ou(0) = 0). (3.4)
Taken together, 3.3 and 3.4 imply:
Eˆ[Yu|admu = 1]− Eˆ[Yu|admu = 0]
Eˆ[Ou|Zu = 1]− Eˆ[Ou|admu = 0]
=∑
k 6=u Eˆ[Iuu − Iuk|Ou(1) = 1, Ok(0) = 1]× P (Ou(1) = 1, Ok(0) = 1)
P (Ou(1) = 1, Ou(0) = 0)
.
As asymptotic 2SLS estimator converges to Wald ratio, we interpret the β2SLS as
the local average treatment effect identified through compliers (students enrolled to
cutoff program when offered admission).
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3.B Robustness Checks
This section investigates if the identification assumptions of our empirical strategy
are satisfied. In Section 3.4 we already show that there is no evidence of manipulation
of the running variable. Thus, in what follows we check if other variables that could
affect individuals’ application and enrollment decisions present jumps at the cutoff
and if the results are robust to different bandwidths. We continue by performing two
types of placebo exercises. In the first we study if similar effects arise when looking at
placebo cutoffs (i.e. cutoffs that do not affect older siblings’ admission). In the second
we analyze if similar effects arise when looking at the effect of the younger sibling
enrollment on older siblings decisions.
3.B.1 Discontinuities in Potential Confounders
A first concern in the context of an RD is the existence of other discontinuities
around the cutoff that could explain the differences we observe in our outcomes of
interest.
Taking advantage of a rich vector of demographic, socioeconomic and academic vari-
ables, we study if there is evidence of discontinuities in any of them around the thresh-
old.
Figure 3.B1 summarizes this result. It plots the estimated discontinuities at the cutoff
and their 95% confidence intervals. To estimate these discontinuities we controll for a
linear polynomial of the running variable which slope is allowed to change at the cutoff.
Using the same bandwidths reported for linear specifications in section 3.5 we find no
statistically significan jump at the cutoff.
3.B.2 Different Bandwidths
In this section, we study how sensible are our main results to the bandwidth used.
Optimal bandwidths try to balance the loss of precision suffered when narrowing the
window of data points used to estimate the effect of interest, with the bias generated
by using points that are too far from the relevant cutoff.
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Figures 3.B2 and 3.B3 show how the estimated coefficients change when reducing the
bandwidth used in the estimations. Although as expected the standard errors increase
while we reduced the sameple, the coefficients that we obtain are very stabel.
3.B.3 Placebo Exercises
This setting allows us to perform two types of placebo exercises. First, in Figures
3.B4 and 3.B5 we show that only at the real cutoff we observe a discontinuity on younger
siblings outcomes This is not surprising since these fake cutoffs do not generate any
increase in older siblings’ admission. In addition, in Figures 3.B6 and 3.B7 we study
if younger siblings’ enrollment affect the application decisions of their older siblings.
Since younger siblings apply to university after their older siblings, being marginally
admitted or rejected from a program or university should not affect what happens with
older siblings. These figures show that this is indeed the case.
3.B.4 Alternative Specifications and Total Enrollment
Figures 3.B8 and 3.B9 and in Tables 3.B1, 3.B3, 3.B2 and 3.B4 we study how ro-
bust are our estimates to the degree of the local polynomial used, to allow the running
variable to have different slopes for each cutoff-program and to re-weighting the obser-
vations by the inverse of the total number of applicants in the proximity of each cutoff.
The results are quite robust to these changes, and although when reweighing the ob-
servations the coefficients are slightly smaller, the general picture remains unchanged.
Finally, Table 3.B5 investigates if marginal admission of older siblings translates into an
increase in total enrollment (i.e. enrollment in any university of the system) for them
or for their younger siblings. We did not find evidence of extensive margin responses
in neither of the countries we study. Thus, according to these results our findings are
not driven by this a general increase on younger siblings enrollment. In the case of
older siblings, while in Chile we observe a relatively small increase in total enrollment,
in Croatia we find a bigger change. This is not surprising because the group of univer-
sities studied in Chile is more selective than the ones we study in Croatia. This means
that in the case of Chile, older siblings’ have still many available universities in case of
rejection.
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Figure 3.B1: Discontinuities in other Covariates at the Cutoff
(a) Chile
(b) Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates the estimated jumps at the cutoff for a vector of
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. These estimates come from para-
metric specifications that control for a linear polynomial of the running variable.
As the main specifications, these also include program-year fixed effects. Figure
(a) illustrates this for Chile, while figure (b) for Croatia. The points represent the
estimated coefficient, while the lines 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.B2: Application and Enrollment Probabilities of Younger Siblings De-
pending on their Older Siblings’ University - Different Bandwidths (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how being admitted to a specific program changes the
probability that younger siblings apply to and enroll in the same university in Chile
and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b),
(d) and (f) the case of Croatia. The coefficients and their confidence intervals come
from parametric specifications that control for a linear polynomial of the running
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. The bandwiths used to
build these figures correspond to multiples of the optimal bandwidths computed
following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Figure 3.B3: Application and Enrollment Probabilities of Younger Siblings De-
pending on their Older Siblings’ Program - Different Bandwidths (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how being admitted in a specific program changes the
probability that younger siblings apply to and enroll in the same program in Chile
and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b),
(d) and (f) the case of Croatia. The coefficients and their confidence intervals come
from parametric specifications that control for a linear polynomial of the running
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. The bandwiths used to
build these figures correspond to multiples of the optimal bandwidths computed
following Calonico et al. [2014b].
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Figure 3.B4: Placebo - Application and Enrollment Probabilities of Younger
Siblings Depending on their Older Siblings’ University (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how being admitted in a specific program changes
the probability that younger siblings apply to and enroll in the same university in
Chile and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures
(b), (d) and (f) the case of Croatia. The coefficients and their confidence intervals
come from parametric specifications that control for a linear polynomial of the
running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. The bandwiths
used to build these figures were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Fake
cutoffs are used to illustrate that the discontinuity only arises when using the real
cutoff.
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Figure 3.B5: Placebo Cutoffs - Application and Enrollment Probabilities of
Younger Siblings depending on their Older Siblings’ Program (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how being admitted in a specific program changes
the probability that younger siblings apply to and enroll in the same program in
Chile and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures
(b), (d) and (f) the case of Croatia. The coefficients and their confidence intervals
come from parametric specifications that control for a linear polynomial of the
running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. The bandwiths
used to build these figures were computed following Calonico et al. [2014b]. Fake
cutoffs are used to illustrate that the discontinuity only arises when using the real
cutoff.
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Figure 3.B6: Placebo - Application and Enrollment Probabilities of Older Siblings
depending on their Younger Sibling’s University (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how younger siblings affect the university to which
older siblings apply to and enroll in in Chile and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e)
illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of Croatia. Red
lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 1 and 95% confidence intervals. In
all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwidths used to build these figures
correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al. [2014b] for
estimating the discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent sample means of
the dependent variable for bins of width 5.
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Figure 3.B7: Placebo - Application and Enrollment Probabilities of Older Siblings
Depending on their Younger Siblings’ Program (P1)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates how younger siblings affect the program to which
older siblings apply to and enroll in in Chile and Croatia. Figures (a), (c) and (e)
illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of Croatia. Red
lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 1 and 95% confidence intervals. In
all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwiths used to build these figures
correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al. [2014b] for
estimating the discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent sample means of
the dependent variable for bins of width 5.
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Figure 3.B8: Probability of Applying and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
University (Reduced Form - P2)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates the probability that younger siblings apply to and
enroll in the target university of their older siblings in Chile and Croatia. Figures
(a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of
Croatia. Red lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 2 and 95% confidence
intervals. In all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwiths used to build
these figures correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al.
[2014b] for estimating the discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent sample
means of the dependent variable for bins of width 5.
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Figure 3.B9: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
Program (Reduced Form - P2)
(a) Applies (1st Preference) - Chile (b) Applies (1st Preference) - Croatia
(c) Applies - Chile (d) Applies - Croatia
(e) Enrolls - Chile (f) Enrolls - Croatia
Notes: This figure illustrates the probability that younger siblings apply to and
enroll in the target program of their older siblings in Chile and Croatia. Figures
(a), (c) and (e) illustrate the case of Chile, while figures (b), (d) and (f) the case of
Croatia. Red lines correspond to local polynomials of degree 2 and 95% confidence
intervals. In all cases triangular kernels are used. The bandwiths used to build
these figures correspond to optimal bandwidths computed following Calonico et al.
[2014b] for estimating the discontinuities at the cutoff. Blue dots represent sample
means of the dependent variable for bins of width 5
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Table 3.B1: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
University (Cutoff-specific Slopes for Running Variable)
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Local Polynomial 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.057*** 0.054***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009)
2SLS 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.106*** 0.092*** 0.048*** 0.041***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011)
Reduced Form 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 71447 152301 71447 152301 71447 152301
Outcome mean 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.29 0.10 0.10
Optimal bandwidth 15.75 42.30 13.08 31.40 18.62 47.43
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 3858.03 4390.98 3858.03 4390.99 3858.03 4390.99
Panel B - Croatia
Local Polynomial 0.080*** 0.090** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.100***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.024) (0.029)
2SLS 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.085*** 0.096***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036)
Reduced Form 0.068*** 0.067** 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.072*** 0.080***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030)
Observations 12526 17312 12526 17312 12526 17312
Outcome mean 0.32 0.32 0.55 0.56 0.29 0.29
Optimal bandwidth 76.24 115.75 79.65 130.98 87.92 114.18
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 4019.77 1945.21 4019.77 1945.21 4019.77 1945.21
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents non-parametric, parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older
siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target university on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling
in the same university. The non-parametric specification controls for a linear or quadratic local polynomial of
older siblings’ application score centered around the target program admission cutoff and for older and younger
siblings application years fixed effects. A triangular kernel is used to give more weight to observations around the
cutoff. The parametric specification controls for a linear or quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application score
centered around the target program admission cutoff. This polynomial is allowed to have different slopes for each
target program; the slope of the running variable is also allowed to change at the cutoff. In addition, the parametric
specification controls for target program-year, older siblings application year, and younger siblings application
year fixed effects. Optimal bandwidths computed according to Calonico et al. [2014b] are used in non-parametric
specifications. Parametric specifications use bandwiths of 15 and 35 for linear and quadratic specifications in the
case of Chile; the same figures for Croatia are 80 and 120. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level.
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.B2: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
Program (Cutoff-specific slopes for running Variable)
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
Local Polynomial 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
2SLS 0.010*** 0.009** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Reduced Form 0.005*** 0.004** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 135229 214840 135229 214840 135229 214840
Outcome mean 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Optimal bandwidth 28.08 38.51 19.11 35.56 32.10 42.68
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 11573.41 7965.26 11573.41 7965.26 11573.41 7965.26
Panel B - Croatia
Local Polynomial 0.014*** 0.011* 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006)
2SLS 0.016*** 0.016** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.014*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006)
Reduced Form 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 36529 48611 36529 48611 36529 48611
Outcome mean 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.02
Optimal bandwidth 72.66 118.67 69.04 105.58 86.87 123.04
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 12089.16 7917.66 12089.16 7917.66 12089.16 7917.66
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents non-parametric, parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older
siblings’ marginal enrollment in a target program on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the
same program. The non-parametric specification controls for a linear or quadratic local polynomial of older siblings’
application score centered around the target program admission cutoff and for older and younger siblings application
years fixed effects. A triangular kernel is used to give more weight to observations around the cutoff. The parametric
specification controls for a linear or quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered around the
target program admission cutoff. This polynomial is allowed to have different slopes for each target program; the
slope of the running variable is also allowed to change at the cutoff. In addition, the parametric specification controls
for target program-year, older siblings application year, and younger siblings application year fixed effects. Optimal
bandwidths computed according to Calonico et al. [2014b] are used in non-parametric specifications. Parametric
specifications use bandwiths of 20 and 35 for linear and quadratic specifications in the case of Chile; the same figures
for Croatia are 80 and 120. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05
***p-value<0.01
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Table 3.B3: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Siblings’ Target
University (Re-weighted)
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
2SLS 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.032** 0.044***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015)
Reduced Form 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.013** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 73331 152301 73331 152301 73331 152301
Outcome mean 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.10 0.10
Optimal bandwidth 15 35 15 35 15 35
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 2576.80 2319.29 2576.80 2319.29 2576.80 2319.29
Panel B - Croatia
2SLS 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.113***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030)
Reduced Form 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.093***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025)
Observations 12950 17312 12950 17312 12950 17312
Outcome mean 0.32 0.32 0.55 0.56 0.29 0.29
Optimal bandwidth 80 120 80 120 80 120
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 3981.46 2474.69 3981.46 2474.69 3981.46 2474.69
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in a
target university on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same university. The parametric specification
controls for a linear and quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered around the target program admission
cutoff. The slope of the running variable is allowed to change at the cutoff. In addition, specifications include controls for target
program-year, older siblings application year, and younger siblings application year fixed effects. These specifications re-weight
observations in order to give equal importance to all the programs in the sample. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family
level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.B4: Probability of Applying to and Enrolling in Older Sibling’s Target
Program (Re-weighted)
Applies in 1st Preference Applies in any Preference Enrolls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A - Chile
2SLS 0.003 0.003 0.024*** 0.016* 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Reduced Form 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 0.007* 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 135229 214840 135229 214840 135229 214840
Outcome mean 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
Optimal bandwidth 20 35 20 35 20 35
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 5791.85 3479.05 5791.85 3479.05 5791.85 3479.05
Panel B - Croatia
2SLS 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.021* 0.012*** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Reduced Form 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.017* 0.010*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 36529 48611 36529 48611 36529 48611
Outcome mean 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.02
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F Statistic 8076.13 5369.30 8076.13 5369.30 8076.13 5369.30
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents parametric (2SLS) and reduced form estimates for the effect of older siblings’ marginal enrollment in
a target program on younger siblings’ probability of applying to and enrolling in the same program. The specifications controls
for a linear or quadratic polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered around the target program admission cutoff. The
slope of the running variable is also allowed to change at the cutoff. In addition, specifications controls for target program-year,
older siblings application year, and younger siblings application year fixed effects. These specifications re-weight observations
in order to give equal importance to all the programs in the sample. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family level.
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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Table 3.B5: Probability of Enrolling in University Depending on Older Siblings’
Admission to Target Program
Younger Sibling Older Sibling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A - Chile
Local Polynomial 0.002 0.002 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Reduced Form -0.002 -0.004 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 101955 206940 101955 206940
Outcome mean 0.53 0.53 0.93 0.92
Bandwidth 15 35 15 35
Panel B - Croatia
Local Polynomial 0.001 0.000 0.141*** 0.142***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Reduced Form -0.003 0.000 0.123*** 0.131***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 36757 48611 36757 48611
Outcome mean 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.85
Bandwidth 80 120 80 120
Cutoff-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Running Variable Polynomial 1 2 1 2
Notes: The table presents non-parametric and parametric estimates for
the effect of older siblings’ marginal admission in a target program on
younger and older siblings’ probability of enrolling in any university of
the system. The non-parametric specification controls for a linear or
quadratic local polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered
around the target program admission cutoff. While older siblings’ appli-
cation year fixed effects are used in all specifications, younger siblings’
application year fixed effects are only used in columns (1) and (2). A
triangular kernel is used to give more weight to observations around the
cutoff. The parametric specification controls for a linear and quadratic
polynomial of older siblings’ application score centered around the target
program admission cutoff. The slope of the running variable is allowed
to change at the cutoff. In addition, the parametric specification con-
trols for target program-year, older siblings’ application year, and in the
specifications of columns (1) and (2) by younger siblings’ application
year fixed effects. In the case of Chile, we observe enrollment for all
the universities of the system from 2007 onwards. Thus, the sample is
adjuster accordingly. In parenthesis, standard errors clustered at family
level. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01.
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